Re: Secure passwords?

Actually, if you think about it, low speed systems are much, much easier to
detect/compromise, in a tempest sense.

Signal emissions are usually the first 5-20 harmonics of the clock speed.
A clock of 100 Mhz probably needs a receiving AND PROCESSING bandwidth of
500-1000 Mhz.

A clock speed of 3 Ghz can mean a processing bandwidth (analog or digital )
exceeding 10 Ghz.
That's a fairly expensive set of kit, super-computing scale, not suitcase
sized, portable gear, especially if you are looking for near-real-time
recovery, not SETI-style post analysis.
Often, these higher frequencies have much less energy/radiated power than
lower speed clocks, for a variety of technical reasons.
So the detection range (signal over noise) is probably much less,
potentially minimising the 'volume' of risk.

Just my 20cents worth.

Lyal

"nemo_outis" <abc@xxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:Xns9720749503131abcxyzcom@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> Juergen Nieveler <juergen.nieveler.nospam@xxxxxxxx> wrote in
> news:Xns9720611B3788Djuergennieveler@xxxxxxxxxxxx:
>
> > "nemo_outis" <abc@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> >> If you would not notice somebody looking (or other forms of
> >> surrepitious observation and/or recording) there is something
> >> desperately wrong, either with you or with your environment.
> >
> > Please note that I included Tempest-attacks. Is your house
> > tempest-shielded?
> >
> > Juergen Nieveler
>
>
>
> Nope, not required as as a result of my risk and threat assessments. Nor
> is protection against laser interferometry on windows and a few other
> exotic attacks.
>
> However, I have posted on how to tackle threats such as Tempest related
> attacks, including my preference for older low-MHz laptops (lesser emsec
> concerns, no exposed cables, no need to isolate power supplies, possible
to
> use RF-shielded enclosures rather than shielded rooms, etc.).
Constructing
> full room-size high-MHz Faraday cages is a bear - the grounding aspects
> alone present significant challenges (as do seals, conduits, air exchange,
> etc.)
>
> Despite your gibe, physical security does not mean that one must always
> escalate to Fort Knox. No, it means that the level of physical security
> should be commensurate with the threats, the risks they pose, and the
> consequences of security breaches. However, all but the very lowest
levels
> of physical security require freedom from direct visual observation by
> others.
>
> But you knew that already; it's just fun to tease me :-)
>
> Regards,
>
>


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