DHCP mitm clarification
From: Julien Vanegue (vanegu_j@epita.fr)Date: 09/24/02
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Date: 24 Sep 2002 21:01:46 -0000 From: Julien Vanegue <vanegu_j@epita.fr> To: vuln-dev@securityfocus.com('binary' encoding is not supported, stored as-is) In-Reply-To: <20020921000213.31474.qmail@mail.securityfocus.com>
This technique has been used for years now, and very advanced , highly
configurable software has been developped for it . Just to quote the
RFC written in 1997 :
7. Security Considerations
DHCP is built directly on UDP and IP which are as yet inherently
insecure. Furthermore, DHCP is generally intended to make
maintenance of remote and/or diskless hosts easier. While perhaps
not impossible, configuring such hosts with passwords or keys may be
difficult and inconvenient. Therefore, DHCP in its current form is
quite insecure.
Unauthorized DHCP servers may be easily set up. Such servers can
then send false and potentially disruptive information to clients
such as incorrect or duplicate IP addresses, incorrect routing
information (including spoof routers, etc.), incorrect domain
nameserver addresses (such as spoof nameservers), and so on.
Clearly, once this seed information is in place, an attacker can
further compromise affected systems.
Malicious DHCP clients could masquerade as legitimate clients and
retrieve information intended for those legitimate clients. Where
dynamic allocation of resources is used, a malicious client could
claim all resources for itself, thereby denying resources to
legitimate clients.
Source document : http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2131.html
Enjoy
-- mayhem
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