Re: MSFT Bans insecure hashes - was"Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows"

From: Thor (Hammer of God) (thor_at_hammerofgod.com)
Date: 09/24/05

  • Next message: Alvin Oga: "Re: VOIP Pen-Testing" 
    To: <pen-test@securityfocus.com>
Date: Sat, 24 Sep 2005 13:11:38 -0700

    Well, the moderator apparently didn't like the way I approached my last
    post, so let's try this again, focusing on just the technical aspects this
    time. (Mod, please let this one through- if he responds, the information
    will be *invaluable* to millions of Windows installations all over the
    world.)

    You postulate: "I still say that Kerberos or IPsec based auth is the best
    policy in windows. LanMan, NTLMv1 or V2 are vulnerable."

    After I pointed out that "IPsec based auth" is not a basic netlogon
    authentication protocol like Kerberos, LM, NTLM and NTLMv2, you said I was
    wrong and came back with several posts containing your google results on
    "IPSec" and "authentication."

    Rather than getting into how the basic client-server authentication netlogon
    protocols are vastly different than IPSec channels, please just answer one
    of the following questions. I'll try to make them very simple.

    Scenario: You've got an XP Pro laptop on the Windows network logged on with
    local credentials. A network resource on a Win2k server somewhere is
    accessed, requiring new credentials be entered to access the resource.
    Please tell us exactly how you force the client and server to use "IPSec
    based auth" to authenticate the request as opposed to LM, NTLM, or NTLMv2.
    Be specific, and please don't just copy and paste someone else's work from
    google.

    or:
    Scenario: You've got a regular domain user on a domain member accessing a
    network share on a remote system. The clock on the PC is 8 minutes off from
    the DC. Please tell us exactly how you force the client and server to use
    "IPSec based auth" to authenticate the request as opposed to LM, NTLM, or
    NTLMv2. Be specific, and please don't just copy and paste someone else's
    work from google.

    or:
    Scenario: You've got a network user accessing a corporate web site that
    does not allow anonymous connections. The web site is configured to use
    only "Integrated Windows authentication."' The browser allows auto-logon
    from local intranet only. Please tell us exactly how you force the client
    and server to use "IPSec based auth" to authenticate the request as opposed
    to LM, NTLM, or NTLMv2. Be specific, and please don't just copy and paste
    someone else's work from google.

    or:
    Scenario: You've got a remote user who has logged in locally, but VPN'd
    into the network using a domain account. They go into outlook, make a SQL
    connection via windows integrated authentication, access network shares,
    print to a domain printer, etc. Please tell us exactly how you force the
    client and server(s) used to use "IPSec based auth" to authenticate the
    request as opposed to LM, NTLM, or NTLMv2. Be specific, and please don't
    just copy and paste someone else's work from google.

    That should be plenty of examples... I've been teaching about IPSec in my
    Microsoft Ninjitsu classes for years now, and I never knew it could used as
    a netlogon authentication protocol. You can image how excited I am to find
    out this information! So please take just a little more time and give us
    the specific settings and configurations used that allow us to specify
    "IPSec based auth" in place of LM, NTLM, or NTLMV2.

    Thanks!

    T

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Craig Wright" <cwright@bdosyd.com.au>
    To: <pen-test@securityfocus.com>
    Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2005 8:52 PM
    Subject: MSFT Bans insecure hashes - was"Passwords with Lan Manager (LM)
    under Windows"

    First the quote from the MSFT program manager

    "Microsoft is banning certain cryptographic functions from new computer
    code, citing increasingly sophisticated attacks that make them less
    secure, according to a company executive. The Redmond, Wash., software
    company instituted a new policy for all developers that bans functions
    using the DES, MD4, MD5 and, in some cases, the SHA1 encryption
    algorithm, which is becoming "creaky at the edges," said Michael Howard,
    senior security program manager at the company, Howard said."

    "All three algorithms show signs of 'extreme weakness' and have been
    banned, Howard said. Microsoft is recommending using the Secure Hash
    Algorithm (SHA)256 encryption algorithm and AES (Advanced Encryption
    Standard) cipher instead, he said.

    Quote when hearing about this
    "It's about time," Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Security Inc "Microsoft
    should
    have ended use of DES, MD4 and MD5 years ago"

    To answer "And I'm not sure where you are getting your info regarding
    Microsoft "dropping NTLMv2 for backward compatibility.""...
    Don't take my word for it...

    http://www.eweek.com/article2/0%2C1895%2C1859751%2C00.asp
    http://www.neowin.net/comments.php?id=30463&category=main
    http://www.technorati.com/search/md5
    http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1697,1859953,00.asp
    http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/09/16/1211227&from=rss
    http://diswww.mit.edu/bloom-picayune/crypto/18482
    http://www.codeproject.com/useritems/GoodbyeMD5.asp
    http://forums.thetechzone.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=76038

    http://download.microsoft.com/download/b/8/3/b838ee36-41a2-4280-af5c-182
    04bb7a581/cryptography_windows_vista_2005_MBR.wmv

    Complimentary
    http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2002/jan02/01-24secure.mspx

    For those who still believe MD5 collisions are just theory
    http://www.codeproject.com/useritems/HackingMd5.asp

    Craig

    PS NTLMv2 uses MD4 and HMAC_MD5 - these are not going to be supported.
    MSFT is moving to AES and SHA256 - so I guess it might be time for some
    people still on Windows 98 or NT 4.0 to finally move on.

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  • Next message: Alvin Oga: "Re: VOIP Pen-Testing"

    Relevant Pages

    • RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows
      ... A device's security associations are contained in its Security Association Database ... Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) provides application-transparent encryption services for IP network traffic as well as other network access protections for the Windows 2000 operating system. ... As for "article you reference does indeed use the phrase "IPSec Authentication," but as any who reads it ...
      (Pen-Test)
    • Re: Kerberos machine authentication - apparent authentication fail
      ... as the case may be) which will delay authentication until ... I also have an Intel network adapter and WAP that does not have this> problem and even works well with 802.1X EAP-TLS for domain logon. ... In> most cases [ipsec a possible exception] kerberos authentication is not> needed to access domain resources as long as the client and server use a> common authentication method for lm/ntlm/ntlmv2. ... The main issue is to> NEVER include an ISP dns server in the preferred server list in the tcp/ip> properties or DHCP scope of any domain computer or any computer you want to> join to the domain in which case your computers may be trying to locate the> domain _srv records on the ISP dns server and fail. ...
      (microsoft.public.windows.server.security)
    • Re: IPsec - restrict communcation
      ... IPsec can use three different methods to initially authenticate machines: ... permit, block, or negotiate security, as well as authentication methods ... you don't need the communications to be private. ...
      (microsoft.public.security)
    • RE: ADS Password Storage Protection
      ... In Windows it is LM or NT (sometimes called NTLM) hashes. ... NTLMv2 refers to the authenication protocol that exchanges the hash ... between the client and server authentication database. ...
      (Security-Basics)
    • Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows
      ... I already said why you can't pre-compile NTLMv2: The hash generated for the ... As I said earlier "Kerberos support with IPsec" And by this yes ...
      (Pen-Test)