Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning

From: Adam Powers (apowers_at_lancope.com)
Date: 06/11/05

  • Next message: Brent Stackhouse: "Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning"
    Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2005 08:17:52 -0400
    To: Gary Halleen <ghalleen@cisco.com>, 'Drew Simonis' <simonis@myself.com>, "'Anton A. Chuvakin'" <anton@chuvakin.org>, <focus-ids@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    If you're looking to the NIDS/NIPS to actually block, this "SIM
    proxy-tuning" approach simply won't work. By the time the alarm gets to the
    SIM and propagation delay is figured in, it's far too late to block or take
    automated action.

    The real value of an inline technology is its ability to block on a
    packet/socket/flow basis. As such, said inline system must be tuned directly
    to do so accurately.

    However if automated action isn't your style and your SIM is capable of
    sustaining the volume of data an untuned NIPS/NIPS will yield, perhaps
    tuning at the SIM and ignoring the sensor itself makes sense. I like the
    idea of having all the alarm data available and filtering at the SIM layer
    rather than turning the alarm/alert off altogether at the NIPS/NIPS.

    On 6/10/05 4:17 PM, "Gary Halleen" <ghalleen@cisco.com> wrote:

    > I'm seeing many organizations now tuning not on the IDS, but on the SIM
    > product they're using for monitoring them.
    >
    > Gary
    >
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Drew Simonis [mailto:simonis@myself.com]
    > Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 6:02 AM
    > To: Anton A. Chuvakin; focus-ids@securityfocus.com
    > Subject: Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning
    >
    >>
    >> All,
    >>
    >> I was thinking about some issues with IDS alerts (their volume, etc)
    >> and realized I could use some help from the list. It might also be a
    >> fun discussion item.
    >>
    >> So, here it is: how many folks who buy/download a NIDS/NIPS actually
    >> tune it? Long time ago when I was asking this question the previous
    >> time, I was scared to learn that lots of people do not tune their
    >> NIDSs. Is it any better now?
    >>
    >
    > I know that, in my experience, many orgs don't tune at all. The fear is
    > that they might do it wrong and thereby miss some important event. IMO,
    > this is a stupid way of thinking, but I bet it isn't as rare as it should
    > be.
    >
    > In other cases, people do not tune and rely on a correlation engine or MSS
    > to filter the events. This is better, but really just moves the tuning to a
    > different level.
    >
    > Personally, I tune sigs and also tailor the sig sets to the devices being
    > monitored. For example, if there are no webservers on a segment, I might
    > not be as inclined to use sigs that check for Apache exploits. I've never
    > really measured the impact on the system vs. the administrative cost of
    > doing this, however, so it is quite possible I am wasting time for a
    > negligable benefit.
    >
    > On the tuning side, I believe that filters and exclusions should be part of
    > the incident response lifecycle. If I am alerted to an event by an IDS, I
    > investigate and discover that the event was benign or did not take place, a
    > filter should result, and thus be properly documented.
    >
    > -Ds
    >
    > --
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    > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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    > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >
    > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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    >
    > Is your IDS deployed correctly?
    > Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from
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    > Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708
    > to learn more.
    > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    >

    -- 
    Adam  Powers
    Director of Technology
    Lancope, Inc.
    c. 678.725.1028
    f. 770.225.6501
    e. apowers@lancope.com
    StealthWatch by Lancope - Security Through Network Intelligence
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    Is your IDS deployed correctly?
    Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from 
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  • Next message: Brent Stackhouse: "Re: on NIDS/NIPS tuning"

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