Re: A question for the list...

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To: Ed Shirey <eshirey@pclocals.com>
Date: Sun, 18 May 2003 14:28:19 -0400

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Ed,

I agree there is much value in having this sort of automated response to patch
all our systems. This idea is at least 20 years old and this point was behind
Morris' intention with the first Internet worm. As you said, liability and
ethics among other things are the reasons we don't use this today.

However, I argue such extreme measures are uneccesary : automated patch
management is already available. Measures like firewalls, proxies, IDS/IPS
can already redirect known attacks and scans to /dev/null. Deceptive
applications even go further to redirect the attacker to a honeypot. Its only
a matter of time until most security vendors will implement this feature.
This summer, a colleague is presenting a paper and a proof of concept on an
system that automatically creates and patches systems based on attack
heuristics. This would solve the problem of waiting for a vendor as well as
distribution.

I suspect the biggest threat vector (in the corporate world) is not unpatched
servers. You mentioned protecting bandwidth. Its DoS attacks from an
availability perspective. The most damaging successful attacks come from an
organization's own people. They don't need to run 0day exploits.

So I agree with you there's much potential for benevolent worms, but I argue
we don't need these drastic measures to secure systems.

ray

On Saturday 17 May 2003 07:30 pm, Ed Shirey wrote:
> Dan Hanson wrote:
> >As part of incident handling and response, most of us have had to respond
> >to virus infections that have affected networks and hosts. Reports are
> >circulating that members of the IRC operator community have distributed
> >code through the update mechanism of the Fizzer virus. The code reportedly
> >attempts to remove the virus from the host. The latest information seems
> >to indicate that the "update" code was removed until further testing can
> >be done and more discussion regarding the legalities of this are had.
>
> I think that this approach to dealing with worms is an inevitable
> evolution of the network
> "organism". It obviously carries many risks, but it can also
> potentially provide tremendous
> benefit to the health of the overall system.
>
> It's certainly not always the case, but often an infected system has
> readily exploitable
> holes that an active "vaccine" could utilize to remove the malware.
> This approach has
> a host of ethical and technical issues, but assuming an altruistic and
> benevolent (and
> technically competent) source, this vaccine has a net benefit (sorry
> about all the puns).
>
> I suggest that many of the issues are similar to those associated with
> "Good Samaritans".
> Our overly litigous society has many would-be samaritans afraid to offer
> a helping hand
> because of concern for liability. Is this right? This isn't a
> rhetorical question -- there are
> certainly examples of well meaning, but inept assistance causing more
> harm than good.
>
> However, as more and more malware "organisms" begin to inhabit our
> network like
> virtual E. Coli. in the Internet gut, active measures may be required,
> if for no other
> reason than to protect bandwidth. Perhaps DSL providers should consider
> making
> permission to release active countermeasures part of the terms of use.
>
> This is going to be a fun thread...
>
> Ed
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>- *** Wireless LAN Policies for Security & Management - NEW White Paper ***
> Just like wired networks, wireless LANs require network security policies
> that are enforced to protect WLANs from known vulnerabilities and threats.
> Learn to design, implement and enforce WLAN security policies to lockdown
> enterprise WLANs.
>
> To get your FREE white paper visit us at:
> http://www.securityfocus.com/AirDefense-incidents
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>-
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** Wireless LAN Policies for Security & Management - NEW White Paper ***
Just like wired networks, wireless LANs require network security policies
that are enforced to protect WLANs from known vulnerabilities and threats.
Learn to design, implement and enforce WLAN security policies to lockdown enterprise WLANs.

To get your FREE white paper visit us at:
http://www.securityfocus.com/AirDefense-incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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