RE: software to control domain administrators

From: LordInfidel (LordInfidel_at_directionweb.com)
Date: 05/09/05

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    Date: Mon, 9 May 2005 13:00:53 -0400
To: "Charles Fraser" <fraserc@mail.montclair.edu>

    I agree whole heartedly about checks and balances, but that was not the question posed.
     
    The question that was posed was,
     
    "Does anyone know any software to control, audit, or restrict access or privileges to domain administrators."

    The "If I can't trust my admin he/she shouldn't be one" is not an archaic thought, it is a reality of computing. This is totally different from granting a user a higher level of permissions to do their work.
     
    In your case of granting sudo aka for win32, runas access to a user or junior admin, that is great, should be done and is a standard in modern networked enviorments. But again, we are not talking about limiting that persons access, we are talking about "YOUR" access, the domain admin, the person who gave the junior admin those rights in the first place.
     
    There is no such beast as a domain admin account without domain admin rights, it does not exist. It's like trying to restrict root on *nix. root is god over *nix, the same way a domain admin is godlike over windows (i use godlike because the juciest account is the all powerful system account)
     
    BTW, Granting a user the necessary rights to do their job with the most restrictive set possible is by no means a new school of thought. It is quite old.
     
    <snip>
    Full domain and
    enterprise administrators are less and less common in favor of dividing
    responsibility so administrators can have less rights to perform their
    day to day functions.
    </snip>
     
    Well, Someone has to got to be in that position, the enterprise just does not manage itself. And that is the person that we are talking about restricting. I have a feeling that your definition of an administrator is much different then mine. I am talking formal Network Administrators, not joe blow end users promoted to a network admin position because they are the most computer savvy.

    I will restate my mantra differently, If you can not trust someone to be in a position of complete un-adulterated control of your network, then they should not be in that position.
     
    Audit, Audit, Audit, Audit.
     
    ________________________________

    From: Charles Fraser [mailto:fraserc@mail.montclair.edu]
    Sent: Mon 5/9/2005 12:02 PM
    To: LordInfidel
    Cc: Diego Teijeiro Ruiz; security-basics@securityfocus.com
    Subject: Re: software to control domain administrators

    "If I can't trust my admin he/she shouldn't be one" is an archaic school
    of thought. In today's age of compliance and accountability that school
    of thought needs to be radically changed. There needs to be checks and
    balances. Which is why security has to be separate from operations. More
    and more enterprises are following the new school of thought that an
    employee has the computer access and permissions that it takes for he or
    she to perform their functions no more no less. Full domain and
    enterprise administrators are less and less common in favor of dividing
    responsibility so administrators can have less rights to perform their
    day to day functions. Windows offers runas and sudo capabilities which
    we utilize to reduce the number of people who require administrative
    access. I advocate a central/separate syslog/event viewer server that
    is not in the domain and the administrators have no access to
    whatsoever. Now if someone is trying to cover their tracks they can't
    because the logs are duplicated in real time to the central server. It
    should be stressed it is not a matter of trust but a matter of checks
    and balances.

    Charlie

    LordInfidel@directionweb.com wrote:

    >One of my co-workers pointed out that my response may of have come off
    >the wrong way...
    >
    >First, Always **Audit Everything**...... I was not advocating 'not
    >auditing'.
    >
    >Trustworthy Admins already do this with the explicit knowledge that they
    >themselves are subject to being audited and that their actions on the
    >network will be logged. The point I was attempting to make before is
    >that a malicious admin or one that feels threatened has the power to
    >reverse that auditing, which the auditing mechanism should reflect
    >anyways. But the problem is compounded if the admin has access to the
    >logs, then there is nothing stopping them from covering their tracks.
    >
    >I apologize if it confused anyone. The overall theme remains the same,
    >if you can't explicitly trust the people who are running your network
    >then they should not be running it.
    >
    >-----Original Message-----
    >From: LordInfidel@directionweb.com [mailto:LordInfidel@directionweb.com]
    >
    >Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2005 6:02 PM
    >To: Diego Teijeiro Ruiz; security-basics@securityfocus.com
    >Subject: RE: software to control domain administrators
    >
    >Probably a little late, been busy, but I did not see a response yet to
    >this.
    >
    >(assuming we are talking about NT/AD Domain Admins)
    >
    >Honestly, if you are looking for something to audit domain admins, then
    >you have bigger problems.
    >
    >Domain admins by the very nature of the account type, have complete
    >control over the domain, second to only enterprise admins. Nothing you
    >install or do will prevent them from removing or modifying it. Even
    >restricting them via NTFS permissions or GPO's does nothing since they
    >can just take ownership and modify the permissions.
    >
    >Keep in mind that spying on a domain admin can have catastrophic effects
    >if they feel threatened by it since they can easily mess up an entire
    >network.
    >
    >Basically, If you can not trust your domain admin(s), then they should
    >probably not be a domain admin and removed from that position of trust.
    >
    >JMO
    >
    >-----Original Message-----
    >From: Diego Teijeiro Ruiz [mailto:dteijeiro@azertia.com]
    >Sent: Thursday, April 28, 2005 5:51 AM
    >To: security-basics@securityfocus.com
    >Subject: software to control domain administrators
    >
    >
    >Does anyone know any software to control, audit, or restrict access or
    >privileges to domain administrators.
    >
    >thnx in advance
    >
    >
    >DTR
    >
    >
    >
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