Re: NAT Secure?

From: Whoever (nobody@devnull.none)
Date: 09/23/02


From: Whoever <nobody@devnull.none>
Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2002 20:04:55 GMT

On 23 Sep 2002, Melinda Shore wrote:

> In article <Pine.LNX.4.44.0209231230580.14195-100000@c941211-a>,
> Whoever <nobody@devnull.none> wrote:
> >What end-to-end assumptions does NAT break?
>
> That addresses are globally unique, globally routable, and
> immutable. These were basic design points. Breaking these
> assumptions is why NAT causes so many protocols to fail.
>
> There's actually substantial literature about this.
> Saltzer's "The End-To-End Argument in System Design" is the
> seminal paper on this topic, but between recent internet
> drafts from the IAB on the internet architecture and the
> research literature on overlay networks there's quite a bit
> of descriptive literature out there that documents 1) what
> IP's design points were, 2) how NAT is in violation of those
> design points, and 3) specific problems caused by that
> violation (like the problem of getting IPSec AH across NATs,
> why NAT looks like a man-in-the-middle attack and why that
> can't be mitigated, etc.).

You appear to be arguing that NAT actually reduces the security of a
network. That is certainly an interesting viewpoint.

On point 3, NAT boxes can provide a IPSEC-passthrough. No changes to the
clients at either end of the IPSEC communication are required for this
functionality. I may be wrong, but I don't see how that allows a
man-in-the middle attack that could not be achieved without the NAT box.
In addition, secure client idenentification can be achieved by such means
as X509 certificates.



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