Re: local admin account password

From: Jimi Thompson (jimit_at_myrealbox.com)
Date: 11/28/03

  • Next message: Sergey V. Gordeychik: "RE: local admin account password" 
    Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2003 23:27:47 -0600
To: "Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP]" <sbradcpa@pacbell.net>

    Domain admin should work as well. I return to my original statement that
    the domain should allow sufficient privledges, either as a Domain Admin
    or via GPO for any user to do anything under normal circumstances that
    you can do as a Local admin.

    Jimi

    Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP] wrote:

    > Think Patch management software now... say that all you computers are
    > running in User mode and you use a product like Shavlik's HfnetchkPro
    > to remotely patch all machines on that LAN. With this product you can
    > easily do this with "admin account logon credentials" in one patch
    > blast across the lan, the zone, whatever.
    >
    > Now... under your scenerio... how do I manage and remotely patch my
    > LAN quickly and efficiently?
    >
    > Physical security is always key - see law #3.
    >
    > I will take the risk of physical access to my machines for the risk
    > that I lessen by being able to remote patch all machines in my Network.
    >
    > DCs diff admin password
    >
    > Workstations.. those suckers are zoned and have matching admin passwords.
    >
    >
    > Susan Bradley
    >
    >
    > The Ten Immutable Laws of Security
    >
    > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/columns/security/essays/10imlaws.asp
    >
    >
    > <#b>Law #1: If a bad guy can persuade you to run his program on your
    > computer, its not your computer anymore.
    > Law #2: If a bad guy can alter the operating system on your computer,
    > its not your computer anymore.
    > Law #3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your
    > computer, its not your computer anymore.
    > Law #4: If you allow a bad guy to upload programs to your web site,
    > its not your web site any more.
    > Law #5: Weak passwords trump strong security.
    > Law #6: A machine is only as secure as the administrator is trustworthy.
    > Law #7: Encrypted data is only as secure as the decryption key.
    > Law #8: An out of date virus scanner is only marginally better than no
    > virus scanner at all.
    > Law #9: Absolute anonymity isn't practical, in real life or on the web.
    > Law #10: Technology is not a panacea.
    >
    >
    >
    > dave kleiman wrote:
    >
    >> 1. Do you think if someone wanted to break the local admin account they
    >> could just boot to Password recovery disk and change the password?
    >>
    >> If you make them all the same you are thinking if one get compromised
    >> they
    >> all get compromised. So you make them all different. How about a
    >> standard
    >> password with the last 5 digits of the MAC of that box in between.
    >> Thinking
    >> that is still to easy then I would say you are dealing with someone who
    >> would just use the idea I listed in number 1.
    >>
    >> You could mask the passwords with little tricks, or make the local
    >> admins
    >> (unusable) but it sounds like a lot of work.
    >>
    >>
    >> Try checking: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/88/312263
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >> _______________________________
    >> Dave Kleiman, CISSP, MCSE, CIFI
    >> dave@isecureu.com
    >> www.SecurityBreachResponse.com
    >>
    >> "High achievement always takes place in the framework of high
    >> expectation."
    >> Jack Kinder
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >> -----Original Message-----
    >> From: Eli Allen [mailto:eallen@bcpl.net] Sent: Tuesday, November 25,
    >> 2003 13:47
    >> To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    >> Subject: local admin account password
    >>
    >>
    >> Say you have more then 1000 systems, how do you handle the local admin
    >> account password on the machines? (assuming it needs to be available for
    >> extreme cases to get into the machine as you'd normally just use a
    >> domain
    >> login)
    >>
    >> A few ways I can think of (in order from what I think is worst to best):
    >> 1) use the same password on all boxes. Obviously insecure
    >>
    >> 2) Use a different password on all boxes and a big filling cabinet to
    >> secure
    >> it (as its impossible to memorize). Don't think this would work in
    >> the real
    >> world so not worth using.
    >>
    >> 3) Use a password scheme where the password is basically the same on
    >> all box
    >> except its based on something specific about the server. This means if
    >> someone figures out the scheme (cracking a single box and figuring it
    >> out or
    >> just gets told) they basically made this as good as the first idea I
    >> list.
    >>
    >> 4) Only use domain accounts so delete the local ones. But this means no
    >> more recovery console and don't think cached logins will work. With
    >> so many
    >> boxes and hence lots of admins you may not have logged onto the box
    >> and so
    >> not have cached login in the cache even if you increased the logins
    >> that can
    >> be cached.
    >>
    >> 5)My main idea/plan is to store all the passwords on a central SQL
    >> server.
    >> This way you can easily have a different random passwords for the admin
    >> accounts on all the boxes.
    >>
    >> The DB file would be encrypted with EFS so only the limited user SQL
    >> runs
    >> under has access to the file and another user just used for doing
    >> backups of
    >> this file. This means an attacker can't use an OS break-in to get to
    >> the
    >> data and needs to compromise SQL or one of those two user accounts. SQL
    >> would be set to integrated auth and only allow the domain groups who are
    >> allowed access to the admin password in. (i.e. using the access rights
    >> already existing)
    >>
    >> For data recovery (this DB is very important not to lose) there are
    >> two main
    >> considerations, one the file is small as the DB has very little info
    >> in it
    >> and two it doesn't get updated very often. The backup user can make
    >> a zip
    >> backup of the DB whenever it gets changed and then encrypt the file
    >> (PGP or
    >> something like it with the private key stored on a/multiple CD-R(s)
    >> somewhere safe) Then this file could be copied to lots of employee's
    >> desktops. Its encrypted so they can't read it and with lots of people
    >> having the file the likelihood of everyone's copy being damaged from HDD
    >> failure is low. (Yes will use tape backup of the file too including
    >> off site
    >> storage but tape is slow and should only be used if necessary) If
    >> there is
    >> an emergency the managers could easily allow the file to be decrypted
    >> and
    >> then attached to any SQL server available relatively quickly.
    >>
    >> Access to this file can be made by any utility that can make use of
    >> stored
    >> procedures. There would be basically two stored procs, one to get a
    >> password from the DB and one to set the password in the DB both would
    >> have 3
    >> values (machine name, username, and password) passed in and out
    >> (obviously
    >> depending on which you use). This way if a person decides to try and
    >> dump
    >> the DB and get all the passwords the stored proc can do something
    >> about it
    >> (alert management, stop it from happening, or something like that)
    >> This way
    >> its easy to write whatever interface you want to be able to do access
    >> the DB
    >> and the app itself doesn't really need to be secure as the
    >> authentication is
    >> based on the user that app is run by.
    >>
    >> Yes I realize it has a central point of attack at the DB but I think
    >> that
    >> can be secured well enough and the design is secure that its still
    >> better
    >> then the other methods.
    >>
    >> Any comments? Thanks
    >>
    >> Eli Allen
    >> eallen@bcpl.net
    >>
    >>
    >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >>
    >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >>
    >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  • Next message: Sergey V. Gordeychik: "RE: local admin account password"

    Relevant Pages

    • Re: local admin account password
      ... how do I manage and remotely patch my LAN ... Physical security is always key - see law #3. ... DCs diff admin password ... A machine is only as secure as the administrator is trustworthy. ...
      (Focus-Microsoft)
    • RE: local admin account password
      ... The problem I see with a central database is two fold. ... Subject: local admin account password ... > Law #2: If a bad guy can alter the operating system on your computer, ... Encrypted data is only as secure as the decryption key. ...
      (Focus-Microsoft)
    • It is secure out of the box
      ... Get Absolute OpenBSD and an OpenBSD 3.3 and try it yourself. ... You want an admin because you may actually want to decide ... Since OpenBSD is secure out of the box, ... admin to set up machines to run services, not to rebuild the machines every ...
      (microsoft.public.security)
    • Re: [Full-Disclosure] A rather newbie question
      ... Say you're an admin at a law ... How about a hospital...shouldn't each admin ... Let my bosses play god. ... And any jobs I do see for law firms, accounting firms, and ...
      (Full-Disclosure)
    • Re: Recovering admin password active directory
      ... The only problem is, the admin ... > recover this password so i do not have to rebuild anything from ... of the law. ...
      (comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.security)