RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption
- From: "John Lightfoot" <jlightfoot@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2006 10:41:14 -0600
I don't understand how a signature can work with a shared key. If two
people share a key, how can you tell which one of them signed it?
-----Original Message-----
From: Gregory Rubin [mailto:grrubin@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, March 22, 2006 12:55 PM
To: Craig Wright
Cc: gillettdavid@xxxxxxxx; shyaam@xxxxxxxxx;
security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption
True. Signatures don't really require asymmetric keys. An example of this
is an HMAC and variants thereof. Right now, I'm commonly signing URLs using
the following system (so I have no excuse for forgetting
it):
BaseUrl = http://www.foo.com/one/two?three=four
Secret = SharedSecret
Signature = md5(Secret + BaseURL)
New URL = BaseURL + "&hash=" + Signature
Greg Rubin
On 3/21/06, Craig Wright <cwright@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Legislation in respect of matters arising within those States and
Hello,
Just to be difficult....
David stated "Signing requires a private key". This is correct through
feasibility, but it is not technically correct as there are signature
schemes that only require symmetric keys. Signing with symmetric keys
is a lot more complex and thus more prone to error and has a range of
key management issues. This does not mean that it is not possible.
In fact there are scheme to sign a message using only Hashing
algorithms. The simplest of these is to hash the document and keep a
list of document hashes (similar to software). A user could check the
list to see if the message was valid or if tampering had occurred. A
third party could keep the hash tables to ensure that the lists where
accurate.
So signing does not require a private key - it just makes it easier.
Next it also depends on non-repudiation/repudiation issues. It is easy
to sign a document and have a verification that it is unaltered but
with no proof that the original signer could not come back and accuse
the receiver of forging the document.
An example symmetric scheme could be:
Alice encrypts a message using a symmetric key known to Bob (and Alice
only)
Alice hashes the encrypted message
Alice encrypts the (encrypted) message and hash using a symmetric key
known to Jim but unknown to Bob Bob receives the hashed and encrypted
message.
If Bob alters the message - the hash will not work. Alice can not lie
as Jim has a copy.
Key management is a bugger, but still possible (though unlikely)
ANSI X9.17 Notarised Symmetric Keys may be used to sign.
Regards
Craig S Wright
PS There are also hybrid ciphers for signing which are based on a
combination of all the above - but this for another post
-----Original Message-----
From: David Gillett [mailto:gillettdavid@xxxxxxxx]
Sent: 22 March 2006 6:21
To: shyaam@xxxxxxxxx; security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: Signing before Encryption and Signing after Encryption
Signing requires a private key -- therefore, it *must* be Asymmetric.
Asymmetric is typically much slower than Symmetric, so you get things
like SSL that use Asymmetric to protect the exchange of the Symmetric
key used for actual payload encryption.
Signing after encryption allows the signature to be verified
before/without decrypting the payload. There are a variety of
circumstances in which that could be useful, which are blocked if the
signing is done first. I can't think of any where the opposite is true.
David Gillett, CISSP
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