Re: KVMs

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• Maybe in reply to: Tim Watkins: "KVMs"
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Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2005 09:48:40 +0800
To: security-basics@securityfocus.com

(Resent to the list due to issues with HTML Formatting (my bad))

> From: Tim Watkins <watkinstj@iimef.usmc.mil> [mailto:Tim Watkins
<watkinstj@iimef.usmc.mil>]

> Sent: Thursday, 17 February 2005 11:04 AM

> To: security-basics@securityfocus.com

> Subject: KVMs

>

>Had a quick question...

>

> I have some users that want to use KVMs to switch between computers on 3
different / separate networks.

>

> Are there any known security concerns about having networks set up this
way?

This really depends on the type of KVM you are talking about.

Switch-KVM - Where the switch connects to each console, and has a physical
cable (non-networked) running to a Keyboard/Video/Mouse.

IP-KVM - where the Switch connects to each console, and is then accessed
over the network

The first type (Switch-KVM) is the traditional KVM switch, and was first
implemented with simple "twist the dial" switch boxes. They are now
electronic, key-stroke controlled, Resolution aware, USB/PS-2 converting
intelligent pieces of physically connected kit.

These devices are safe in Restricted and Secret environments (don't quote
me - I have no military standing do justify this statement, but they do
comply with my understanding of Orange/Red Book requirements).

The IP-KVM is a whole different beast. These devices are analogous to
Serial Console servers, modem banks and other shared networking systems.

An IP-KVM allows a knowledgeable user to connect to a system console over
the IP network using one (or more) of a variety of protocols - including
(depending on the type of IP-KVM used) HTTP, HTTPS, HTTP/Java, RDP, ISA,
VNC and PCAnywhere. The IP-KVM may (or may not) implement additional
security, encryption or authentication beyond that offered by the
underlying Remote Terminal protocol.

In a military environment, IP-KVM would almost certainly constitute a
forbidden zone bridge, as a single device would be present in multiple
zones, unless the network interface of the IP-KVM resided in a zone that
has rights to see information in all the other zones.

This is the network equivalent of the restrictions on physical placement of
workstations - i.e. If the computer holds classified information, the
console (and access) to that computer must reside in a location of equal or
greater classification.

I hope that this helps.

Crispin.

P.S. I would be recommending that the individual use a (relatively) cheap
commercial Switch-KVM such as the Belkin OmniView, the LinkSys ProConnect,
D-Link DKVM to name a few.

>

> I am thinking that if I can remote into the machine that touches the
cloud, I would be able to then by pass security and use that machine to
remote into the private network.

>

> Any thoughts?

>

> Tim

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• Previous message: Gideon T. Rasmussen, CISSP, CISA, CISM, CFSO, SCSA: "General security policy vs. security awareness"
• Maybe in reply to: Tim Watkins: "KVMs"
• Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ] [ attachment ]