Re: Worm on 445/tcp?

From: james (jamesh@cybermesa.com)
Date: 12/17/02

  • Next message: Joao Gouveia: "IRC -> smtp worm?"
    From: "james" <jamesh@cybermesa.com>
    To: <incidents@securityfocus.com>
    Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2002 13:54:45 -0700
    
    

    Somewhat decompiled source here:
    http://www.unixwiz.net/iraqworm/iraqworm.cpp

    This looks ripe for a content matching rule:

    static const char *PasswordTable[] = {
            NullPassword,
            "admin",
            "root",
            "111",
            "123",
            "1234",
            "123456",
            "654321",
            "1",
            "!@#$",
            "asdf",
            "asdfgh",
            "!@#$%",
            "!@#$%^",
            "!@#$%^&",
            "!@#$%^&*",
            "server",

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Joe Blatz" <sd_wireless@yahoo.com>
    To: "Scott A.McIntyre" <scott@xs4all.net>;
    <incidents@securityfocus.com>
    Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2002 12:50 PM
    Subject: Re: Worm on 445/tcp?

    > Anyone have packet captures or Snort rules?
    >
    > --- "Scott A.McIntyre" <scott@xs4all.net> wrote:
    > > Over the past two weeks or so I've been noticing a
    > > steady rise in what
    > > appears to be worm related traffic to the new
    > > unified smb over tcp port
    > > (445) on Microsoft Win2k and newer operating
    > > systems.
    > >
    > > I haven't yet been able to properly identify what
    > > the culprit is; at
    > > first I thought a variation of OpaServ, and that
    > > hasn't been fully
    > > ruled out, but I'm not quite convinced of that
    > > either. Anyone have any
    > > clues that might help pin this down further?
    > >
    > > An infected machine seems to send the following:
    > >
    > > 1095 114.002629 src -> dst SMB Negotiate Protocol
    > > Request
    > > 1105 114.363458 src -> dst SMB Session Setup AndX
    > > Request
    > > 1106 114.774364 src -> dst SMB Session Setup AndX
    > > Request
    > > 1107 115.168792 src -> dst SMB Tree Connect AndX
    > > Request,Path:
    > > \\dst\IPC$
    > > 1110 115.330792 src -> dst SMB NT Create AndX
    > > Request, Path: \samr
    > > 1112 115.652261 src -> dst DCERPC Bind: call_id: 1
    > > UUID: SAMR
    > > 1136 117.759036 src -> dst SAMR Connect4 request
    > > 1137 118.299350 src -> dst SMB Close Request, FID:
    > > 0x4000
    > > 1142 119.004483 src -> dst SMB Logoff AndX Request
    > > 1150 119.375665 src -> dst SMB Tree Disconnect
    > > Request
    > >
    > > And another:
    > >
    > > 7.933416 src -> dst SMB Negotiate Protocol Request
    > > 10.958481 src -> dst SMB Session Setup AndX Request
    > > 13.654558 src -> dst SMB Tree Connect AndX Request,
    > > Path: \\dst\IPC$
    > > 13.926353 src -> dst SMB NT Create AndX Request,
    > > Path: \samr
    > > 15.231252 src -> dst DCERPC Bind: call_id: 1 UUID:
    > > SAMR
    > > 17.149345 src -> dst SAMR Connect4 request
    > > 20.405997 src -> dst SAMR EnumDomains request
    > > 23.579240 src -> dst SAMR LookupDomain request
    > > 25.341903 src -> dst SAMR OpenDomain request
    > > 25.891947 src -> dst SAMR EnumDomainUsers request
    > > 26.597393 src -> dst SAMR Close request
    > > 29.615040 src -> dst SMB Close Request, FID: 0x4000
    > > 30.048894 src -> dst SMB Logoff AndX Request
    > > 32.738878 src -> dst SMB Tree Disconnect Request
    > >
    > >
    > > It appears as though there's a high degree of
    > > randomness to the
    > > destination IP addresses that are chosen by the worm
    > > as can be seen
    > > from this 1 second snapshot:
    > >
    > >
    > > 121.33.1.48
    > > 91.71.109.105
    > > 76.123.46.27
    > > 222.120.99.35
    > > 124.72.254.8
    > > 17.64.153.118
    > > 27.23.33.121
    > > 185.33.178.38
    > > 151.49.213.31
    > > 167.60.15.125
    > > 132.86.243.68
    > > 26.125.133.71
    > > 1.104.130.21
    > > 40.88.91.120
    > > 48.101.140.21
    > > 48.93.34.36
    > > 193.60.220.48
    > > 117.26.58.96
    > > 27.2.15.114
    > > 25.7.221.31
    > >
    > >
    > > Note: the infected system's ip address is not within
    > > any of these
    > > network segments.
    > >
    > > I've noticed others reporting similar increase in
    > > traffic, but so far
    > > haven't seen a definitive acknowledgment of
    > > precisely what it is that's
    > > responsible.
    > >
    > > Any pointers gratefully accepted.
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > >
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    >
    >
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