Re: Software vendor clueless
To: Mark Medici <firstname.lastname@example.org> Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2003 00:47:33 -0400
On Tue, 19 Aug 2003 18:32:11 EDT, Mark Medici <email@example.com> said:
> If, in fact, the firewall is configured as indicated, and that only
> authorized IP addresses from the software vendor's IP space is permitted
> to access pcAnywhere, then it is NOT a trivial hack to gain access to
> pcAnywhere in order to exploit the weak passwords. In order to
> circumvent the firewall, the intruder would have to first compromise a
> router or host at either the vendor or customer's end, or somewhere in
> between, or the firewall itself. Or the intruder would need to gain
> physical access to one of these end locations.
RFC1948: Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks. S. Bellovin. May 1996.
(Format: TXT=13074 bytes) (Status: INFORMATIONAL)
Turns out it was this very attack that Kevin Mitnick used on Shimomura's
And it turns out that a lot of vendors still get it wrong, or suboptimal:
- application/pgp-signature attachment: stored