Re: Trojan horse Downloader.Generic.ML
From: Arthur Hagen (art_at_broomstick.com)
Date: 06/22/05
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Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2005 09:29:26 -0400
Zvi Netiv <support@replace_with_domain.com> wrote:
>
> The definition of virus ( www.invircible.com/glossary.php ) is: "A
> virus is parasitic computer code that replicates by producing
> functional copies of itself into host files. The infected hosts
> inherit the replication ability of the affecting virus, in addition
> to maintaining the original functionality of the host program or
> file."
>
> The last part requires that everything that was contained in the
> program in its preinfected state, be still there, plus the necessary
> changes made by the virus to incorporate its own code in the program
> flow. A direct deduction is that all virus infections are
> theoretically reversible, by reverting the changes made to the
> program, and since nothing from the original code was lost. This is,
> in a nutshell, the entire theory on which virus disinfection and
> recovery is based upon.
You forget that a virus can *replicate* the functionality of a program
without keeping it, in which case there's nothing to revert back to.
This is most certainly true for most boot virus, and also some file
virus do this.
> As to disinfection vs integrity restoration, everything disinfection
> can do, restoration will do better, and much of what restoration will
> do, can't be done by disinfection at all (like disinfection from
> highly polymorphic viruses, or from new ones).
Or disinfection where the original is not retained at all.
>>> Let's extend the above now: Real-time AV optimized integrity
>>> checkers can detect an infection and block execution of that
>>> object. When implemented properly, real-time integrity monitoring
>>> is nearly infallible at detecting viral changes in monitored files.
>>
>> i'm afraid i'm not yet convinced of that...
>
> I didn't expect you will, yet ... ;)
The problem is with the word "nearly". Just for fun, place the eicar
test string in an NTFS or XFS stream for a file, and see how many
"properly implemented" real time integrity monitors will catch it. Or
do a prelink/requickstart of executables and libraries and see how many
of the monitoring programs that will go nuts because the files have
changed.
(So far I know of only *one* AV product that breaks down a file into
different hunk types and only scans the relevant bits. And it doesn't
do monitoring. And only *one* product that checks streams, and it's not
an AV product, but an anti-spyware product.)
Regards,
-- *Art
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