RE: Proxy & Firewall Implementation

From: David Gillett (gillettdavid_at_fhda.edu)
Date: 01/13/05

  • Next message: Davide: "Re: How TCP handle (RST,SYN) at initial connection establishment"
    To: "'John'" <naverxp@yahoo.com.sg>, <security-basics@securityfocus.com>
    Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2005 14:16:00 -0800
    
    

      There's no question that you need at least one firewall filtering
    traffic between your internal network and the outside world. Your
    DMZ servers accept connections from that outside world, so you want
    filtering between them and the inside network, too. But they shouldn't
    accept every and all connections from the outside. There are three
    basic ways to do this:

    1. Put a firewall between your internal network and the DMZ which allows
    session origination only from the trusted internal network. Put another
    firewall between the DMZ and the outside, which allows session origination
    from the inside and DMZ, and much more limited from the outside into just
    the DMZ.

    2. Put a firewall between your internal network and the DMZ which allows
    session origination only from the trusted internal network. Harden your
    DMZ servers ("bastion servers") to the gills.

    3. Put your internal network, DMZ, and the Internet on three (or more)
    interfaces of a firewall with appropriate filtering rules for traffic
    between
    these zones.

      Option #1 can be the most secure, but at the price of a second firewall,
    more complicated management (especially if the firewalls are of different
    types or vendors), and probably some performance overhead.
      Option #2 can be inexpensive, and provides the best possible performance.
      Option #3 offers a good trade-off between price, performance, protection,
    and manageability.

      The relative priority of these four criteria vary from one organization to
    the next. One size does not fit all.

    David Gillett

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: John [mailto:naverxp@yahoo.com.sg]
    > Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 5:04 PM
    > To: security-basics@securityfocus.com
    > Subject: Proxy & Firewall Implementation
    >
    >
    > Hi
    >
    > I'm a fresh graduate in System Administrator field. Recently,
    > with much
    > of luck, i was recommended to a company to implement a
    > firewall system
    > to their network infrastructure. I hope to pick some experience from
    > this forum as to how people in here might consider different
    > circumstances when placing their proxy server inside a
    > protected network
    > (behind the firwall) or before the firewall. Would i need two
    > firewalls?
    > (i'm considering the Cisco FW, and CyberGuard FW).
    >
    > During my research, i found a documentation written by a
    > blackhat whom
    > suggested to allocate DMZ most of my services (httpd, mail,
    > etc) outside
    > the internal network and make redundancies everynight. My 2nd
    > question,
    > why did he suggested that? why expose my services outside the network
    > where my information are Live and exposed to the risk of
    > being compromised.
    >
    > John
    >


  • Next message: Davide: "Re: How TCP handle (RST,SYN) at initial connection establishment"

    Relevant Pages

    • Re: Firewall and DMZ topology
      ... > network, Windows and Linux. ... > laptop used as a simple firewall setup. ... > machine and placing it in a DMZ. ... > internal network, one for the DMZ and one for the Internet. ...
      (Security-Basics)
    • RE: Firewall and DMZ topology
      ... purpose of a DMZ is to segment machines from your internal network whilst ... Subject: Firewall and DMZ topology ... I would like to set up a SOHO network with a firewall and DMZ for mostly ... Evaluating SSL VPNs' Consider NEOTERIS, chosen as leader by top analysts! ...
      (Security-Basics)
    • Re: Exchange server in DMZ, not FE server. Is this ever ok?
      ... It will turn out that it doesn't add value in terms of security ... If I hear you as saying having a firewall present is without value, ... NICs - one for the internal network, and the other for the DMZ. ...
      (microsoft.public.security)
    • Re: firewalling and dmz - hmmmm...
      ... A compromise of the first firewall or of a computer in the DMZ does not ... A more common scenario is for an intruder to use open ports on the firewall ... to compromise a host in the DMZ, such as a web server, using a vulnerability ... much better to have a firewall between that server and your internal network ...
      (comp.security.firewalls)
    • Ang: RE: Firewall and DMZ topology
      ... Network Engineer ... Subject: Firewall and DMZ topology ... > The Gartner Group just put Neoteris in the top of its Magic Quadrant, ...
      (Security-Basics)