RE: Moving from Defense to Offense (or vice versa) to secure your network

From: Evans, Arian (Arian.Evans_at_fishnetsecurity.com)
Date: 11/28/05

  • Next message: Harry Hoffman: "Re: Experiences with company nCircle and their IP360 product"
    Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2005 15:00:03 -0600
    To: "Erin Carroll" <amoeba@amoebazone.com>, <pen-test@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Erin Carroll [mailto:amoeba@amoebazone.com]
    > Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 7:37 PM
    > To: pen-test@securityfocus.com
    [...]
    > How many of you have switched between offense/defense and
    > what were some of the stumbling blocks or key differences you
    > found in how you approached your goals?

    As previously mentioned in this thread, these are two *very* different
    skills/knowledge bases. When hiring brand-name pen-testing groups in a
    previous life I found that most individuals' comprehension of the art of
    defense was inversely proportional to skill/knowledge-base in the art of
    attack. Common example issues w/attacker(consultants):

    1)--no idea how Windows/AD/GPO security worked. Baffled by designs I
    implemented that prevented compromise techniques. </RestrictAnonymous=2>

    2)--common misunderstandings of network/protocol analysis, and filtering
    rules distinguishing between TCP/UDP implemented to limit attacks
    on things like old versions of BIND (e.g.-attacks typically TCP-based so
    easy to block completely; when UDP based were trivial to filter for)

    3)--Same as #2 re: arp-cache poisoning; rarely understood VLANs; VLAN trunking;
    master trunk ports; why they were limited; what secure switch-fabric/VLAN
    design actually entailed. No real-world enterprise experience.

    4)--Same as #2 re: web app security. Little/limited understanding of XSS
    and SQLi exploitation abilities, impact, and sound mitigation (still today).

    5)--context-less findings. No solution here for outside consultant reports...
    requires internal business/org knowledge.

    > Is it worth it to cross-train in some manner?

    Yes/Know (pun). Developers/business-owners will rarely fix their app/code
    unless you can demonstrate a successful compromise. Same with the Windows
    admin that isn't willing to address headaches with RA=2 (Mac/*nix clients,
    legacy DCs, etc) until effective compromise is demonstrated. However...:

    I believe "How to Hack" classes are mostly wasted/useless for skills-based
    objectives (as frequently sold). Admins and developers need to focus on secure
    design/architecture, implementation, and threat-mitigation. The behavioral
    result of "how to hack" is strictly awareness change (knowledge-based, not
    skills-based gains) for 95+% of people. (which has *a* value but different value...)

    Teaching someone how to properly use parameterized SQL is entirely different
    from teaching someone the art of SQL Injection. I do not believe that you
    need to know one to address the other. (Unless a specific security domain
    is in your defined area of responsibility.)

    > How have you sold someone on the advantages of penetration-testing your network
    > to quantify and test the effectiveness of your existing defenses?

    Validation. Human beings make mistakes. After imitation, mistakes are one of
    the key ways humans learn. Considering today's IT/security landscape is chiefly
    built upon security mistakes, learning via imitation (of questionable behaviors)
    + natural human propensity for error = necessary validation.

    This is demonstrated by the fact even our security controls (firewalls, AV, etc.)
    can be the key points of security weakness in our enterprise.
     
    > I would be interested to hear some cases you have run into out there.

    It is an interesting subject. I have irritated "security professionals" before
    by informing them that "how to hack" is not what they want. "How to Hack" is
    cool, sexy, gets attention, gets budget dollars, etc. It's what "security
    professionals" tend to request in training RFPs for developers or admins,
    though I do not think it is that useful.

    It's why ads for "secure cars" show slow-motion video of the vehicle being
    *smashed*, instead of video of endless engineering-specification meetings
    for side-impact airbags and quarter-panel crumple-zones.

    But here is the part of the analogy that interests me: Do automotive engineers
    responsible for implementing properly designed/deployed airbags need to study
    accidents to design/implement them....perform "fault injection" on vehicles to
    learn how to improve them? I do not know.

    I suspect that the two aspects (fault injection; implement fault-tolerance) are
    disparate fields in automotive engineering, much like I believe they are in IT.

    Disclaimer: the above is all my opinion. I have been wrong before...a few times...,

    -ae

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  • Next message: Harry Hoffman: "Re: Experiences with company nCircle and their IP360 product"

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