Windows/Exchange security auditing tool
From: Kevan Smith (Kevan.Smith_at_tideworks.com)
Date: 09/08/04
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Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2004 13:08:28 -0700 To: <focus-ms@securityfocus.com>
Note, this is a repost due to expiration of the initial post. Feel free
to strip this line if approved. Tx.
---- Exchange 2003 has no internal directory services so to speak, it uses AD for account maintenance, so yes Exchange 2000/2003 does require very fast, very reliable connectivity to a Windows 2000/2003 DC/GC. Best practice recommendation is to have at least one domain controller with GC services in the same network segment as each Exchange back-end server and access to multiple DC/GCs for redundancy. The front-end (OWA) server can be on a separate segment (read, separate interfaces on a firewall), but should maintain a solid connection to at least 1 DC/GC (again redundancy...). The most common method of setting up OWA in a mid-size to large organization is to place your back-end Exchange server (hosting mailboxes) in the internal network or an internal DMZ with at least one DC/GC, then a separate front-end server in a publicly accessible DMZ. Lock down your ports, and make your pinholes in the firewall. Another method, also common in larger organizations, is to further isolate the front-end server behind an ISA server for further protections. Fewer holes in the firewall, better SSL protection, higher cost/overhead. Your concern over exposure is valid; it's the same concern which drives us to use UNIX based SMTP proxies. As to the real exposure limit, keep OWA restricted to https and require authentication at IIS before even presenting the OWA logon page, and you give yourself a good level of protection against unauthorized access to your GAL. Your remaining risk is that because your Exchange server requires access to your Domain Controllers, it's a potential path into your network. Prevent hackers from hop-scotching from a hijacked web server to the LAN via the OWA server by placing the OWA server in an isolated DMZ. Alternatively, Since you're using 2-factor authentication via pseudo-random numbers, force users to authenticate at the firewall before a single packet reaches the OWA server. In doing this, you're inherently protected against unauthorized access and would then have the option of keeping your OWA server in the private LAN. There is one final alternative, which involves replicating your user accounts and using cross-forest authentication. This does remove the direct connectivity into the network (though there is still the connectivity between DCs in the respective forests), but IMHO is an extreme measure with many hidden costs, and is not warranted in most circumstances. References: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/itsolutions/msit/deploy/ex03atwp.mspx KB270836 KB298369 KB264035 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/exchange/2003/library/ex2k3 rpc.mspx http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/isa/2004/plan/exchage2003.m spx http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=/servicedesks/webcasts/wc 070902/wcblurb070902.asp http://support.microsoft.com/servicedesks/webcasts/en/wc021203/WC021203. ppt Kevan S. MCSE, Contributing Author, MCSE Guide to Microsoft Exchange 2000 Server Administration. -----Original Message----- From: Chad Lorenc [mailto:CLorenc@entfederal.com] Sent: Thursday, September 02, 2004 3:01 PM To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com Subject: RE: Windows/Exchange security auditing tool I have a quick question, we are rolling out exchange 2003 with OWA. Our OWA server sits one of our DMZ's, because of the active directory component the engineers state that OWA must be a part of our internal AD domain. We currently do not have any servers bridging the internal AD domain into the DMZ's. Is there anyway around this requirement? How significant of a risk does this create, or more importantly are the feasible exploits past information probing? We do have multiple layers of protection such as two factor authentication (AD login + random authenticator), host monitoring, firewall rules, VLAN's etc. I am just curious, on its own, what kind of risk we assume with this design. Chad Lorenc DISCLAIMER: The information contained in this email and in any attachments is intended for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. If you have received this email in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the message and delete the email from your computer. Use of this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ --- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ --- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Previous message: Hidenobu Seki: "Listing usernames via a null session on Windows XP"
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- Maybe reply: Chad Lorenc: "RE: Windows/Exchange security auditing tool"
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- Maybe reply: Scott Harrington: "RE: Windows/Exchange security auditing tool"
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