RE: Logging mechanism in IIS (was RE: code red---- on system that is already (and has been) patched)

From: David Vincent (david.vincent@mightyoaks.com)
Date: 03/06/03

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    From: David Vincent <david.vincent@mightyoaks.com>
    To: 'Geoff Craig' <GCraig@quilogy.com>, focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2003 08:43:45 -0800 
    
    

    hi.

    i searched google with no results, filesearching.com with no results, and
    found nothing on the microsoft site - not even in the DLL Help Database
    (http://support.microsoft.com/servicedesks/fileversion/). where might i be
    able to get a copy of this dll?

    -d

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Geoff Craig [mailto:GCraig@quilogy.com]
    Sent: March 5, 2003 9:33 AM
    To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    Subject: RE: Logging mechanism in IIS (was RE: code red---- on system
    that is already (and has been) patched)

    I do not know if this is distributed beyond the Microsoft Course on IIS
    5 but Microsoft does have an ISAPI filter called URLLog.dll. What it
    does is log HTTP requests both before AND after they are processed. It
    is true that IIS will NOT log any request that it cannot process. This
    is a distinct disadvantage for those who want to know what is getting
    dropped by inetinfo.exe. Since the dll is an ISAPI filter it is
    executed before the request is handed to inetinfo.exe. I did a Google
    search to find the dll but I did not receive any results. The only
    place I have even seen it mentioned is in the IIS 5 courseware which I
    have taught frequently.

    Geoff Craig
    Quilogy - The Art & Science of Business

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Ken Schaefer [mailto:ken@adOpenStatic.com]
    Sent: Tuesday, March 04, 2003 7:41 PM
    To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    Subject: Re: Logging mechanism in IIS (was RE: code red---- on system
    that is already (and has been) patched)

    I concur with Keith (but I could be wrong...)

    In the case of buffer overflow attacks (/not/ Sadmind etc that used
    Unicode
    traversal to get to cmd.exe) a successful attack should result in
    nothing in
    the IIS logs.

    Attacks like Sadmind which use traversal will be logged either way. 404
    if
    cmd.exe can't be found and 200 if cmd.exe can be found (subject,
    possibly,
    to the qualification wrt to sites that have custom 404 pages which
    someone
    else mentioned).

    Cheers
    Ken

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    From: "Turner, Keith (Contractor)" <Keith.Turner@tea.army.mil>
    Subject: Logging mechanism in IIS (was RE: code red---- on system that
    is
    already (and has been) patched)

    :
    : I believe this to be true, someone please correct me if it is not.
    : Logging is one of the last steps IIS takes while processing a request.
    : Logging is not a separate process. If your server is attacked
    successfully,
    : some other code starts executing and therefore, IIS never gets a
    chance to
    : log that entry into the logfiles.
    :
    : Keith
    :
    :
    : -----Original Message-----
    : From: Levinson, Karl [mailto:LevinsonK@STARS-SMI.com]
    : Sent: Monday, March 03, 2003 4:18 PM
    : To: 'Sandy Ryan'; focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    : Subject: RE: code red---- on system that is already (and has been)
    : patched
    :
    :
    : My understanding is that code 200 is exactly what you get in response
    to
    : Code Red's GET /DEFAULT.IDA request, if you have installed the
    relevant
    : security patch but have not yet removed the relevant script mappings
    from
    : IIS. More information:
    :
    : http://securityadmin.info/faq.htm#iislogs2
    : http://securityadmin.info/faq.htm#iislogs
    :
    : Note that usually a HTTP code 200 is a disturbing code to see in the
    context
    : of a worm, as it normally represents the successful execution of the
    attack
    : command. In this case, however, the code 200 is inconclusive and does
    not
    : in itself prove the success or failure of the attack. [Similarly, an
    HTTP
    : 502 doesn't always prove that a particular attack failed.]
    :
    : On the other hand, successful attacks from Nimda, Code Red, Sadmind,
    etc.
    : will all show code 200's in the logs.
    :
    : As your customer might already know, just installing patches does not
    by
    : itself make your server secure. Your customer would want to consider
    also
    : setting the correct settings, deleting the correct files, setting the
    : appropriate file permissions, disabling services, etc. Installing
    patches
    : may protect you from many of today's exploits, but not the exploits
    : discovered tomorrow. The Baseline Security guidelines for Windows and
    IIS
    : from www.microsoft.com/technet/security are one place to start, and/or
    the
    : instructions at http://securityadmin.info/faq.htm#harden
    :
    : HTH
    :
    : - karl
    :
    :
    : -----Original Message-----
    : From: Sandy Ryan [mailto:sryan@seewolf.com]
    : Sent: Monday, March 03, 2003 11:47 AM
    : To: focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    : Subject: [despammed] code red---- on system that is already (and has
    : been) patched
    :
    :
    : well - I doubt that the log is right - because I think the 200 implies
    : that its not infected - by when my customer sees his report - and path
    : taken through the site he sees worm.com
    :
    : here's the log (simplified to get through the moderator)
    : GET /default.ida
    :
    :
    NN----NN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801...%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%
    : u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a 200 0 206 4039 266 HTTP/1.0 [you know
    the
    : url]- - -


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