Publishing Nimda Logs - Summary

From: Deus, Attonbitus (
Date: 05/08/02

Date: Wed, 08 May 2002 07:35:12 -0700
From: "Deus, Attonbitus" <>

Hash: SHA1

First, I would like to thank everyone who took the time to reply, both
publicly and privately. I appreciate the feedback.
Vuln-Dev has been the most interactive with this thread, so if you have
more to add, please post to vuln-dev or privately to save on moderation.

I would say that > 90% of all the responses support publishing the
list. Many of those stipulated that I should warn people first, and only
post them after no action was taken. Additional ideas were to post a
'history' of contacts and actions taken. Some people are already posting
such a list, and many of you offered to post your own logs if I make it
available. Many were also exuberant about it with "Hell Yeah!" type posts-
this speaks to the level of frustration out there.

A very small majority of people, about 4%, said it was a Very Bad Idea as
blackhats could use the list as a source for DDoS host candidates. I agree
with Jay Dyson and others in that this information is already easily
available to anyone with an Internet connection if that is what they are
looking for. Just last November, Dug Song published papers showing that
Nimda probes, globally, were at "roughly 5 *billion* attempts per
day." Anyone with half a clue that was looking for bots could actively
gather information in far greater quantities than what would be on my
list. I can only imagine what the aggregate waste of bandwidth is at that
level! I do not believe that withholding the list because it could be used
maliciously is valid.

The rest, about 6% or so, said to ignore it, spend the time securing your
systems, or to just silently blackhole the offenders.

Things learned:
1) ARIN is reportedly a bad source, or at least, outdated source, of
contact info.
2) Jay also has a *nix product called EarlyBird, which will look up the
contact info for you to email offenders.
3) maintains information like this, and allows you to post
logs to them.
4) Jonathan Bloomquist and others actively connect to offenders to send net
messages to the console. Pretty cool.

Next Step:
I will probably proceed with my project, taking into account the
suggestions of the posters. One thing now interests me more...
In the vein of JBloomquist's post and another poster who said to
reverse-patch the systems, I am willing to peek into Pandora's Box and
explore that precise option-
Waiting for an attack, and then reverse-patching the box. Please don't
tell me about the legal ramifications- I don't care about that yet. What I
would like to know is if anyone has such an animal, or how one would go
about reverse-patching an attacking system-- I can't write that code, but
would really like to try it out.

Thanks to all for your help.


Version: PGP 7.1


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