Re: TCP/IP offload: security implications
From: Barry Margolin (barmar@genuity.net)Date: 02/27/02
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From: Barry Margolin <barmar@genuity.net> Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2002 16:15:16 GMT
In article <2c505724.0202270757.d8c346d@posting.google.com>,
Richard Masoner <nospam@masoner.net> wrote:
>In a software-only network stack, you just patch the software if a
>vulnerability is found. But what do you do if the hardwired protocol
>implementation is found to be vulnerable? Can the logic be
>re-programmed in the field? Or are you stuck until new hardware is
>created?
You'd have to ask the vendors to be sure, but I suspect it's actually in
firmware, not hardware, so patches can be downloaded to the cards.
-- Barry Margolin, barmar@genuity.net Genuity, Woburn, MA *** DON'T SEND TECHNICAL QUESTIONS DIRECTLY TO ME, post them to newsgroups. Please DON'T copy followups to me -- I'll assume it wasn't posted to the group.
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