Microsoft Cerebrates Fifteen Years of Poor Security

From: leslie (LESLIE_at_JRLVAX.HOUSTON.RR.COM)
Date: 08/24/03

  • Next message: phn_at_icke-reklam.ipsec.nu: "Re: Virus and spam blocking technique"
    Date: Sun, 24 Aug 2003 08:10:11 GMT
    
    

    Microsoft's (lack of) security has cost its users billions of dollars,
    and given it's track record to-date, it doesn't plan to change...

       http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=11108
       Microsoft cerebrates fifteen years of poor security

      "Microsoft cerebrates fifteen years of poor security
       Augmented by the Infernet

       By EURuromole: Tuesday 19 August 2003, 11:53

       THAT THE Blaster worm should spread as rapidly as it did was testament
       to one thing only, the poor security in Microsoft's software.

       In the first few months of last year Microsoft spent about eight weeks
       in what was reportedly an intense effort to improve the security of
       their software. And what a joke that turned out to be, because within
       a just few months we were seeing security alerts about Microsoft
       products that had supposedly been thoroughly checked and corrected.

       These statements of 2002 were not the first time that Microsoft has
       declared the problem solved and buffer overflow banished. Back in
       September 2001 Jim Allchin, a Microsoft vice president, declared that
       this problem had been stamped out in Windows XP. Supposedly Microsoft
       had made a complete code review of its operating system and removed
       all the buffers which could overflow.

       Microsoft has had more than 15 years to get it right and it still
       cannot create a secure operating system. In fact in 2002 Windows had
       the dubious honour of accounting for 87% of all virus infections
       reported to the Australian office of the Sophos anti-virus group. This
       came on top of about 130 vulnerabilities that were reported for
       Windows during the year 2000, which is an average rate of more than
       one every three days.

       Given this kind of track record from Microsoft I am quite surprised
       that in jurisdictions with strong consumer laws there has never been a
       class action against Microsoft for selling poor quality software.
       Other operating systems have achieved far better security and have
       done so since their very early releases, so why is Microsoft unable
       to?

       As for secure operating systems, ask IBM users about the security of
       their operating systems prior to AIX which itself introduced the usual
       Unix problems. Or ask OpenVMS users about its security. Its bug list
       is still in the low double digits after about 30 major and minor
       versions in its 25 years, which is a sharp contrast to Microsoft's 130
       problems in year 2000 alone!

       OpenVMS is even more relevant to Microsoft because about 1989 it
       acquired about 20 software engineers from Digital's cancelled Prism
       project which was developing an operating system called Mica. These
       engineers were the designers for Microsoft's NT and borrowed a large
       number of concepts from OpenVMS, but unfortunately the security
       concepts were not included. Was it a matter of meeting release
       deadlines, potential breakage of other code or keeping third party
       software houses happy? We will probably never know.

       Microsoft relies on the users to apply the stream of patches for
       Windows but many users are unaware of the patches or where to find
       them, and they are often reluctant to download large patches which can
       take hours over a dialup line. The frequency can be overwhelming and
       some users just ignore any problems that do not directly affect them.
       Microsoft's attitude seems to be so what if the virus mail bombs other
       users, so long as no damage happens to my system.

       And wrapped around all this is the quite reasonable argument that if
       Microsoft cannot produce secure product releases then its ability to
       produce secure patches just as suspect.

       In recent years Microsoft has had the gall to receive an award for its
       security from the Department of Defense (perhaps the first award for
       "lowering the bar" in many years) and another reward for the manner in
       which it created tools to allow users the ability to automatically
       patch their software versions. It is simply beyond a joke.

       In my opinion, the fundamental problem is that the basic architecture
       of Windows has two fatal flaws in its memory management and while
       these remain in the software the ad hoc patches will never be enough
       to make Windows a secure operating system.

       [snip]

       Some Solutions

       The solution that Microsoft has been trying to apply involves the use
       of software packages to identify vulnerabilities. It also appear to be
       experimenting with different languages, perhaps in the hope of finding
       one which offers its programmers a better chance of fixing the problem
       or avoiding it altogether. Both seem to be rather a waste of time and
       effort when all it really requires is to use correct concepts in the
       operating system and compilers.

       On the matter of memory regions and their protection it is absolutely
       clear that this technique needs to be applied and done so in a very
       strict fashion with none of the stupidity of EXECUTE_READWRITE. I can
       do no better than suggest that Windows and Unix take a good look at
       how OpenVMS handles these matters because it has the most effective
       system that I am aware of.

       The method used by OpenVMS is one of separating the virtual memory
       into regions, each with their own protection. At execution time the
       various program sections (PSECTs) are loaded into one of these regions
       into orderly and defined areas, applying the protections specified for
       each PSECT as it does so. Thus data is separated from executable code.

       It is similar to the protection offered by Windows XP, which is not
       surprising since NT arrived on the scene but the important difference
       is that PSECT protections are set by default and the programmer must
       explicitly modify them for special circumstances.

       Now this introduction of proper memory access controls is all that is
       required to prevent the introduction and execution of malicious code
       but it does not solve the problem of an overflowed buffer corrupting
       the call stack.

       A reliable solution to this second problem can probably only come
       about by altering the manner in which the stack is used.

       One possible option is to change the order in which the data items are
       written to the stack so that the return address pointer and the
       pointer to the previous call frame are written before the parameters.
       This means that any buffer overflow on the function arguments would
       not corrupt these data items but may simply attempt to write beyond
       the end of the stack.

       Another option is to write the parameters to the heap, not the stack
       and on the stack simply write their data length and their address on
       the heap. This would enable them to be used and if they were returned
       to the calling routine, it would be a simple matter to copy the
       specified number of bytes from the specified heap address into a known
       location for the calling routine. Buffer overflow on the heap would
       still quite possible but these would be impossible to eradicate
       without fundamental changes to several programming languages.

       Both options would require changes to compilers so that the stack was
       used in a way that made it immune to the vexatious problem of buffer
       overflow corrupting the stack. One would imagine though that these
       changes and the very small amount of additional processing would be a
       small price to pay in order to avoid these problems. µ"

    Communist China is abandoning Microsoft in its government computers...

       http://asia.cnet.com/newstech/applications/0,39001094,39146335,00.htm
       China blocks foreign software use in gov't

      "China blocks foreign software use in gov't
       By Staff, CNETAsia
       Saturday, August 16 2003 10:49 AM

       A new policy by China's governing body the State Council will rule
       that all ministries have to buy only locally-produced software at the
       next upgrade cycle.

       The move, aimed at breaking the dominance of U.S.-based Microsoft on
       desktop computers, will eliminate Microsoft's Windows operating system
       and Office productivity suite from hundreds of thousands of Chinese
       government computers in a few years' time..."

    --Jerry Leslie (my opinions are strictly my own)
      Note: leslie@jrlvax.houston.rr.com is invalid for email


  • Next message: phn_at_icke-reklam.ipsec.nu: "Re: Virus and spam blocking technique"

    Relevant Pages

    • SecurityFocus Microsoft Newsletter #176
      ... MICROSOFT VULNERABILITY SUMMARY ... Microsoft Windows XP HCP URI Handler Arbitrary Command Execu... ... PHPNuke Category Parameter SQL Injection Vulnerability ... Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer Vulnerability Identific... ...
      (Focus-Microsoft)
    • SecurityFocus Microsoft Newsletter #242
      ... MICROSOFT VULNERABILITY SUMMARY ... PostNuke Blocks Module Directory Traversal Vulnerability ... Groove Networks Groove Virtual Office COM Object Security By... ... The Microsoft Windows IPV6 TCP/IP stack is prone to a "loopback" condition initiated by sending a TCP packet with the "SYN" flag set and the source address and port spoofed to equal the destination source and port. ...
      (Focus-Microsoft)
    • [NT] Vulnerability in HTML Help Allows Code Execution (MS05-001)
      ... The following security advisory is sent to the securiteam mailing list, and can be found at the SecuriTeam web site: http://www.securiteam.com ... Get your security news from a reliable source. ... * Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 1 and Microsoft Windows XP Service ...
      (Securiteam)
    • Re: I want to migrate to Linux
      ... Microsoft considers the x86 platform to still be what it was when it was ... Dirty Operating System"; not to be confused with the Q-DOS ... 1.x versions had a GUI called Presentation Manager, from which the Windows ... Thompson has stated that GNU/Linux and cousins are all de facto UNIX ...
      (comp.os.linux.hardware)
    • Re: lets vote for better security
      ... WINDOWS SOFTWARE. ... > Once the operating system is developed, it's pretty hard to add more ... that put out more and better free tech support ... > enough initiative to go look at Microsoft. ...
      (microsoft.public.security)