Re: Information on generating unique IDs

From: Alun Jones (alun@texis.com)
Date: 01/29/02 

From: alun@texis.com (Alun Jones)
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 13:59:07 GMT

In article <a35m8n$o6r$1@canopus.cc.umanitoba.ca>, roberson@ibd.nrc.ca (Walter
Roberson) wrote:
>In article <b1eed05d.0201282313.40faa939@posting.google.com>,
>Laith <lkhateeb@hotmail.com> wrote:
>:Does anyone have any information on how unique IDs are generated for
>:the prepaid cards like phone cards?
>
>:What I mean is what are the algorithms that help in generating those
>:unique IDs such that if one card has the ID 12345 then 12346 would not
>:be a valid one.
>
>Security by obscurity. ;-)

Not necessarily. It may be that what the OP was asking for is a scheme that
would limit the likelihood of a mistype. Credit cards include checksum digits
for just such a purpose. It has the side-effect of meaning that most of the
time, a kiddywink can't just make up a random number and submit it as payment,
but its primary purpose is not likely to have been for security.

Alun.
~~~~

[Note that answers to questions in newsgroups are not generally
invitations to contact me personally for help in the future.] 

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