RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk

Craig,

Let me clarify, when I said "Developers can add verification code before
they send code to libraries", I was implying that if a developer is using a
routine which has certain limitations (such as a routine taking source and
destination buffers & a copy length where the length can not exceed the
destination buffer length) they can build in parameter verification before
calling the routine if they're not sure what will happen.

The verification code need not be at every routine call, it may be higher up
the call chain. The only variables within systems can be considered input,
it can be input as the result of a database query, a query to another device
or system, or data fed in by a user. Verification can take place at these
points of input to make sure the data is valid for the entire call chain.

Whilst source code scanners are useful for simple logic errors, I fully
agree that compilers introduce a level of uncertainty which makes source
code testing not sufficient (Memories of a assembler that "optimized" out
some place holder strings designed to be modified by another part of the
proprietary OS I was involved in writing come to mind, what fun that was
;)).

Black box testing can be used to eliminate many of the variables you
mention. If you run your tests against the compiled form of the
application, on the hardware you are going to deploy to, your tests (if
complete) will show up any hardware, OS, or compiler introduced problems as
issues, they may not pinpoint where the problem is, but they should show the
application is not behaving as it should.

I accept that very little is perfect and will last forever without a
problem, but in IT at the moment we seem to have problems getting things to
be problem free in a known environment out of the box, which is a long way
short of other disciplines.

Al.

-----Original Message-----
From: Craig Wright [mailto:cwright@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: 24 February 2006 05:06
To: support@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; dave kleiman; Darren W Miller
Cc: defendingthenet; security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk



Why the following is wrong "Developers can add verification code before they
send code to libraries"


The assumption is made that all libraries may be mathematically checked for
completeness and accuracy. Taking the assumption of perfect hardware aside
(i.e. forget Intel Pentium errors). Assuming that all compliers have been
created and mathematically proven (as none have been as yet - I would love
you to prove this point wrong - honestly I have been looking for one since
the 80's and I am still looking for one).

Assuming the perfect world for all other components (which is not the case).

Code is complied by higher level languages to another form. To do this it
uses a parser. The idea (and this is I know simplified immensely) is to take
the high level language and create a context-free grammar (CFG). CFG's are
similar though more complex to finite automata and trickier to construct.

CFG's have an issue in that complex algorithms (i.e. code) create ambiguity.
Ambiguity results as there are generally several ways to create the same
string from a grammar. Such strings have several different parse trees and
thus several different meanings.


In some instances the result may be undesirable for certain applications
where a given programme should have a unique interpretation. When a grammar
generates some string ambiguously it is known that the grammar is ambiguus.

An example includes the following grammar;
<EXPR> -> <EXPR> + <EXPR> | <EXPR> x <EXPR> | (<EXPR>) | a

The grammar prior to this expresses the string "a+axa" ambiguously. It leads
to multiple parse trees. (check if you like).

We could in theory have all code developed alone the lines of a Chomsky
normal form (look this up yourself if unsure). The issue is the cost. The
process involved with the computational analysis from all stages of the code
would have the resultant effect that we would still be coding at similar
levels to the 70's now (if even this far is doubtful).


The finite automaton called a pushdown automata are nondeterministic finite
automata with the addition of a stack. The context free grammar required to
either push or pop the symbol in the stack is computationally infeasible
without creating ambiguousity.

I have not even got to the Church-Turning thesis and Alan Turning's model,
but I will jump ahead and let you read this off line.


A basis in determining decidable language needs to follow. Than we get on to
Turing-recognisable languages. Some of the issues here are the
computationally insolvability of what you are proposing. Please see the
"Halting problem" for proof of this claim.

If you believe that these issues are decidable and determinate, please have
a look at the "Post Correspondence Problem" or PCP. Solve this and you WILL
be famous. There is mathematical proof in pure maths that a PCP is
undecidable. So if you do manage this feat you also take down the pillars of
science and maths at the same time. Good luck.

Finally you have to look at Pspace completeness and EXPTIME in respect to
their effects in space complexity.


Simple answer is the let all code be good argument is flawed. I do agree
that there are FAR too many unbounded buffers and race conditions in code
and there is little excuse for this. At the same time it is not possible to
completely remove error (at best) or ambiguity. Yes Microsoft has something
to answer for, but Linux is just as bad at the moment.


Here finishes lecture 1 on the theory of computation ;)

Regards
Craig


[1] Post, E., L., A variant of a recursively unsolvable problem,Bull. of the
Am. Math. Soc., 52, 1946.

[2] Ehrenfeucht, A., Karhumaki, J. and Rozenberg, G., The (generalized) post
correspondece problem with lists consisting of two words is decidable,
Theoret. Comput. Sci.,21, 2,1982.

[3] Vesa Halava, Tero Harju and Mika Hirvensalo, Binary (Generalized) Post
Correspondence Problem, TUCS Technical Report No. 357, August 2000. [PS
file]

[4] Y. Matiyasevich and G.Senizergues, Decision problems for semi-Thue
systems with a few rules, Proceedings, 11th Anual IEEE Symposium on Logic in
Computer Science, 1996. [PS file]



-----Original Message-----
From: Al Sutton [mailto:asutton@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Sent: 24 February 2006 8:33
To: Craig Wright; 'dave kleiman'; 'Darren W Miller'
Cc: 'defendingthenet'
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk

Hi,

I too am very open to being proven wrong, but as a scientist I need solid
proof which involves cold hard facts, not statements such as "I can't go
into all the details for various reasons.".

I've been involved in many development projects, and at the end of the day a
product ships with bugs from a library then it's the developer who is
responsible for their choice of libraries. The attitudes Darren describes
are typical in Development, the "If it ain't in my code it ain't my problem"
is one of the most fundamental problems of current development mentality.
How many architects do you know that would design for the side of a hill
without making sure the hill could support their design?, or design an
extension to a house without ensuring the house was sound?, the same is true
of code, if you're writing software you need to make sure your libraries
support it securely, if not, then you're not doing your job. Developers can
add verification code before they send code to libraries, and if they have
concerns of a library this is what they should be doing (after all why
rewrite a string copy routine when you just need to check that the length of
your copy is less than the length of your destination buffer?).

My view is that the original paper was FUD, intended or not, that's how it
appeared, that's how it read, and it it walks like a chicked and clucks like
a chicken people are going to call it a chicken.

Al.


-----Original Message-----
From: Craig Wright [mailto:cwright@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: 23 February 2006 21:10
To: dave kleiman; Darren W Miller
Cc: Al Sutton; defendingthenet
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk



Hello,

Dave stated; "Craig.. And be gentle Craig will pick apart opinions and bring
back factual information without batting an eye."

True and I am always open to being proved wrong. The thing is that I have to
be PROVED Wrong. Opinion and anecdotal evidence is not proof. Validated
points and correctly collected statistical data are.

As much as many people find this difficult to believe (even my wife) I enjoy
being proved wrong. It is both a learning opportunity for my self and a
demonstration that others are engaging in serious peer review processes
outside of academe.

In the past 20 years I have performed close to 5,000 engagements. At the
moment I am conducting one of the largest vulnerability and risk assessments
ever conducted in Australia in association with the Attorney Generals CNVA
programme.

The first issue to address is yes you found a vulnerability and it was
exploitable. What is the risk? The impact threat vectors and other analysis
factors need to be considered. Vulnerabilities do not matter by themselves.
They create a risk potential. When you understand this you will both serve
your clients more effectively and also add value in a manner they will
understand. You need to sell to management. They understand finance and
risk. Vulnerabilities are FUD. They do not help.

As for engineering something not to fail. This is where I have an issue with
people who think they are engineers. Engineering is the process of building
something to a set specification. An example is giving a 95% Confidence
Internal of a 5 year expected life. It involves the analysis and design of
hazard functions and survival processes.

Regards,
Craig

PS this is about as nice as I get unless people actually seek to open their
minds and learn.


-----Original Message-----
From: dave kleiman [mailto:dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Sent: 23 February 2006 4:25
To: 'Darren W Miller'
Cc: Craig Wright; 'Al Sutton'; 'defendingthenet'
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk

Darren,

I am going to explain this to you, since you are new here on this forum, or
at least I have only saw one or two of your posts go by recently. I am not
the form moderator, nor do I have any influence over the posts that make the
forum.

First, I wanted to give you a friendly heads-up, because you are throwing
"articles" out to this forum and they are your opinion.

Secondly, I am a nice guy :), maybe you are taking this personally, but you
need to read through the archives, this s what we do here debate!!


"""I don't have the time to keep this discussion (if that I what we are
actually having) going for an infinite amount of time""" You posted this to
a Security Discussion board, that is what we do here.

Do not get me wrong you have the right to post almost anything you want
pertaining to security, but if throw your opinion out here, expect to have
to defend it, and back it by fact. Because it is going to get torn up by the
professionals.

I have seen threads, that is what you started a thread, go for 20-30 days.
See "Forensic/Cyber Crime Investigator" in the archives, it went from
mid-Jan until Feb 15th, and I thought Craig was going to kill me on that
one, but that is how this forum goes, you make a statement expect educated
well-informed/experienced responses, a lot of them you will not agree with,
but will not be able to tap dance away from.

Craig.. And be gentle Craig will pick apart opinions and bring back factual
information without batting an eye. He and I have gone toe-to-toe on many a
subject on this and other discussion forms.

Darren, I know you are used to posting articles at CastleCops were the home
user is the basic audience and nobody is retorting, but when you step into
this arena you will see some serious professionals in varying fields and
they will not let misinformation slide. You of course do not have to respond
to the responses, but expect even heavier discussion when you post and
disappear.

By the way if you were to post this at a higher level forum such as
pen-test, they would eat your below write-up for breakfast. But since you
left it off post, I did the same....however I know Craig loves pen-testing
so he may not.




Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: Darren W Miller [mailto:Darren.Miller@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2006 20:06
To: Craig Wright; dave kleiman
Cc: Darren W Miller
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk



Gentlemen,



I don't have the time to keep this discussion (if that I

what we are actually having) going for an infinite amount

of time. But let me give you a couple high-level examples

of what I am talking about here. The key word is

high-level, I can't go into all the details for various reasons.



In the last 3 months I have performed 5 assessments. Phase

I of these assessments involved penetration testing of

external public facing systems. Out of the 5, we achieved

total systems penetration / compromise of 4. All 4 of

these systems were web based services. All 4 of these

systems were compromised by exploiting "custom" code or

modules. During post-assessment meetings the developers

(who were independents) were present. When they were shown

what modules were used to achieve the compromise everyone

one them blamed it on other external modules they used (or

re-usable code / modules,) and that they had no idea these

bugs existed. They further explained that some of the

source code, at least the ones they had access to, were so

extensive and complex that they probably would never had

found the bugs. One gentleman even stated that it was not

up to him to make sure code developed by others is secure

even if he is using that code. That did not go over well

in the meeting, trust me



AS far as "engineering something not to fail", I don't

even think that is possible at this point in time. Or ever

will be. Quite frankly, if someone were to tell me that a

particular system, any system, was fail-proof, I'd say

that they were off the wall. Let me just include a couple

bullet point items that may fall into this category of

"complex systems" and security:



1) Compromise of internal network systems using citrix as

an entry point. End users thought that the citrix remote

desktop profiles were secure because of how they were

setup but never realized that flaws in something as simple

(or complex) as ms-word would allow an isolated compromise

to lead to additional systems compromise.
2) System A interacts with System B which interacts with

system C. End users are aware, to an extent, about the

flaws in system A & B and their interaction, but not aware

of much regarding system C. In fact, they were not even

aware there was a system C. That interaction with system C

resulted in a security breach. In this case, complex

systems interacting with other complex systems, some of

which were unknowns, leading to security breaches.

3) IT department decides to increase the over all security

of authentication methods so increase complexity rules and

other related items such as aging.... However, they have

poor auditing measures internally and have know idea that

there are 150 user accounts for people who no longer work

for the company. Even though authentication measures /

procedures have been changed on the system, these

particular accounts will not have them applied until the

next time they are used. Several of these accounts are

compromised because they don't meet even basic complexity

rules for passwords. However, the end user thought that

the system would take care of this and force all accounts

to abide by the same rules immediately. Did not happen.



Here is the bottom line. Either I did a really poor job at

trying to get my message across in a high-level way, or I

am just being totally misunderstood. I would suggest it's

a little of both based on this dialoged.



Note: One final point. I would rather you not make the

statement that I am using FUD as a selling tool. The fact

is that is not true and is not my intention. If either of

you new me personally you would know that. I would never,

and have never, made that kind of assumption without

knowing for sure. Quite frankly, I'm not sure I would make

that kind of statement about anyone, even if I knew for

sure that is what they were all about.



Regards,



Darren W. Miller



-----Original Message-----
From: Craig Wright [mailto:cwright@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2006 5:41 PM
To: dave kleiman; security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Darren W Miller; defendingthenet
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk






Hello



Here I have to state that I agree 100% and categorically with Dave.



FUD - Fear Uncertainty and Doubt is a common tool used by

vendors to sell security. It is also one of the greatest

threats to security today.



It makes people inured to security in the long run (i.e.

cry wolf) and in the short term results in a lot of

technical solutions that generally fail to address the issue.



NASA uses hazard and survivability models to determine

risk. They do not engineer to not fail - they just reduce

the probability of an incident. What needs to be

remembered that is that 1 in a million occurrence happens

all the time in the real world. Even a 1 in a billion

occurrence will happen daily somewhere in the world.

Welcome to the world of risk.



So as to the original post, how would complex software

make you less risk prone?



Regards,
Craig






-----Original Message-----
From: dave kleiman [mailto:dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]



Sent: 23 February 2006 2:23
To: security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Darren.Miller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; 'defendingthenet'
Subject: RE: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk



Inline....











-----Original Message-----
From: defendingthenet [mailto:mlapidus@xxxxxxxx]
Sent: 20 February 2006 14:35
To: security-basics@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk


















Title
-----
Why Easy To Use Software Is Putting You At Risk






Can Easy To Use Software Also Be Secure
----------------------------
Anyone who has been working with computers for a long time



will have noticed
that mainstream operating systems and applications have



become easier to use
over the years (supposedly). Tasks that use to be complex



procedures and
required experienced professional to do can now be done at



the push of a
button. For instance, setting up an Active Directory



domain in Windows 2000
or higher can now be done by a wizard leading even the



most novice technical
person to believe they can "securely" setup the operating



environment.



Where does it claim that it is "securely" setting up AD in

the wizard?



This
is actually quite far from the truth. Half the time this



procedure fails
because DNS does not configure properly or security



permissions are relaxed
because the end user cannot perform a specific function.



Sounds like you have had this problem a few times, maybe

you should not use the wizard, or attempt AD setups.



Do you understand how to "securely" setup AD, for your

comments here, I would say no.



Instead of using the "sky is falling routine" suggest how

to do these things securely instead of syaing "look how

terrible this is"















If It's Easy To Develop, Is It Also Secure
--------------------------------------------------
One of the reasons why operating systems and applications



"appear" to be
easier to work with then they use to is developers have



created procedures
and reusable objects to take care of all the complex tasks



for you.









Are you referring to shared code? In case you do not know

what that is, it is code that is shared by apps for the

same routines.






For instance, back in the old days when I started as a



developer using assembly
language and c/c++, I had to write pretty much all the



code myself.






Are you suggesting your code was more secure back in the

"old" days, when security was not a concern in coding?






Now everything is visually driven, with millions of lines of



code already
written for you. All you have to do is create the



framework for your
application and the development environment and compiler



adds all the other
complex stuff for you. Who wrote this other code? How can



you be sure it is
secure. Basically, you have no idea and there is no easy



way to answer this
question.











Secure Environments Don't Exist Well With Complexity
----------------------------
The reality is it may look easier on the surface but the



complexity of the
backend software can be incredible. And guess what, secure



environments do
not coexist well with complexity. This is one of the



reasons there are so
many opportunities for hackers, viruses, and malware

to attack your
computers. How many bugs are in the Microsoft Operating



System? I can almost
guarantee that no one really knows for sure, not even



Microsoft developers.
However, I can tell you that there are thousands, if not



hundreds of
thousands of bugs, holes, and security weaknesses in



mainstream systems and
applications just waiting to be uncovered and maliciously



exploited.






How Reliable and Secure are Complex Systems?
----------------------------------------------------------
Let's draw a comparison between the world of software and



security with that
of the space program. Scientists at NASA have know for



years that the space
shuttle is one of the most complex systems in the world.



With miles of
wiring, incredible mechanical functions, millions of lines



of operating
system and application code, and failsafe systems to



protect failsafe
systems, and even more failsafe systems to protect other



systems. Systems
like the space shuttle need to perform consistently, cost



effectively, and
have high Mean-Time-Between-Failure(MTBF).









*All in all the space shuttle has a good record.*









One thing



it is not though
is cost effective and consistent. Every time there is a



launch different
issues crop up that cause delays. In a few circumstances,



even the most
basic components of this complex system, like "O" rings,



have sadly resulted
in a fatal outcome. Why are things like this missed? Are



they just not on
the radar screen because all the other complexities of the



system demand so
much attention? There are million different variables I'm



sure. The fact is,
NASA scientists know they need to work on developing less



complex systems to
achieve their objectives.












Ok now you have stepped out of bounds, first of all I love

NASA and have the utmost respect for them and all the

astronauts who have braved the frontier.
However, the record of the shuttle is 110+ scrubbed

launches. That is more than the number of launches. You

can do the math for the rest, but it does not add up to a

good record, you might have to use one of those "complex

systems" though to run calc.






So your saying a more simplistic system would create a

better record, maybe they should try fly the Kitty Hawk to

the moon.






I am just going to stop here and say Hogwash.



My advice to you is stop selling fear and your opinion,

and start selling solutions to problems. Next time tell us

how to fix your proposed problems.















Respectfully,



______________________________________________________
Dave Kleiman, CAS,CCE,CIFI,CISM,CISSP,ISSAP,ISSMP,MCSE



www.SecurityBreachResponse.com
 















This same principal of reducing complexity to

increase security,
performance, and decrease failures really does apply to



the world of
computers and networking. Ever time I here associates of



mine talk about
incredibly complex systems they design for clients and how



hard they were to
implement I cringe. How in the world are people suppose to



cost effectively
and reliably manage such things. In some cases it's almost



impossible. Just
ask any organization how many versions or different brands



of intrusion
detection systems they have been through. As them how many



times the have
had infections by virus and malware because of poorly



developed software or
applications. Or, if they have ever had a breach in



security because the
developer of a specific system was driven by ease of use



and inadvertently
put in place a piece of helpful code that was also helpful



to a hacker.






Can I Write A Document Without A Potential Security

Problem Please
-----------------------------------------------
Just a few days ago I was thinking about something as



simple as Microsoft
Word. I use MS-Word all the time, every day in fact. Do



you know how
powerful this application really is? Microsoft Word can do



all kinds of
complex tasks like math, algorithms, graphing, trend



analysis, crazy font
and graphic effects, link to external data including



databases, and execute
web based functions.









Do you know what I use it for, to write documents. nothing



crazy or complex,
at least most of the time. Wouldn't it be interesting that



when you first
installed or configured Microsoft Word, there was an



option for installing
only a bare bones version of the core product. I mean,



really stripped down
so there was not much to it. You can do this to a degree,



but all the shared
application components are still there. Almost every



computer I have
compromised during security assessments has had MS-Word



installed on it. I
can't tell you how many times I have used this



applications ability to do
all kinds of complex tasks to compromise the system and



other systems
further. We'll leave the details of this for another



article though.






Conclusion
----------
Here's the bottom line. The more complex systems get,



typically in the name
of ease of use for end users, the more opportunity for



failure, compromise,
and infection increases. There are ways of making things



easy to use,
perform well, and provide a wide variety of function and



still decrease
complexity and maintain security. It just takes a little



longer to develop
and more thought of security. You might think that a large



part of the blame
for complex insecure software should fall on the

shoulders of the
developers. But the reality is it is us, the end users and



consumers that
are partially to blame. We want software that is bigger,



faster, can do just
about everything, and we want it fast. We don't have time



to wait for it to
be developed in a secure manner, do we?









You may reprint or publish this article free of charge as



long as the
bylines are included.










Original URL (The Web version of the article)
------------
http://www.defendingthenet.com/NewsLetters/WhyEasyToUseSoft
wareIsPuttingYouA
tRisk.htm






About The Author
----------------
Darren Miller is an Information Security Consultant with



over seventeen
years experience. He has written many technology &



security articles, some
of which have been published in nationally circulated

magazines &
periodicals. If you would like to contact Darren you can



e-mail him at
Darren.Miller@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx If you would like to



know more about
computer security please visit us at



http://www.defendingthenet.com.


















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