Re: Failed Hard Drive

From: David H. Lipman (DLipman~nospam~_at_Verizon.Net)
Date: 05/17/05


Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 15:36:04 GMT

From: "nemo_outis" <abc@xyz.com>

| This from the fellow who chided me for not referring to [the grossly
| outdated] DoD 5200.28-M in the first place? Degaussing is your hobby-
| horse; do your own homework.
|
| Ahh, I'm such a softie - I'll relent.
|
| The US security agencies now advocate **destruction** of any HD that will
| pass outside the agency. In fact the US DoD now mandates this *even for
| HDs used in general office work,* and not just those holding classified
| security data. The following (although slightly dated) is representative
| of current approaches:
|
| http://iase.disa.mil/asd_hd_disposition_memo060401.pdf
|
| While the attachment does speak of degaussing as well as physical
| destruction, I invite you to consider the following:
|
| 1. These standards are just for lousy unclassified data!
|
| 2. There are repeated warnings about the difficulties of ensuring full
| data erasure with degaussing and the need for special procedures. For
| instance the following excerpt from section 3.2 says, "Due to the
| variation of media formats and their corresponding magnetic densities, a
| correct and effective degaussing is often difficult to achieve..."
| [Precisely the point I made in earlier posts]
|
| 3. Section 3.3.4 makes clear that the disk case must be removed to
| achieve effective degaussing. [As I said in an earlier post, through-
| the-case degaussing is unreliable.]
|
| 4. Section 3.3.6 emphasizes the difficulties with modern (as of 2001!)
| HDs with high coercivity and the need to disassemble the platters! The
| attachment speaks of 1700 Oersted degaussers, when 4000 Oersted material
| is now used in some HDs! If you don't know the coercivity of the media
| in your HDs - and you almost certainly don't! - then how would you know
| you used a powerful enough degausser and were effective?
|
| I could go on and on, but you get the point. Degaussing is problematic
| even with careful procedures - physical destruction is far preferable.
| In fact, the amount of disassembly required for effective degaussing
| makes physical destruction no more complicated.
|
| Regards,
|

That's so funny !

You point to a IASE DISA posted PDF from Acting ASD Linton Wells that I mentioned in my
reply @ 8:48 AM !
We both point to the same memo, but my post came first. ;-)
{ And I read that memo in 2001 when it came out }

That fact is there are COTS/GOTS units available with high coercivity to do the job such as;
http://www.datasecurityinc.com/products.htm

-- 
Dave
http://www.claymania.com/removal-trojan-adware.html
http://www.ik-cs.com/got-a-virus.htm