Re: Block martians with source address 127.0.0.1

From: Thomas Corriher (thomas_corriher_at_earthlink.net)
Date: 06/01/04

  • Next message: LFM: "Re: Block martians with source address 127.0.0.1"
    Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2004 07:33:26 -0400 (EDT)
    To: "focus-linux@securityfocus.com" <focus-linux@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    On Mon, 31 May 2004, Bjørn Rasmussen wrote:

    > iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 127.0.0.1 -j LOG iptables -A
    > INPUT -i eth0 -s 127.0.0.1 -j DROP
    >
    > The kernel on the firewall logs these packets as martians
    > which it should do, but my rules will not log or block
    > these packets. Anybody who knows how to do it? Is it
    > possible?

    With the kernel's IP-Chains (and probably IP-Tables) the
    first chain (rule) that matches a packet is applied to it,
    and ONLY THE FIRST RULE THAT MATCHES IS APPLIED to a packet.
    So, whenever the kernel matches a packet with:

            "iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -s 127.0.0.1 ..."

    it then attempts to apply " -j LOG" without doing anything
    else to the packet. It simply moves on to checking the next
    packet after that. Therefore, the order of rules is always
    extremely important. If the "-j DROP" rule instead came
    before the "-j LOG" rule, then the matching packets would
    silently disappear ("DROP") without ever being logged;
    because the matching "DROP" rule came before the matching
    "LOG" rule. If you want two actions taken such as drop and
    log, then these commands must be in the the same rule: on
    the same line. For instance, this would probably work:

            "-j DROP --log-level 5"

    By the way, from briefly browsing the documents, it appears
    that your syntax is incorrect as well. Please notice the
    differences in my "-j" parameters, and read the
    documentation.

    Please pardon me while I pick on you for the sake of the
    greater good. Your problems are representative of general
    newbie mistakes caused by having the wrong attitudes about
    operating systems and network security. I call it the
    "Microsoft Effect" on computing (one of the effects). You
    see: you took a user-friendly (possibly point and click)
    program (or template or script) to automatically manage your
    security. You avoided the frustrating and time consuming
    process of reading the technical documents. It was all too
    easy. Now you are in a situation of not understanding the
    how or why things work as they do. Your laziness will
    continue to place you at risk, and potentially allow your
    machines to become a menace to the the global network. If
    that happens, YOU will be every bit as responsible for the
    problems as the script kiddies who took advantage of you.
    In legal terms, it is called "negligence". Until you
    endeavor to learn about the security of whatever operating
    system that you use; you will remain irresponsible. I also
    contend that attaching certain operating systems to the
    global Internet is irresponsible in any configuration; but
    that would be another rant. Some people assume that since a
    person is not allowed to view and change firewalling at a
    core level using Windows that these activities should not be
    necessary with unices. Again, this is the "Microsoft
    Effect". The unices have traditionally had much better security
    because they forced administrators to understand the how
    and why things work as they do. The "unfriendliness" that
    the unices are notorious for was a security blessing --
    since it forced lazy people to use other operating systems. As
    more software is created to make Linux easier, these sort of
    situations will become common. Its security reputation will
    be unjustly tarnished.

    -- 
      Thomas Corriher
      A.I.M.: corriherct
      phone: 336-391-2713
      "I think anybody who doesn't think
      I'm smart enough to handle the job is
      misunderestimating."
        -- George W. Bush
    

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