RE: Some questions on DES Encryption...

From: Jeremy Epstein (jeremy.epstein@webmethods.com)
Date: 03/10/03

  • Next message: Marc Slemko: "Re: Insecurities in Non-exclusive Scoket Binding" 
    From: Jeremy Epstein <jeremy.epstein@webmethods.com>
To: Kryptik Logik <kryptiklogik@hushmail.com>, secprog@securityfocus.com
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 09:24:42 -0800

    Depends on why you're asking. If you're researching crypto,
    sci.crypt.research is probably a better place to ask. If you're worried
    about someone attacking our crypto, you're worried about the wrong thing.
    Even 56 bit DES is strong enough that an attacker will almost always attack
    something else before they attack the crypto.

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Kryptik Logik [mailto:kryptiklogik@hushmail.com]
    > Sent: Saturday, March 08, 2003 3:57 PM
    > To: secprog@securityfocus.com
    > Subject: Some questions on DES Encryption...
    >
    >
    >
    >
    > I'm not too sure whether this is the right forum to ask this but I
    >
    > couldn't find a Crypto mailing list so here goes:
    >
    >
    >
    > I have a few questions on the DES Encryption algorithm:
    >
    >
    >
    > 1. In DES algorithm, given an encrypted text and the
    > corresponding plain
    >
    > text for that is it possible to retrieve the key.
    > Essentially, how secure
    >
    > is DES to known-plain text attack. I read some where that it is quite
    >
    > resistant requiring 2^55 plain texts to get the key but why
    > is this so?
    >
    > What particular feature of the algorithm makes it this way?
    >
    >
    >
    > # klogik
    >

  • Next message: Marc Slemko: "Re: Insecurities in Non-exclusive Scoket Binding"