RE: priviledge escalation techniques

From: Michael Howard (mikehow_at_microsoft.com)
Date: 01/20/05

  • Next message: Leonardo Eloy: "Re: Recent Linux vulnerabilities"
    Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2005 21:12:54 -0800
    To: "Marc Maiffret" <mmaiffret@eeye.com>, "Dan Rogers" <pentestguy@gmail.com>, <pen-test@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    >> c:\program

    By default, at least on WinXP and WinServer 2003, you'd need to be an
    admin to drop program.[exe|cmd|com] into the root dir.

    Of course, if you have FAT, or a weak ACLs on the root, then yeah.

    [Writing Secure Code] http://www.microsoft.com/mspress/books/5957.asp
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    -----Original Message-----
    From: Marc Maiffret [mailto:mmaiffret@eeye.com]
    Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 12:59 AM
    To: Dan Rogers; pen-test@securityfocus.com
    Subject: RE: priviledge escalation techniques

    If your looking to do a quick privilege escalation with a system where
    you already have a login then I would suggest using the c:\program trick
    in which any service that fails to put quotes around its "Path to
    executable" argument and points to a file in c:\program files can lead
    to local SYSTEM ... As windows will execute c:\program before the real
    file. There are a lot of third party applications installed in most of
    corporate America that can lead to this attack working. Products by
    companies like Scriptlogic for example or any software that used one of
    the buggy versions of Microsoft's MSI to create their installer package.
    Even this new "biometric" authentication keyboard I am playing with from
    MS has the flaw... They reference, C:\Program
    Files\DigitalPersona\Bin\DpHost.exe, which means if I put a trojan as
    c:\program than the next time that service starts (most likely a reboot)
    my trojan (c:\program.exe) will execute as SYSTEM. Good thing my
    biometric keyboard made me more secure :-) p.s. don't forget to make it
    a service file.

    As for the rest of your internal security... Your probably better off
    understanding your patching processes, how you've locked down your
    client apps (outlook, IE, etc...) and what you've done to lock down the
    file system, which can prevent attacks like the one mentioned above.
    Obviously once you have asked everyone how they think they have locked
    down the security of your internal network you should then double check
    that by doing your "hacking" stuff. If you cant yourself or don't have
    anyone that can *already* answer questions like this for your company,
    than the answer is your internal security is non-existent.

    Signed,
    Marc Maiffret
    Chief Hacking Officer
    eEye Digital Security
    T.949.349.9062
    F.949.349.9538
    http://eEye.com/Retina - Network Security Scanner
    http://eEye.com/Iris - Network Traffic Analyzer
    http://eEye.com/SecureIIS - Stop known and unknown IIS vulnerabilities

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    | -----Original Message-----
    | From: Dan Rogers [mailto:pentestguy@gmail.com]
    | Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2005 7:59 AM
    | To: pen-test@securityfocus.com
    | Subject: priviledge escalation techniques
    |
    | Hi List,
    |
    | I have been asked to test the network security of my
    | organisation from an internal perspective. My boss has not
    | been particularly specific in his requirements (other than
    | asking that I don't break any operational
    | infrastructure) so I can approach the problem from whichever
    | way I deem most appropriate.
    |
    | I suspect the first thing I will attempt is privilege
    | escalation techniques from a workstation with a domain user
    | account to see if I can install my own software/toolset. Can
    | anyone suggest any good whitepapers or tools that I can use
    | to get a head start?
    |
    | I intend to follow this up by scanning/targeting critical
    | parts of our infrastructure - domain controllers, mail
    | servers, routers etc.
    | However, I am interested to know what other people would do
    | when given free reign to identify internal weaknesses - so
    | how should I approach this? This is not an 'audit' exercise,
    | as I will not be given access to server/infrastructure configurations.
    |
    | Any advise on this appreciated.
    |
    | Dan
    |


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