Re: Honeypot detection and countermeasures

From: Lance Spitzner (lance_at_honeynet.org)
Date: 06/24/03

  • Next message: Trygve Aasheim: "SV: Honeypot detection and countermeasures"
    Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2003 22:01:09 -0500 (CDT)
    To: Dragos Ruiu <dr@kyx.net>
    
    

    On Mon, 23 Jun 2003, Dragos Ruiu wrote:

    > On June 23, 2003 06:58 am, Rob Shein wrote:
    > > This wouldn't work. Seeing the packets/traffic on the wire doesn't tell
    > > you the tools that are used, and it also doesn't really give you much else.
    > > Considering that a honeypot is either not really rootable (DTK) or is very
    > > low hanging fruit (and very rootable, like a honeynet.org system), they
    > > either won't see tools downloaded to the system or won't see anything more
    > > than the bare minimum needed to exploit a system that is too vulnerable to
    > > begin with.

    *sigh*, its misconceptions like these that create confusion. Honeypots
    are an extremely powerful and flexible tool that comes in many shapes
    and sizes. Everything from Honeyd which can deploy millions of virtual
    honeypots on your network, to more advance high-interaction honeypots,
    such as ManTrap or Honeynets. This does not even take into consideration
    concepts such as honeytokens or honeypot farms.

    In reference to your concern of easy to break in systems, a great deal
    of research is going into more advance honeypot deployments. Examples
    include HotZoning or Tiering. HotZoning is when all 'bad' traffic
    is directed to honeypots. Tieiring is honeypots of different
    complexity levels, where advanced attackers are lured into more
    difficult honepyots.

    Second, you are falling into the common trap of the break in. The most
    interesting tools we have seen were not the ones used to break into
    honeypots, but the ones used afterwards. Things like IPv6 tunneling
    to hide traffic, remote commands using IP proto 11, or advance CC
    Fraud. We have even seen exploits being developed in real time. This
    information has been used to help OS vendors change their patching
    priorities.

    If you have not looked at honeypots in a while, I recommend you give
    them a quick reivew. They have made radical advances in the past
    several years.

        Honeypots: Definitions and Values
        http://www.tracking-hackers.com/papers/honeypots.html

    lance

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  • Next message: Trygve Aasheim: "SV: Honeypot detection and countermeasures"

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