Re: easiest and best email encryption plug-in

From: John Elsbury (johne@sovereign.co.nz)
Date: 03/12/02


From: johne@sovereign.co.nz (John Elsbury)
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2002 02:00:27 GMT

On 11 Mar 2002 16:06:51 GMT, phn@icke-reklam.ipsec.nu wrote:

<snip>
>
>Well, if the virus-scan can decrypt the mail, i would not call them
>secure. ( any breakin into one machine will jeopardize everyones security)

It doesn't have to. It works like this:

The E-mail content management software's job is to accurately parse
e-mail content and attachments and verify compliance with specified
policies: for example, blocking viruses, blocking scripts,
quarantining specified image types, blocking e-mail containing
specified expressions, and so on. Typically it will also include an
SMTP relay function.

For this to be effective, the software has to be able to see the
e-mail message header, body, and attachments. If a body or
attachment is encrypted then this cannot be done.

The solution is to move key management to the content management
software. In the case of a scheme using secure mime, the external
party acquires a certificate and sends it to the relay administrator.
The relay end - typically a corporate - sends a certificate (possibly,
but not necessarily, self-signed) to the external party. Rules are
set up to specify encryption and/or digital signing of outgoing mail
to that external party. From then on, the relay component decrypts
(etc) incoming mail then passes it to the content management engine.
Outgoing mail is likewise checked by the content management engine (if
required by policy) then signed and encrypted.

This is referred to as "proxy encryption". It has the big advantage
that (at least internally) the key management process is hidden from
the user: while it also permits the elimination of risky items,
typically attachments, before they pass into the organisation.

Typically it doesn't matter that the process is not true "end-to-end"
encryption, as the last leg in the journey is within the corporate
security domain.



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