Re: Lets talk about firewalls - what do we as a group think a firewall should be/have?



On Tue, 22 Aug 2006in the Usenet newsgroup comp.security.firewalls, in article
<vfDGg.68760$u11.65861@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Leythos wrote:

We're talking a firewall, strictly a firewall, something that can be
used in all cases. We'll brake down the features into Home/SOHO/etc...
later.

To an extent, that's an awfully large stretch. A Home/SOHO is going to be
quite a bit different compared to something used at a .edu with even 500
students. Yes, one would hope that the admins on that .edu had a lot more
knowledge at choosing/configuring the network as well as the firewall, but
your certification requirement (your item 12) is going to attract the
attention of the Pointy-Haired crowd. The fact that there might be a
difference between a POTS/?DSL/OC-3 would be a detail they'd ignore or
at least not notice.

I'd also prefer to analyze the separate requirements, rather than slow
them down. (break != brake)

5) A firewall should have a real DMZ if it claims to have a DMZ -
meaning that it should have a physical jack for a DMZ that is not
part of the same network as the LAN.

I agree to a point. Each interface of a firewall should be distinct from
each other. However, a firewall does not necessarily need more than two
interfaces, so a "DMZ interface" is not a requirement.

I'll definitely agree with this one. IF it claims to have the capability
of a DMZ, then this MUST (using the capitalization in the same way as in
RFCs [see RFC2119]) provide this on a separate physical connection. If
this separate connection is not provided, the supplier/vendor/what-ever
MUST NOT claim a DMZ capability.

7) A firewall should clearly log/report all traffic, in/out, and make
it easy to determine if it was approved/unapproved, etc...

Yes.

This should be configurable. I _really_ don't want to see a mile long
list of "packet allowed/disallowed" every ten minutes. On my home system,
I purposely do not log 'disallowed inbound'. So what if some klown in
South Whatiz scanned the box - the firewall blocked it (or there was
nothing running on that port or protocol), and that's the end of that.
Logging the source of UDP to ports in the range 1024 - 1050 is a waste of
time/bandwidth/CPU-cycles, as most of that is messenger spam, and the last
time I looked at it, most of the IPs were faked (wrong TTLs were the most
obvious, IPs that haven't even been issued by the RIRs was another).

10) A firewall should provide for multiple subnets on any network
interface.

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by that.

It also doesn't "fit" the normal use of the WAN side.

In my networks I have multiple networks behind each network in many
cases. As an example, I might have a DMZ with a network with servers in
it (say 192.168.16.1/24)

Not mentioned before - NAT, and perhaps 'port forwarding'. As regards
the multiple networks, I could see this done with the rule associating
network address (range) and a specific interface. This would be a part
of RFC3704 filtering anyway.

and then inside that network I might have classrooms with their own
isolated networks (10.1.0.1/24, 10.2.0.1/24...). The firewall has to know
that there is also the 10.x.x.x networks on that interface or it will
block traffic from them - or it should block traffic from them.

Your use of the DMZ is different from what I see to be normal. The only
things we put in the DMZ are those hosts that need to be reachable from
the WAN side. These would be the public DNS, mail, web, FTP servers and
the like. Hosts that are not offering services to the WAN do not belong
in the DMZ. In your example, the classrooms would likely not be offering
such services, and probably should be isolated on their own NATing
firewall - to allow (probably controlled) access OUT to the Internet, and
limited (if any) access to the rest of the internal networks.

11) A firewall should not have DHCP Service enabled on the LAN/DMZ by
default.

Make that "any service on any interface". One reasonable exception may
be a service providing a (secure) configuration frontend on one distinct
interface, that is marked as such (see also below).

I'd agree with this

Yes, but I was specifically thinking about Drop-In devices like the
household NAT appliances that come with DHCP Service enabled to make it
easy for users.

What do you propose instead? No DHCP - so it's static or LinkLocal? Or
is it some other box separate from the firewall/user systems?

12) A firewall should be certified as a firewall by some reputable
authority.

That only helps your legal department. If you think you need that: fine,
but it's most definitely not a technical requirement for a firewall.

But, if it's not certified, then anyone can call an appliance a firewall
and the public will buy it as a firewall - See all the residential
devices out on the market.

I can see your point, but what do you define as a reputable authority?
ANSI? IEEE? IETF? NIST? NSA? Some supra-national entity from the EU,
or similar? Good Housekeeping magazine? ;-)

Old guy
.



Relevant Pages

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