Re: TCP/IP offload: security implications
From: William P.N. Smith (wpns@compusmiths.com)Date: 02/27/02
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From: William P.N. Smith <wpns@compusmiths.com> Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 16:34:33 -0500
nospam@masoner.net (Richard Masoner) wrote:
>Adaptec and Intel have announced gigabit ethernet cards with full
>TCP/IP protocol offload in hadware. I think offloading TCP/IP from the
>CPU to other hardware makes sense when high wire speeds are involved.
>Not infrequently, however, TCP/IP implementations are found to be
>vulnerable to attack by malformed packets.
While DOS is still a concern, I'd think you'd be even more secure from
buffer overrun attacks that generally allow the attacker to run the
code of his choice on your machine. [Not that the code couldn't be
written to drop executables in the right place in the host's memory
using bus master or DMA, but that's certainly a much harder and less
likely attack than taking advantage of the usual wellknown MicroSoft
vulnerabilities]
-- William Smith wpns@compusmiths.com N1JBJ@amsat.org ComputerSmiths Consulting, Inc. www.compusmiths.com
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