RE: Wireless Security for Home Users

From: Keenan, Scott (scott.keenan@eds.com)
Date: 09/04/02


From: "Keenan, Scott" <scott.keenan@eds.com>
To: "Snow, Corey" <csnow@deltadentalwa.com>, "'Tony Brisco'" <tony_brisco@yahoo.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 16:59:56 -0500 


While I don't disagree with Corey's approach, it may be a bit of overkill
for most home users to create and/or manage 2 firewalls and a DMZ. Don't
get me wrong, this is essentially the same setup I employ at home, but
creating, managing and playing with firewalls is also something I do for fun
much like Corey's 1/2 mile antenna.

If I were a typical home user with a few PCs for my kids to game on, a
laptop or PC for home finance and occasional netsurfing/homework help, I
don't think I'd go so far as to install 2 firewalls and segment off traffic
from the wireless access points. As with most network security, the level
of security needs to be weighed against both the value of the assets to be
protected, and the hassles/difficulties inherent in adding layers of
security (i.e. if you don't know anything about firewalls, either the
expense of buying them or the complexity of building them as Corey suggests
may be more trouble than it's worth to just be able to surf the net while
sitting on your deck). That said, installing a firewall on the inside of
your cable router is a good idea, and should be considered a mandatory
security practice for anyone. Most of the "home use" companies like D-link,
Netgear and Linksys make decent ones that can also serve as an intro to
firewall features such as NAT, PAT, statefull packet inspection, etc. I
would recommend ANY and EVERY home user have some sort of firewall between
themselves and the internet, even when using dial-up.

Beyond just good home network security practices, specific to wireless I
would recommend the following;

1) As Corey says, use WEP, 128 bit if possible. In addition, as suggested,
investigate additional security features available from the WAP
manufacturer. Some are implementing additional WEP features like TKIP
(rotating WEP keys), and MIC (Message Integrity Check). If not, then also
as suggested, change your WEP keys regularly and often.

2) Disable broadcast SSID. Sure the SSID is always transmitted in the
clear, so anyone wanting to find it merely has to wait for an exchange
between the access point and a client, but most WAP's support disabling
broadcasting the SSID to the world. At least this way someone driving up
your street isn't greeted by your WAP saying "hi, here's my SSID, want to
join me?" Changing the SSID from the default is slightly helpful. As said,
it's always transmitted in the clear, but if you disable broadcast SSID, but
never change it from the default, then anyone driving down your street who
knows default SSIDs for WAPs would have very little trouble associating to
your AP. For example, Cisco's default SSID is tsunami. Everyone knows this
(there are webpages that list these, along with default administrator
account names and passwords for the various WAP manufacturers), so changing
the defaults is always a good idea, if only marginally helpful.

3) Check to see if your access point allows limiting the number of client
associations. Some manufacturers allow you to limit the number of clients
associated at any given time. So, for example if you have 2 wireless
clients, and they maintain a constant connection to the WAP, set this to 2
and no one else can associate to the access point.

4) Along the lines of "additional security features", check to see if your
manufacturer allows MAC address filtering. Again, it's easy enough to spoof
MAC addresses, but as Corey mentions, why bother trying to break in when
someone else down the street is wide open?

5) Depending on your home network complexity, some WAP manufacturers are
beginning to support 802.1x EAP, which allows for client authentication via
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) enabled RADIUS servers, thus
allowing the RADIUS server to authenticate users prior to allowing then onto
your network. This assumes you have an EAP enabled RADIUS server, and both
the time and inclination to use it.

6) Last, but not least, see if you can adjust your transmit power. Most
802.11b AP's transmit at 100mW max. This of course, allows for the maximum
distance for clients attempting to associate with the AP. However, in most
cases, particularly in home use, this range far exceeds that necessary.
Being able to broadcast 200 feet indoors is useful if your home is 400 ft x
400 ft (that's a bit of an exaggeration, but I'm sure you get the point).
Placing an AP in the center of such a house allows 200 feet in all
directions (including similar ranges above and below), but if your house
isn't that large, then your broadcasting strong signals into the street.
Many manufacturers allow the transmit power to be adjusted to lower settings
such as 50, 20, 5 and even 1mW. I would suggest lowering the power and then
moving around in your house with a wireless laptop, and seeing if you get
sufficient coverage in all areas. If so, lower it again, until you find
you're losing signal at your most distant client device location. In other
words, set the transmit power as low as you can to maintain sufficient
coverage inside your home, or intended coverage area, i.e. deck, porch,
garage, etc). You may still be beaming signal 50 feet in front of your
house, but you may at least stop transmitting to the houses across the
street......you can always wander around outside to see if you can connect
from the middle of the street or further also.

Having said all of the above, it doesn't take someone long with tools such
as AirSnort to break WEP encryption keys. Currently the security measures
"within wireless" can help prevent casual drive by's or curious neighbors,
but by corporate security standards, none of them provide "enterprise class"
security. TKIP with frequently rotating WEP key changes help mitigate the
threat from all but the most determined hackers, but support for it is only
recently beginning to appear in WAPs, so for now most home users are stuck
with static WEP. Better than nothing, but you shouldn't rely on it for
highly sensitive information. For example, most security plans for large
corporations include the use of an IPSEC VPN for encryption between wireless
clients and internal networks in addition to network segmentation and
isolation within DMZ's as Corey suggests. This allows for the creation of a
tunnel between a wireless client device such as a laptop and the corporate
intranet, similar to those used for RAS access for years. The user may be
at home or on the road, but so long as they're connecting via VPN, they're
safe. Many companies are adopting this same approach to WLANs.

Scott

Now for the legal stuff: These are my opinions and suggestions alone, and
in no way represent the opinions, advise or positions of my employer.

-----Original Message-----
From: Snow, Corey [mailto:csnow@deltadentalwa.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 04, 2002 12:54 PM
To: 'Tony Brisco'
Cc: 'security-basics@securityfocus.com'
Subject: RE: Wireless Security for Home Users

Well, I'm not entirely certain what you mean by securing it over cable
modem, but the things to do with WLAN connections:

Use WEP. It's not perfect, but it's a heckuva lot better than nothing.

User 128-bit WEP if your equipment supports it. If it doesn't, look into
firmware updates from your vendor. Just using WEP will cause about 95% of
the casual wardrivers to pass you by; there's always an unencrypted network
to snoop just up the street.

Use any vendor-specific security improvements available to you. For example,
I believe if you use a 3Com WAP and 3Com client cards, there are some
higher-security options than straight WEP available to you. If, like me, you
have a different vendor for your client WLAN card than your WAP, you're
probably stuck with straight WEP. (do some research as well. Check out the
various wireless LAN sites, and google around a bit).

Change your WEP keys on a regular basis. Even if it means typing them in
manually. Since this is a home network, you probably don't need to do it for
a bunch of machines.

DO NOT, and I repeat: DO NOT put your WAP on your network directly! This is
security suicide, and I don't care how many layers of encryption you put on
it. If it's directly on your network, you're done for. Put it on a DMZ of
some type, and assume that everything coming from that DMZ is suspect. I
have a 3-tier system on my home network, like so:

Internet---DSLRouter---Firewall---DMZ---Firewall---Internal
                                           |
                                           |
                                          WAP

On my firewall(s), I have some very specific rules about what traffic is
allowed in from the segment the WAP point lives on- that is, very, very
little. And even that is only enough to establish a more secure connection,
which is subject to only very slightly higher privilege levels. I also
recommend the use of tools like SSH to add an additional layer of security
to your WLAN sessions.

You may not have or need a large system like the one above, but you should
definitely keep a WAP off your internal network. Use an old box (even a 486
DX2/66 will do), throw FreeBSD and a couple of old NICs in it, and you've
got a nice, cheap firewall.

Remember, nothing prevents someone from associating with a WAP or simply
listening to the traffic it broadcasts passively. I have built, just for
grins, a directional antenna that lets me use a laptop to pick up and sniff
WAP signals from over 1/2 mile away. If I had used more precision tools, I
could probably do it from 2 miles. I did this because it amused me. There
are people who will do it to attack you. Wireless is cool, but it's major
security risk if you don't do it right- and the reason wardriving is so
popular is because almost no one does.

Corey M. Snow- csnow@deltadentalwa.com
I don't speak for my employer.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tony Brisco [mailto:tony_brisco@yahoo.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 9:34 AM
> To: security-basics@securityfocus.com
> Subject: Wireless Security for Home Users
>
>
>
> Hello everyone,
>
> What would be the must do things to secure my home
> wireless connection over cable modem ?
>
> Thanks,
> Tony Brisco.
>
> __________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
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>

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