RE: Fwd: Terminal services and remote programs.
- From: Sat Jagat Singh <flyingdervish@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 10:42:45 -0700 (PDT)
I'll count myself as corrected on the issue of privilege escalation through MS Office. I actually did find one. MS06-009 pertains to a vulnerability in the Korean Input Method Editor of multi-language versions of Office 2003 that Microsoft says can be exploited to escalate privileges. So, that's pretty obscure and unlikely to be found in most environments. But it demonstrates that such a thing is conceptually possible.
Concerning access control and other "unauthorized" access, in some environments simply being able to use ping or browse the network is a violation of policy, though it may not violate the configured access rights. One needs to distinguish between what is authorized in the sense of managerial policy versus permissions that are actually configured. These types of unintended access are often the gateway to finding poorly secured assets that are actually sensitive. That is why such desktop restrictions are implemented as one way of enforcing access control. You are certainly correct that in and of themselves these measures are not access control.
--- On Fri, 5/2/08, Thor (Hammer of God) <thor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: Thor (Hammer of God) <thor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: RE: Fwd: Terminal services and remote programs.
To: "PenTest" <pen-test@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Friday, May 2, 2008, 3:50 PM
Inline:
-----Original Message-----Jagat Singh
From: listbounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:listbounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Sat
Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2008 7:48 AMprograms.
To: PenTest
Subject: Re: Fwd: Terminal services and remote
through social
Our team regularly breaks into Terminal Servers
engineering and phishing techniques. So, measure #1to protect these:
require either ipsec vpn to be able to connect to thebox or two
factor
authentication such as RSA or Vasco to get on it.
Always excellent advise, and not just for terminal
services. Multiple
authentication methods are always recommended.
When I have credentials, I have never yet seen aTerminal Server or
Citrix Metaframe server on which I wasn't able togain unauthorized
access to programs and escalate that to where I couldget to most
anything, no matter how tightly somebody thought itwas locked down.
There are dozens of ways to break out of anapplication jail in
Windows.
Well, you might choose to call it "unauthorized"
access, but it is
clearly "authenticated" access, and access to
files that you have
*permission* to access. More next...
1) In the programs you mention, just go to the fileopen dialog box.
Now you basically have a Windows Explorer interface.You can use this
to create shortcuts on your desktop to executablesthat may be
otherwise inaccessible, browse the network, deletefiles and more.
Internet
2) The help system for the application is basically an
Explorer interface. This has been widely exploited bymany people to
carry out all kinds of mischief.
So, yes -- there are many, many ways to "exit"
out of published
applications or otherwise "desktop access
limitation" methods like found
in the resource kit. Help-menu access is a well known
method of opening
other windows while in a "limited desktop"
environment, as is
"alternateshell" or "launch on connect"
options. However, limited
desktop measures are *not* security solutions - they are
simply methods
by which to streamline deployments and to keep users from
"hurting
themselves" by accident.
But don't confuse "using help to access an
Internet Explorer interface"
with something like "bypassing permissions" or
"un-authenticated access"
or "privileged escalation." I know *you* are not
confusing the two, but
others on this list may think you are saying that accessing
IE via Help
is the same thing as bypassing an access control, which you
are not.
Escalating from a normal user to admin on a properly
secured box (or
just a regular, say, Win2k3 box for that matter) is not as
easy as you
make it sound. You'll have to either find an unpatched
vulnerability to
exploit, or some other terribly misconfigured service to
leverage.
In this example, the OP was concerned with a full desktop
of all Office
and Adobe applications -- the issue is NOT about
"getting IE" or
"explorer" windows - it is about taking simple
measures of auditing
system permissions so that users cannot trivially (or even
non-trivially) escalate privilege. All applications via
RDP will be run
in the context of the logged on user (to answer the
original question)
and no manner of "unauthorized access" to IE or
Explorer changes that.
This is the crux of the past post about a "RDP
vulnerability" that dude
didn't understand.
3) Application vulnerabilities that permit codeexecution.
Indeed. RDP hosts must be properly patched just like
desktops. The one
good benefit of an RDP host over a desktop is that the user
doesn't have
direct physical access by which they can easily get admin.
However,
they still must be audited, patched, and have logs
reviewed.
Critical measures to prevent these include:possible, or restricted
- install the system on an isolated network if
DMZ otherwise;of a Windows
- such servers should be either standalone or a member
domain that is used only for administering theTerminal Servers;
- ensure that all of the application patches areinstalled promptly
Great advise, of course.
personnel
Other security controls are also relevant, including,
controls such as background checks, user accountmanagement that
include promptly deleting obsolete accounts.
I'm really glad you mentioned this. Policy counts
here. Just like on
desktops, users caught trying to bypass authentication
methods or
practicing unsafe computing should be shot immediately.
Corporate due
diligence in hiring, old account maintenance, and general
good
housekeeping is a must, and an excellent inclusion.
To answer your other question, if there is apatch-based vulnerability
in the application that someone can exploit to executecode, it would
typically give them the security context of their ownuser account.
But I think their have been at least a few MS Officevulnerabilities
that were exploitable to escalate privileges.
Like which? Can you name one? I'm not aware of an
office vuln that
allowed for escalation.
It would depend on thebetter over
nature of the vulnerability. Typically, MS has gotten
time
at limiting the opportunities to carry out exploitsand the impact of
the exploit when it does succeed. So, it would beworth considering
Windows 2008 to deploy such a solution. While it islargely untested
in the wild, it should benefit from Microsoft'simproved development
and testing processes under the "securitydevelopment lifecycle" and
"trustworthy computing" regime.
Again, great advise. 2008 offers many new methods by which
to secure
TerminalServices and RemoteApp deployments, including
certificate
connectoids, TLS/SSL connections, digitally signed RDP
files and
MSI-based remote app deployments, and in combination with
ISA, even
client-certificate based TSWeb connection options.
t
-----------
Check out Tim Mullen's "Microsoft Ninjitsu"
training at Blackhat Vegas
2008.
There are also some other great NGS classes lead by
world-class
researchers and trainers available.
http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-08/train-bh-usa-08-tm-ms-bbe.html
<paul.halliday@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
--- On Fri, 4/25/08, Paul Halliday
<paul.halliday@xxxxxxxxx>
From: Paul Halliday
programs.Subject: Fwd: Terminal services and remote
audit on aTo: pen-test@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Friday, April 25, 2008, 4:03 PM
I am just curious if any of you have performed an
thesetup
like this:
In a nutshell, tech services is looking to offer
throughentire
Microsoft Office suite and Adobe Creative suite
vulnerability inTerminal
services.
My immediate concern is, If there is a
closelythe remote
apps, what will the context be for the attacker?
Is there anything else I should be looking more
---------------------------------------------------------------------at?
Thanks.
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Need to secure your web apps NOW?
Cenzic finds more, "real" vulnerabilities fast.
Click to try it, buy it or download a solution FREE today!
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