RE: Question: Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access Components Coul d Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)

From: Fraser Hugh (hugh_fraser@dofasco.ca)
Date: 11/28/02

  • Next message: Fraser Hugh: "RE: Question: Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access Components Coul d Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)"
    From: Fraser Hugh <hugh_fraser@dofasco.ca>
    To: "'Hayes, Bill'" <Bill.Hayes@owh.com>, "Harris, Ken" <KHarris@HIPUSA.com>, focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 15:04:59 -0500
    
    

    Microsoft web site indicates that a backout isn't recommended... that a
    re-deploy is needed to undo the upgrade. Our experience is that 2.6 is a
    subset of 2.7, and downgrading from 2.7 to 2.6 appears to work correctly,
    but there are vestiges of 2.7 left behind (to be expected since it's a
    subset). It's not a re-assuring state to be in.

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Hayes, Bill [mailto:Bill.Hayes@owh.com]
    > Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 2:24 PM
    > To: Harris, Ken; focus-ms@securityfocus.com
    > Subject: RE: Question: Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access
    > Components Coul d Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)
    >
    >
    > Before you upgrade to MDAC 2.7, check with your vendors, even ones you
    > don't think would have a problem. You might be surprised.
    >
    > For instance, I've heard ClearSwift is not supporting MAILsweeper
    > installations with MDAC 2.7. Does anyone know if this is true? Is it
    > just a temporary situation?
    >
    > Out of curiosity, has anyone attempted back out of MDAC 2.7 and go to
    > MDAC 2.6 with patch? How bad was it?
    >
    > Bill...
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Harris, Ken [mailto:KHarris@HIPUSA.com]
    > Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 2:16 PM
    > To: 'Kolde, Jennifer E.'; 'focus-ms@securityfocus.com'
    > Subject: RE: Question: Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access
    > Components Coul d Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)
    >
    >
    > Hello,
    >
    > Thanks to all on focus-ms who replied, very good information
    > indeed. It
    > looks like the best practice is to upgrade across the board
    > to MDAC 2.7
    > (with proper testing) /unless/ there is a known inoperability
    > requiring
    > 2.6,
    > in which case the patch is our best (albeit weak) hope.
    >
    > Thanks again for your help,
    >
    > Ken Harris
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Kolde, Jennifer E. [mailto:jkolde@nosc.mil]
    > Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2002 1:21 PM
    > To: Harris, Ken; 'focus-ms@securityfocus.com'
    > Subject: RE: Question: Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access
    > Components
    > Coul d Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)
    >
    >
    > Hello Ken,
    >
    > Sorry, trying again minus the digital signature.
    >
    > Microsoft also (quietly) lists upgrading to MDAC 2.7 as
    > another fix. The
    > information in the security bulletin is a bit confusing when
    > you try to
    > figure out just what is going on and where the vulnerability lies. The
    > way I
    > read it, the problem lies both the version of MDAC used AND a specific
    > ActiveX control that is vulnerable. You are correct that even if you
    > patch
    > your current version of MDAC, the vulnerable ActiveX control
    > could still
    > be
    > introduced.
    >
    > MDAC 2.7 is not vulnerable to the problem according to
    > Microsoft, so if
    > you
    > upgrade to 2.7, the ActiveX issue becomes moot.
    >
    > A possible concern is that, because MDAC brokers your
    > database requests,
    > the
    > upgrade may affect your application based on any differences
    > between the
    > older MDAC components and 2.7. I'm not a database guru
    > (IANADBG???) so
    > you'd have to research/test this on your own.
    >
    > MDAC can be downloaded from http://www.microsoft.com/data/, which also
    > includes documentation / changelogs for different versions. I did
    > install
    > MDAC 2.7 on a Win2K Server with no ill effects, but the Server is not
    > doing
    > anything specifically database-related.
    >
    > Regards,
    > Jennifer
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Harris, Ken [mailto:KHarris@HIPUSA.com]
    > Sent: Friday, November 22, 2002 2:39 PM
    > To: 'focus-ms@securityfocus.com'
    > Subject: Question: Buffer Overrun in Microsoft Data Access Components
    > Coul d
    > Lead to Code Execution (Q329414)
    >
    >
    > Hello all on focus-ms,
    >
    > Was wondering if anyone had figured out the best practice fix to the
    > security flaw described here:
    >
    > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/tec
    > hnet/secur
    > ity/
    > bulletin/MS02-065.asp
    >
    > The reason I ask is that Microsoft does not seem to show much
    > confidence
    > in
    > this patch; e.g. in the Caveats section, it is implied that
    > if a webpage
    > references the older, pre-patch RDS control, dependent upon the IE
    > security
    > settings they will either be prompted to install the control,
    > or it will
    > be
    > installed silently if Microsoft is added to the Trusted
    > Publishers list.
    >
    >
    > We happen to have a mission-critical custom webapp used
    > internally which
    > does use RDS, and is in the Trusted Sites zone on our workstations.
    > However,
    > I can't guarantee that the developers of this solution will get around
    > to
    > patching the server on which this runs, or changing the references in
    > the
    > ASP pages. Microsoft is NOT in the Trusted Publishers list on our
    > workstation build, although there is nothing keeping our users from
    > clicking
    > "Always trust content from Microsoft".
    >
    > Am I right in assuming that even if we deploy the patch to our
    > workstations,
    > unless the patch is also applied to the webapp and the code
    > is changed,
    > the
    > vulnerable control could be reinstalled and the workstation would be
    > again
    > vulnerable to this attack from a malicious website? Is there a better
    > option? The client/server nature of this vulnerability makes me think
    > that
    > we may see a worm written to exploit it soon.
    >
    > Thanks in advance.
    >
    > Regards,
    >
    > Ken Harris
    >
    >
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