RE: Firewall and VLAN security design

From: Paul Benedek (paul.benedek_at_excis.co.uk)
Date: 11/03/04

  • Next message: Mike: "RE: Spyware"
    To: "'Ivan Coric'" <ivan.coric@workcoverqld.com.au>, <bsampsel@libertyactivist.org>, <security-basics@securityfocus.com>
    Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2004 19:34:49 -0000
    
    

    Because of the way that switches deal with broadcasts, they can be insecure.
    VLANS as a form of separation is not a thorough method of separating a
    network. There is however a technology called a private VLAN that is more
    secure and allows you to control traffic at layer 2 by installing access
    lists on your switches and by designating ports with differing levels of
    control. Cisco and Nortel switches have this capability and Cisco does
    recommend it for use within the SAFE methodology.

    The SAFE methodology calls for defence in depth and Private VLANS are one of
    their recommendations for Layer 2 defence. They further recommend other
    devices such as IDS, firewalls and filtering to give additional security at
    this and other layers.

    Paul Benedek
    Director
    Excis Networks Limited

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Ivan Coric [mailto:ivan.coric@workcoverqld.com.au]
    Sent: 03 November 2004 04:44
    To: bsampsel@libertyactivist.org; security-basics@securityfocus.com
    Subject: RE: Firewall and VLAN security design

    I beg to differ, using VLANs to segregate your external and internal
    network is a bad idea.

    I don't think even Cisco recommends VLANs as a security mechanism

    http://www.sans.org/resources/idfaq/vlan.php

    http://www.spirit.com/Network/net0103.html

    http://www.terena.nl/conferences/tnc2003/programme/slides/s1c3.ppt

    http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/networkdevs/1090.php

    http://www.google.com.au/search?q=vlan+hopping&hl=en&lr=&start=10&sa=N

    cheers
    Ivan

    Ivan Coric, CISSP
    IT Technical Security Officer
    Information Technology
    WorkCover Queensland
    Ph: (07) 30066414 Fax: (07) 30066424
    Email: ivan.coric@workcoverqld.com.au

    >>> "Bryan S. Sampsel" <bsampsel@libertyactivist.org> 2/11/2004 2:56:11
    pm >>>

    >
    >> Is VLAN segmentation enough to segment between the internet, DMZ
    and
    >> the internal network, or should I also use different switches for
    >> each, and be connected through the firewall.
    >
    > This is a FAQ, and the usual answer is that no, VLAN separation is
    not
    > a robust security barrier, an separate switches are recommended where
    the
    > different subnets need separation for security reasons.
    >

    Actually, if you don't offer up your management interface to the
    publicly
    accessible side of things, the VLAN separation makes things function
    exactly like a physically separate switch. Without the routing
    between
    those VLANs, the traffic does not magically go from one VLAN to
    another
    and the ability to exploit/crack the switch is no greater than having
    a
    separate switch in place. In fact, if you have a managed switch, and
    do
    not logically isolate your management interface/IP, you're opening up
    that
    standalone switch.

    If you're not crazy enough to put the management IP on the publicly
    accessible side, there is no risk unless you allow access through a
    firewall or other routing solution. This is a fundamental concept of
    managed switches and VLANs.

    This is at least true of Foundry Networks and Cisco switches. Mileage
    may
    vary. ;)

    Sincerely,

    Bryan S. Sampsel
    LibertyActivist.org
    FNCNE

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