Re: local admin account password

From: Eli Allen (eallen_at_bcpl.net)
Date: 11/26/03

  • Next message: Jimi Thompson: "Re: local admin account password"
    To: "David Cameron" <david@uberconcept.com>
    Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2003 06:31:06 -0500
    
    

    Thanks, I've used that tool before (seems to have a bug as it didn't work
    with a particular password I was trying to use one while "net user" worked
    fine at changing the password but thats a different story)

    some other consideration that I probably should have mentioned:
    - Some users are admins of some boxes but should have no access to others.
    i.e. they can do lophtcrack on their own box but don't wnat that to help
    them get into another box

    - physical security negates the need to worry about boot floppy/cds

    Thanks
    Eli Allen

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "David Cameron" <david@uberconcept.com>
    To: "Eli Allen" <eallen@bcpl.net>
    Cc: <focus-ms@securityfocus.com>
    Sent: Wednesday, November 26, 2003 3:25 AM
    Subject: Re: local admin account password

    > You might want to consider a solution using something like this:
    >
    http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=http://support.microsoft.com:80/support/kb/articles/Q272/5/30.ASP&NoWebContent=1
    >
    > using the above, you could write a script that would change the
    > passwords of the servers on a regular basis (say weekly).
    >
    > regards
    > David Cameron
    >
    > Eli Allen wrote:
    > > Say you have more then 1000 systems, how do you handle the local admin
    > > account password on the machines? (assuming it needs to be available for
    > > extreme cases to get into the machine as you'd normally just use a
    domain
    > > login)
    > >
    > > A few ways I can think of (in order from what I think is worst to best):
    > > 1) use the same password on all boxes. Obviously insecure
    > >
    > > 2) Use a different password on all boxes and a big filling cabinet to
    secure
    > > it (as its impossible to memorize). Don't think this would work in the
    real
    > > world so not worth using.
    > >
    > > 3) Use a password scheme where the password is basically the same on all
    box
    > > except its based on something specific about the server. This means if
    > > someone figures out the scheme (cracking a single box and figuring it
    out or
    > > just gets told) they basically made this as good as the first idea I
    list.
    > >
    > > 4) Only use domain accounts so delete the local ones. But this means no
    > > more recovery console and don't think cached logins will work. With so
    many
    > > boxes and hence lots of admins you may not have logged onto the box and
    so
    > > not have cached login in the cache even if you increased the logins that
    can
    > > be cached.
    > >
    > > 5)My main idea/plan is to store all the passwords on a central SQL
    server.
    > > This way you can easily have a different random passwords for the admin
    > > accounts on all the boxes.
    > >
    > > The DB file would be encrypted with EFS so only the limited user SQL
    runs
    > > under has access to the file and another user just used for doing
    backups of
    > > this file. This means an attacker can't use an OS break-in to get to
    the
    > > data and needs to compromise SQL or one of those two user accounts. SQL
    > > would be set to integrated auth and only allow the domain groups who are
    > > allowed access to the admin password in. (i.e. using the access rights
    > > already existing)
    > >
    > > For data recovery (this DB is very important not to lose) there are two
    main
    > > considerations, one the file is small as the DB has very little info in
    it
    > > and two it doesn't get updated very often. The backup user can make a
    zip
    > > backup of the DB whenever it gets changed and then encrypt the file (PGP
    or
    > > something like it with the private key stored on a/multiple CD-R(s)
    > > somewhere safe) Then this file could be copied to lots of employee's
    > > desktops. Its encrypted so they can't read it and with lots of people
    > > having the file the likelihood of everyone's copy being damaged from HDD
    > > failure is low. (Yes will use tape backup of the file too including off
    site
    > > storage but tape is slow and should only be used if necessary) If there
    is
    > > an emergency the managers could easily allow the file to be decrypted
    and
    > > then attached to any SQL server available relatively quickly.
    > >
    > > Access to this file can be made by any utility that can make use of
    stored
    > > procedures. There would be basically two stored procs, one to get a
    > > password from the DB and one to set the password in the DB both would
    have 3
    > > values (machine name, username, and password) passed in and out
    (obviously
    > > depending on which you use). This way if a person decides to try and
    dump
    > > the DB and get all the passwords the stored proc can do something about
    it
    > > (alert management, stop it from happening, or something like that) This
    way
    > > its easy to write whatever interface you want to be able to do access
    the DB
    > > and the app itself doesn't really need to be secure as the
    authentication is
    > > based on the user that app is run by.
    > >
    > > Yes I realize it has a central point of attack at the DB but I think
    that
    > > can be secured well enough and the design is secure that its still
    better
    > > then the other methods.
    > >
    > > Any comments? Thanks
    > >
    > > Eli Allen
    > > eallen@bcpl.net
    > >
    > >
    >
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    > >
    > >
    >
    >
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  • Next message: Jimi Thompson: "Re: local admin account password"

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