Administrivia: Challenge Guidelines

From: Dave McKinney (dm_at_securityfocus.com)
Date: 05/15/03

  • Next message: Kenji Cronos: "Re: vulndev1.c solution (warning SPOILER)"
    Date: Thu, 15 May 2003 10:23:57 -0600 (MDT)
    To: vuln-dev@securityfocus.com
    
    

    First of all, we'd like to thank everybody who expressed an interest in
    the challenge and those who contributed. We'd also like to acknowledge
    those who expressed concerns about how this would affect the future of
    this list.

    For those who voiced concerns about the extra traffic, we had no idea what
    sort of response to expect when we put this together so were pretty lenient with
    approving posts as to not discourage anybody from participating. We
    decided it was best to handle it this way so that we could establish
    guidelines which were appropriate to the types of posts that were being
    submitted as opposed to having to moderate based on preconceived
    expectations.

    Now that we know what type of response to expect, these will be the basic
    guidelines for how we conduct the challenges in the future:

    a) Since the challenges are really for the list's benefit, solutions and
    other discussion should be posted directly to the list. I think if we
    were to assess people's solutions and observations in private, it'd
    detract from everybody's learning experience. If people want, they
    should feel free to drop hints instead of providing outright spoilers. We
    also encourage in-depth analysis of the program or of any proof-of-concept
    code that arises from the challenge.

    b) There were a number of posts which discussed the robustness or
    correctness of the example program. While these issues are relevant when
    auditing software, we're more concerned with the security aspects of any
    bugs in the program. We didn't really design the initial program to be
    syntactically perfect or to demonstrate good programming habits,
    since it is intentionally buggy code. It is understandable why people
    responded with these types of observations, since we didn't really say too
    much about the example program or what the exact objectives of the
    challenge were. In the future though, we'll be rejecting a lot of these
    posts if they don't mention possible security implications of errors. In
    this way it will be no different than when a possible real world
    vulnerability is reported, in that we want to keep the focus on the
    security problems themselves.

    c) The eventual goal of each challenge will be to generate a
    proof-of-concept that demonstrates that the problem is exploitable (if
    indeed it is). Each challenge will be designed to take a theoretical
    problem and then either prove or disprove that it could be a vulnerability
    in certain circumstances (ie: if it were setuid, etc.). Not all problems
    will be exploitable across all architectures and platforms, but we'd
    rather that people experimented and figured this out on their own as
    opposed to spoiling it for everyone. This could also generate some
    interesting discussion about why something would be a vulnerability in one
    environment and not in another.

    d) Many posts were sent that independently confirmed someone else's
    observations. Much of the normal vuln-dev traffic is also of this nature.
    We will use the same guidelines for challenges as we do with other
    vuln-dev traffic for these types of posts, which is normally to choose the
    one that has the most details over the others we have received at the time
    of moderation. This is done to avoid repetition.

    I would also like to state that we were impressed with the overwhelmingly
    positive response to this idea. One of the main reasons for doing this is
    to help people learn more of the theory behind security vulnerabilities,
    which can be applied to real world issues. We think that if people have a
    good learning resource, it will definitely benefit the list in other ways,
    since more people who use vuln-dev will have a stronger theoretical basis
    when discussing real world vulnerabilities.

    Any questions or comments about these guidelines can be directed to myself
    or to Aaron Adams <aadams@securityfocus.com>. This list of guidelines may
    be prone to additions or changes down the road, depending on how other
    challenges play out and the consensus of the list.

    As a side note, we'll also be posting summaries of each challenge upon
    their conclusion.

    Dave McKinney
    Symantec

    keyID: BF919DD7
    key fingerprint = 494D 6B7D 4611 7A7A 5DBB 3B29 4D89 3A70 BF91 9DD7


  • Next message: Kenji Cronos: "Re: vulndev1.c solution (warning SPOILER)"

    Relevant Pages

    • Re: "Security" out on the road
      ... The most efficient security tool, obviously, is a good semiautomatic ... posts here, and his wife BOTH carry guns in fanny packs. ... I never wear my seatbelt, even though it's illegal to do so. ... And you quite possibly could be a troll just trying to stir shit. ...
      (rec.motorcycles.harley)
    • Re: Seucity audit
      ... but most of her posts are filled with soapbox rantings (we still love ... >> Your security issues are not your server. ... >> told you what ports you had open. ... >> You don't need to spend your security dollars on a security audit in SBS ...
      (microsoft.public.windows.server.sbs)
    • Re: LymeNUT: Paranoia on the forum
      ... > posts. ... thread, "ILADS Charging for Guidelines?" ... I have not any affiliation with ILADS ... I can not agree that the publisher ...
      (sci.med.diseases.lyme)
    • Re: Obsessed Stalker Re: grayed out icon on desktop wont delete
      ... Stop replying to my posts. ... >> Obsessed Stalker you are. ... > going to follow the normal security advice and warn people about the ...
      (microsoft.public.windowsxp.general)
    • Re: Using S-MIME (encrypted & signed email)
      ... encrypt email is about better security practice, ... >> preceived view of complexity in deployment? ... I don't know how important these posts really are... ...
      (microsoft.public.security)