Re: openbsd 3.4 ps bug

From: Kurt Seifried (bt_at_seifried.org)
Date: 11/20/03

  • Next message: Daniel: "Re: openbsd 3.4 ps bug"
    To: "thanos F@rm@k1s" <fsvsunix@hotmail.com>, <vuln-dev@securityfocus.com>
    Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2003 02:51:53 -0700
    
    

    > Security bug for openbsd 3.4
    >
    > While i was testing my new openbsd 3.4 i found the following problem.
    > First of all i have the OpenBSD3.4 FUlly patched with all the latest
    > fixes in an i386 machine (P3 128mb ram).Some of the ports were installed
    > too(From the oficial 3cd set which i bought).While i was playing with the
    > command ps i found the following which i have tested it in two machines
    with
    > four different kernels(2 patched and 2 unpatched).The utility ps has a
    flaw
    > when used with the bash shell.Go to your root(/) directory or any dir that
    > contains more then two files or directorys and give the command ps -p * or
    > ps -N * or ps -M * and you will instantly see a core dump file in your
    dir.
    > The ps program is giving us a signal (SIGSEGV).Please try all the above
    args
    > more then two times and first in your root dir.When i tried to confirm it
    with
    > the gdb it gave me the address 0x1c01c116 in ?? ().I don`t have the
    > time to confirm if the bug is exploitable or not but it is a big problem
    > because a user(id 1000+) can also do that.This is a report which will also
    > be submited in the bugtraq.It is also not confirmed that other versions
    are
    > vulnerable to this bug.This bug can only be reproduced when bash2 is
    installed
    > (from the official ports package) and a in a dir where more then two files
    exists.
    > Sorry for the bad englis.
    >
    > The openbsd team has been informed.

    Yes this creates a core dump. I fail to see how this is exploitable for
    additional privileges however as ps is not setuid/setgid (simply mode 0555).
    Can you please enlighten us as to how this is exploitable for additional
    privileges?

    Kurt Seifried, kurt@seifried.org
    A15B BEE5 B391 B9AD B0EF
    AEB0 AD63 0B4E AD56 E574
    http://seifried.org/security/


  • Next message: Daniel: "Re: openbsd 3.4 ps bug"

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