Re: IDS\IPS that can handle one Gig

From: Frank Knobbe (frank_at_knobbe.us)
Date: 06/07/05

  • Next message: Anton A. Chuvakin: "on NIDS/NIPS tuning"
    To: Control Zed <cntlzed@gmail.com>
    Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2005 15:59:24 -0500
    
    
    

    On Tue, 2005-06-07 at 21:06 +0530, Control Zed wrote:
    > Sometimes it may not be possible to patch critical servers simply
    > because you can't afford the downtime or you don't know if the patches
    > would break other critical applications or software.

    If downtime is important, surely there are redundancies in place. You
    should be able to take one set, patch it, verify it, and put it back in
    production, and then repeat the same with the second set. (Of course you
    have the whole thing already tested in your test environment...right?)

    Any company that does not have the capability of working on one half of
    a redundant setup, or doesn't even have a redundant setup, doesn't have
    a test-bed, still hasn't properly addressed handling critical servers or
    dealing with redundancy and downtime issues. Shops without redundant
    capabilities have other problems that need to be addressed first. After
    all, availability is an important leg of most security mantras.

    > So if you know
    > the vulnerability and the way it can be exploited, you can protect it
    > till you can find time to patch it. Nothing wrong in this approach.

    Except for "finding time".

    The risk is that people will brush applying patches aside to deal with
    other more important issues (like fixing non-redundant servers). It's
    the same thing with input validation during code development. Yeah,
    developers know about it, but they just don't have the time to properly
    implement it. I think relying on IPSes to buy time for patch
    installation will do the same thing. Why patch today when you can wait a
    month and roll up several patches at once?

    Peter and Vikram were referring to finding a balance between these VM
    and IPS. However, it is not an either-or situation. If you have an IPS
    in place, and even if you don't have any vulnerability management
    software in place, you still have to balance the patching issue.

    I'm just highlighting the danger that if you have one or both in place,
    people might become complacent with actually fixing the vulnerabilities.

    If you don't have to right away, but could patch systems at your
    leisure, would you do it?
    If you don't have to right away, but could implement input validation
    after the fact, would you do it?

    Principle and "correctness" get often compromised for $EXCUSE.

    Cheers,
    Frank

    
    



  • Next message: Anton A. Chuvakin: "on NIDS/NIPS tuning"

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