Re: secure file deletion

From:
Date: 07/13/02


Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2002 11:05:22 -0700


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On Fri, 12 Jul 2002 10:10:44 +0200,
 Kasper Dupont <kasperd@daimi.au.dk> wrote:
> Mark Gordon wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, 11 Jul 2002 17:52:24 +0100, Tim Haynes
>> <usenet@stirfried.vegetable.org.uk> wrote:
>>
>> >Mark Gordon <spamtrap@ruddygore.net> writes:
>> >
>> >>>* Simply delete the files to protect yourself
>> >>> from Joe Normal.
>> >>>
>> >>>* Overwrite the files/disk to protect yourself
>> >>> from someone with software knowledge.
>> >>>
>> >>>* Shred and burn the disk to protect yourself
>> >>> from someone with hardware knowledge and time+money.
>> >>
>> >> I've heard that at one point the official method of disposing of an HD
>> >> with classified information on it was to smash it to bits using a sledge
>> >> hammer.
>> >
>> >I used to have a `srm.c' lying around for this purpose.. Idea was that you
>> >write a bunch of 0s to the file, then frag it with binary 10101010 then
>> >binary 01010101 back and forth a couple of times, then write some random
>> >guff, then finally a load of 0s.
>> >
>> >I understand that those who attempt to recover data from HDs do so by
>> >looking at the edges of the tracks where the recording signal might be less
>> >strong or deviate slightly from central position, so while a blast of dd
>> >if=/dev/zero would be enough to nuke most of the centre of the tracks, the
>> >above should adversely affect the outsides as well. Probably not a
>> >completely 100% secure approach, but it should make recovery fairly
>> >expensive.
>> >
>> >Well, that's my theory and I'm sticking to it ;8)
>>
>> I've heard (from a *very* unreliable source) that there was government
>> approved software that did something like this to wipe HDs. However, I
>> prefer the hammer approach. It is much more fun (when someone else is
>> paying the bill).
>
> I think multiple overwrites is more secure than a sledge hammer.
> Of course if you are really paranoid you do both. Remember to
> overwrite before usinge the hammer, you will probably have a
> little difficulties getting the disk spinning after using the
> hammer.
>
> On what to overwrite with I'd say I expect the number of
> overwrites to be more important than the actual data being used.
> But still I guess random data is more secure than some fixed
> pattern. But of course the random data takes more time. I think
> Tims approach sounds like the most secure that can be done in a
> reasonable time.
>
> Finally I like being able to use the harddisk again (when
> nobody else is paying).
>

We used to remove the platters, and burn them with an oxy-acetelene
torch, when it's slag, it's unreadable. A bit extreme for some perhaps.
Smelly too.

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-- 
Jim Richardson
	Anarchist, pagan and proud of it
http://www.eskimo.com/~warlock
Linux, from watches to supercomputers, for grandmas and geeks. 



Relevant Pages

  • Re: secure file deletion
    ... > prefer the hammer approach. ... I think multiple overwrites is more secure than a sledge hammer. ... But of course the random data takes more time. ...
    (comp.os.linux.security)
  • Re: [SLE] Wiping disk?
    ... then take a hammer and have fun... ... more secure than zeros all over the harddisk? ... and your solution (of zeros) would work against the ordinary person, ... In the Beginning was the Command Line ...
    (SuSE)
  • Re: Truly Secure File or Disk free space Shredding
    ... read that only the Gutmann algorithm is truly secure against Forensic ... Hardware recovery techniques. ... There can always be physical data trails in or near the hard disk, ... even a hundred overwrites is not enough. ...
    (sci.crypt)
  • Re: Truly Secure File or Disk free space Shredding
    ... read that only the Gutmann algorithm is truly secure against Forensic ... There can always be physical data trails in or near the hard disk, ... practice Mr. Gutmann's conjecture is much worse than he thought. ... even a hundred overwrites is not enough. ...
    (sci.crypt)
  • Re: Secure Delete App?
    ... > with random data. ... Right below Empty Trash in the Finder's application menu is Secure Empty ... Trash which uses a moderately aggressive algorithm to overwrite the data ...
    (comp.sys.mac.apps)

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