Re: Height of paranoia



1 - encryption. Even admins should not be able to read confidential
files. Domains. Microsoft touts domains and AD as a security feature,
while every hacker knows it's just an administrative feature. Any GPO
or domain structure can be circumvented with a little time and
enginuity. Assume your attacker has SYSTEM privileges on any domain
host and all of the MS protections melt away. Forget MSIE training and
start looking at how processes interact with network sockets and such
outside of the GPO and AD allowances. PSTOOLS is a great place to
start. Want to be sure? Establish a known 'gold' image, reimage the
execs pc's, baseline, and implement a whitelisting technology that
prevents any unknown binary on their machines. Alerts you to attempts
and keeps execs safer.

2 - vpns are for creating privacy between two TRUSTED networks. vpns
ARE NOT SECURITY DEVICES (one of the biggest marking lies ever), just
conduits. Use them to segregate networks and provide trusted
transports, not secure endpoints.

3 - encryption. Exchange admins should not be able to read confidential
emails, even when hosted on their servers (desirable for backup/DR
processes). PKI should be managed/supported by another group outside of
mail administration.

WALI wrote:
It's a given that all workstations have XP firewall enabled, an
enterprise grade antivirus and Windows defender installed. I am the
security guy.

The need is that there are a couple top management executives that have
highly confidential data/emails residing on their desktops, and quite a
few times, the information seems to have leaked out.

Discounting the 'word of mouth' of their secretaries or the end
recipients of that information, I want to take as many precautions from
the IT security perspective as possible and even bring our domain admins
and helpdesk personnel into the realm of doubt.

We have a Windows 20003/exchange 2003 environment of about a 2000 users.
Here's what I have thought:

1. If I detach these executive PCs from the domain. Mails will stop
landing in MS Outlook. Is there a way around? Also DNS security doesn't
register any PC unless it's joined to a domain. I thought of this to
make it out of bounds by system/domain admins. I have a feeling that
their port 3389 gets accessed when they aren't around.

2. Alternatively, create a private vlan on the core switch and make
these PCs as it's members. Put an ACL and deny everything except ports
required to authenticate to AD and exchange and few other web
applications. Monitor port memberships regularly.

3. How to secure their emails from exchange admins (it's the height, I
know).

Pls advise!!




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