Re: local admin account password

From: Jimi Thompson (jimit_at_myrealbox.com)
Date: 11/28/03

  • Next message: Jimi Thompson: "Re: local admin account password"
    Date: Thu, 27 Nov 2003 23:15:45 -0600
    To: "Rockliff, Max M.J." <Max.Rockliff@woodside.com.au>
    
    

    Our purpose was to preving circumvention of the audit trail by using the
    local admin password to access the machine. Our purpose was not an
    anti-hacking/cracking measure. In reading between the lines from the
    original post, I gathered that this was the "root cause".

    If I were to implement an anti-hacking measure, I'd recommend that you
    go to one-time pad passwords and call it a day.

    HTH,

    Jimi

    Rockliff, Max M.J. wrote:

    >With all due respect, how is this any different to randomly generating a
    >long password string and storing it in a secured location(locked safe,
    >encrypted database, etc). Ultimately the password is static and
    >therefore discoverable (learnt or lophtcracked etc), which is the actual
    >vulnerability.
    >
    >Now if this could be combined with a database system that periodically
    >changed the password, permitted authorised users (maybe even using
    >Windows authentication) to check out a particular password for a defined
    >period, after which the system would automatically change the password
    >thereby locking out the user who had access - of course the system
    >should let the current user extend the use of the password, perhaps
    >within defined limits. Such a system would ensure that no one actually
    >knows a password unless they formally check one out, that the passwords
    >would be sufficiently complex to slow down crackers and that passwords
    >would be changed with enough frequency to further mitigate the risk of
    >cracking. The system itself should keep a log of all successful and
    >unsuccessful check-outs, along with a record of password maintenance,
    >encrypt the database and create alerts in the event of unsuccessful
    >requests or failure to maintain passwords.
    >
    >
    >-----Original Message-----
    >From: shimi [mailto:shimi@shimi.net]
    >Sent: Thursday, 27 November 2003 1:40 AM
    >To: eallen@bcpl.net
    >Cc: focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    >Subject: RE: local admin account password
    >
    >
    >
    >I have an idea.
    >
    >Find a given word (keep it secret!); Concat it into the machine's name;
    >
    >Take the concated string and run it through md5().
    >(http://www.php.net/md5)
    >
    >Put the result as the admin password.
    >
    >Next time you need the password, you need to know: Your secret word +
    >The
    >machine name. (Do note - they WILL BE case sensitive, so make them all
    >small or all big, or, whatever you want...)
    >
    >All you need is a webserver and PHP enabled to generate your passwords
    >in
    >future use... (secret word isn't stored anywhere!)
    >
    >I have set up a living example at http://shimi.staff.fresh.co.il/md5.php
    >
    >Here is the source code for that PHP file:
    >
    >--- CUT HERE ---
    >
    ><form action="<?=$_SERVER["PHP_SELF"];?>" method="post"> Machine's Name:
    ><input type="text" size="30" name="machine"><br> Secret passphrase:
    ><input type="password" size="30" name="password"><br>
    ><input type="submit" value="Generate me my password!">
    ></form>
    >
    ><?
    >if ($_POST) {
    > $machine = $_POST["machine"];
    > $password = $_POST["password"];
    > echo "For administrative access to machine $machine, use the password:
    >".md5($machine.$password); } ?>
    >
    >--- CUT HERE ---
    >
    >
    >
    >
    >>-----Original Message-----
    >>From: Eli Allen [mailto:eallen@bcpl.net]
    >>Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 12:47 PM
    >>To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    >>Subject: local admin account password
    >>
    >>
    >>Say you have more then 1000 systems, how do you handle the local admin
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>account password on the machines? (assuming it needs to be available
    >>for extreme cases to get into the machine as you'd normally just use a
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>domain
    >>login)
    >>
    >>A few ways I can think of (in order from what I think is worst to
    >>best):
    >>1) use the same password on all boxes. Obviously insecure
    >>
    >>2) Use a different password on all boxes and a big filling cabinet to
    >>secure it (as its impossible to memorize). Don't think this would
    >>work in the real world so not worth using.
    >>
    >>3) Use a password scheme where the password is basically the same on
    >>
    >>
    >all box
    >
    >
    >>except its based on something specific about the server. This means
    >>
    >>
    >if
    >
    >
    >>someone figures out the scheme (cracking a single box and figuring it
    >>out or just gets told) they basically made this as good as the first
    >>idea I list.
    >>
    >>4) Only use domain accounts so delete the local ones. But this means
    >>no more recovery console and don't think cached logins will work.
    >>With so many boxes and hence lots of admins you may not have logged
    >>onto the box and so not have cached login in the cache even if you
    >>increased the logins that can be cached.
    >>
    >>5)My main idea/plan is to store all the passwords on a central SQL
    >>server. This way you can easily have a different random passwords for
    >>the admin accounts on all the boxes.
    >>
    >>The DB file would be encrypted with EFS so only the limited user SQL
    >>runs under has access to the file and another user just used for doing
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>backups of this file. This means an attacker can't use an OS break-in
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>to get to the data and needs to compromise SQL or one of those two
    >>user accounts. SQL would be set to integrated auth and only allow the
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>domain groups who are allowed access to the admin password in. (i.e.
    >>using the access rights already existing)
    >>
    >>For data recovery (this DB is very important not to lose) there are
    >>two main considerations, one the file is small as the DB has very
    >>little info in it and two it doesn't get updated very often. The
    >>backup user can make a zip backup of the DB whenever it gets changed
    >>and then encrypt the file (PGP or something like it with the private
    >>key stored on a/multiple CD-R(s) somewhere safe) Then this file could
    >>be copied to lots of employee's desktops. Its encrypted so they can't
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>read it and with lots of people having the file the likelihood of
    >>everyone's copy being damaged from HDD failure is low. (Yes will use
    >>tape backup of the file too including off site storage but tape is
    >>slow and should only be used if necessary) If there is an emergency
    >>the managers could easily allow the file to be decrypted and then
    >>attached to any SQL server available relatively quickly.
    >>
    >>Access to this file can be made by any utility that can make use of
    >>stored procedures. There would be basically two stored procs, one to
    >>get a password from the DB and one to set the password in the DB both
    >>would have 3 values (machine name, username, and password) passed in
    >>and out (obviously depending on which you use). This way if a person
    >>decides to try and dump the DB and get all the passwords the stored
    >>proc can do something about it (alert management, stop it from
    >>happening, or something like that) This way its easy to write
    >>whatever interface you want to be able to do access the DB and the app
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>itself doesn't really need to be secure as the authentication is based
    >>
    >>
    >
    >
    >
    >>on the user that app is run by.
    >>
    >>Yes I realize it has a central point of attack at the DB but I think
    >>that can be secured well enough and the design is secure that its
    >>still better then the other methods.
    >>
    >>Any comments? Thanks
    >>
    >>Eli Allen
    >>eallen@bcpl.net
    >>
    >>
    >>----------------------------------------------------------------------
    >>-----
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >---
    >
    >
    >>
    >>----------------------------------------------------------------------
    >>-----
    >>
    >>
    >>
    >------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >---
    >
    >
    >
    >
    >

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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  • Next message: Jimi Thompson: "Re: local admin account password"

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