Re: Firewalls (was Re: IDS evaluations procedures)
From: Fergus Brooks (fergwa_at_gmail.com)
Date: 07/22/05
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Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2005 11:21:41 +0800 To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com
Agreed on all the above points. Without going too far off topic, this
leads me to another area that has been troubling me. One of the key
aims of security vendors over the last few years has been minimising
the importance of security experts (i.e. experienced human beings) in
the process of attack mitigation, remediation and defence.
I think this has a lot to do with the complexity of selling services
and would be interested in hearing from people out there who have had
success in the managed IDS space.
One of the reasons that the reputation of IDS suffered (and maybe why
S&M (sales & marketing) had to pep things up with the P) is because
IDS was delivered to enterprises as a box-drop with no real bedding-in
and tuning and have therefore generated too many false
positives/negatives & noise. So what has happened is that the less
consultative companies out there have minimised the perceived value of
what Richard accurately describes as "an important part of the
security arsenal."
We have been offering expert network intelligence services (similar to
managed NIDS services, but not restricted to security) for about 9
months now and are constantly having to convince people that being
able to speak to an expert is infinitely better than trusting a
machine. My point is that S&M are doing their best to minimise
perception of the value of the talented and dedicated people who
continue to improve detection and mitigation capabilities.
It makes me wonder when I see so many IDS systems out there that have
cost a lot of money mindlessly shooting alerts off to an email account
that nobody ever reads. Or just as bad, shooting them off to a
log/event outsourcer whose tech staff have never even met the client
so have no idea of their policies, environment or concerns.
I suggest we drop IPS from the nomenclature. And let's encourage the
consultative approach...
On 7/21/05, Richard Bejtlich <taosecurity@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 7/20/05, Nick Black <dank@qemfd.net> wrote:
> > Richard Bejtlich rigorously showed:
> > > In fact, you could argue the IPS is a step backward from a stateful
> > > layer 3/4 firewall in that the IPS inverts a proven security model.
> > > Good security (implemented on most firewalls) says "allow what policy
> > > says is authorized, deny all else." The IPS model says "deny what
> > > policy says is malicious, allow all else." Marty pointed this out a
> > > while ago and it has stayed with me.
> >
> > This statement seems quite too general -- who is to define the "IPS
> > model" as it is implemented in a wide swath of appliances? I can speak
> > with some authority regarding our hybridized approach here at Reflex,
> > and suggested deployment procedure: the very first activity performed on
> > a new install is the same determination of necessary network traffic one
> > would codify when preparing a link/network/transport-layer firewall.
> > Signature and anomaly-based detection follows this basic {protocol X
> > addressing}-based blacklisting (although it can also be applied to data
> > already rejected, should a customer wish to spend resources examining
> > such).
> >
> > Your issue seems to be more properly with those who configure IPS
> > devices, and perhaps those who write misleading documentation and
> > marketing info, than with the "IPS model".
> >
>
> Hi Nick and list,
>
> If someone configures their layer 3/4 firewall to block, say, ports
> 111 TCP and 445 TCP, and let everything else pass, we would agree that
> is a poor deployment model. People still do this, unfortunately.
>
> If someone configures their layer 7 firewall (aka IPS) to block
> traffic identified by signature, anomaly, vulnerability, whatever, and
> let everything else pass, now we're discussing the way almost everyone
> deploys IPSs.
>
> I have not heard anyone defining and passing "authorized" traffic and
> denying everything else via IPS. In fact, a hot hardware item these
> days are inline bypass switches to avoid inline IPSs that fail.
> "Better to keep the traffic flowing than fail closed!" is the
> rationale.
>
> I detest the term IPS, as it is a pure marketing term. It was created
> by companies that needed to define a new access control product niche
> to compete against the firewall giants of the early 2000s. (All
> defensive measures are trying to prevent intrusions.)
>
> However, I am not disrespecting the technology. Anything which can
> make smarter access control decisions is extremely helpful and an
> important part of the security arsenal.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Richard
>
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>
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