RE: Vulnerability vs. Exploit signatures and IPS??

From: Andrew Plato (andrew.plato_at_anitian.com)
Date: 05/18/05

  • Next message: Matt.Carpenter_at_alticor.com: "Re: Vulnerability vs. Exploit signatures and IPS??"
    Date: Wed, 18 May 2005 10:51:06 -0700
    To: "Jacob Winston" <jctx09@yahoo.com>, <focus-ids@securityfocus.com>
    
    

    DISCLAIMER: My firm is a Tipping Point and ISS reseller.

    Hi Jacob. I'd be happy to explain it. While it's a little marketing
    fluff, there is actually big benefits to Tipping Point's method.

    A lot of IPS/IDSs have their signatures set to fire on exploit
    fingerprints. That is, they release a signature to detect an exploit
    after the exploit is released into the wild. This is done by simply
    analyzing a packet capture of the exploit, locating some unique pattern
    in the exploit packets, and then keying on that pattern. So long as a
    packet stream has that pattern in it - the IPS fires an alert. This
    works fine, except when the next variant of the exploit comes out, it
    can typically fly right by the IPS until the vendor releases a new
    signature.

    Alternatively, you can have signatures based on vulnerability. This is
    how Tipping Point, ISS, and some others do it. For this technique, you
    analyze ALL traffic of a specific protocol. This typically requires the
    ability to perform a full protocol analysis (something ISS pioneered).
    For example, logon traffic for Windows machines. There are known
    vulnerabilities to the logon service. If you send a huge string of
    characters to the logon service, you can overflow a buffer and then
    write code into memory and execute it. This is how a whole series of
    exploits work.

    The Tipping Points have triggers to accomplish this where as ISS uses
    thresholds. If the TP sees a Windows logon request with a huge string of
    characters being sent, it deems that an attack and can (if so
    configured) block it. Since there is no logical reason to have a huge
    string of characters there, it's a very effective detection method. Only
    after it has detected the trigger will the IPS send the packet stream to
    a more in-depth analysis engine that to match the packet stream to a
    known exploit. This is typically just to correctly name the attack. The
    protection has already worked.

    The benefit of this method is that you can detect and block a whole set
    of exploits with a single signature. TP will often release new
    signatures simply so the correct name of the exploit is identified
    without having to change to original detection signature.

    The end result is that TP and ISS products tend to be better at catching
    zero-day exploits than other IPSs.

    _____________________________________
    Andrew Plato, CISSP
    President/Principal Consultant
    ANITIAN ENTERPRISE SECURITY

    3800 SW Cedar Hills Blvd, Suite 280
    Beaverton, OR 97005
    503-644-5656 Office
    503-214-8069 Fax
    503-201-0821 Mobile
    www.anitian.com
    _____________________________________

    GPG fingerprint: 16E6 C5B0 B6CB F287 776E E9A9 AF47 9914 3582 633D
    GPG public key available at: http://www.anitian.com/corp/keys.htm

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Jacob Winston [mailto:jctx09@yahoo.com]
    Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 7:58 PM
    To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com
    Subject: Vulnerability vs. Exploit signatures and IPS??

    Can someone explain to me the difference in writing signatures based on
    Vulnerabilities versus writing signatures based on Exploits?
    TippingPoint makes a claim that their IPS is better because they write
    signatures based on Vulnerabilities and not exploits. I don't quite
    understand this.

    Thank you,

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    --
    Test Your IDS
    Is your IDS deployed correctly?
    Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from
    CORE IMPACT.
    Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708
    to learn more.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    --
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Test Your IDS
    Is your IDS deployed correctly?
    Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from 
    CORE IMPACT.
    Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 
    to learn more.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    

  • Next message: Matt.Carpenter_at_alticor.com: "Re: Vulnerability vs. Exploit signatures and IPS??"

    Relevant Pages

    • Re: IDS vs. IPS deployment feedback
      ... I'd be very interested to know how you would know this, since their "signatures" are proprietary. ... ISS can protect against the ... I use both snort and TP daily. ... I suspect the folks at VRT would be highly offended by the implication that they're not professional enough to recognize vulnerabilities, but I'll let them defend themselves. ...
      (Focus-IDS)
    • Re: IDS vs. IPS deployment feedback
      ... SNORT is usually behind the curve on new signatures. ... to protect against things that Snort people don't even know about. ... Are you implying that ISS knows about zero-day vulnerabilities it hasn't ...
      (Focus-IDS)
    • RE: IDS vs. IPS deployment feedback
      ... claiming that ISS uses 1. ... asked for an example in which Snort used more signatures to provide ... agree that they handle exactly what the Snort rules are doing. ... You state that Snort uses 300 rules to cover one vulnerability while ...
      (Focus-IDS)
    • Re: How to choose an IDS/FW MSS provider
      ... "A potential hacker can read how the signatures work, ... before you ask ISS to release their codebase for their signature ... >Bu e-posta mesaji kisiye ozel olup, ... >CORE IMPACT. ...
      (Focus-IDS)
    • Re: How to choose an IDS/FW MSS provider
      ... "A potential hacker can read how the signatures work, ... before you ask ISS to release their codebase for their signature ... >Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE ... >CORE IMPACT. ...
      (Focus-IDS)