Re: Wishlist for IPS Products

From: PS R (secureyourself_at_gmail.com)
Date: 09/23/04

  • Next message: Jason: "Re: IPS, alternative solutions" 
    Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2004 10:36:27 -0400
To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com

    We have gotten off topic, but to complete the thought:
    Is it fair to assume by your last comments about working for ISS and
    panning Tipping Point that ISS' Proventia appliance would detect the
    scenario you outlined below? If so, is it blocked out of the box?
    Can someone on the list test this with a Proventia box?

    Back on topic (and soapbox)
    Is there nothing else that the IPS/IDS user community wants from
    future IPS appliances? I see this as an opportunity to really outline
    the roadmap that vendors should be taking. It is the lack of good
    input on forums like this that results in developers who aren't
    security savvy creating products that aren't what the public wants.

    Jack

    On Tue, 21 Sep 2004 15:31:52 -0400, David Maynor <dmaynor@gmail.com> wrote:
    > I work for ISS btw.
    >
    >
    >
    >
    > On Mon, 20 Sep 2004 18:49:25 -0400, David Maynor <dmaynor@gmail.com> wrote:
    > > No guess. It's a simple recipe. Take one Tipping Point box, one
    > > machine that is vulnerable to MS03-026, and a bit on coding knowledge
    > > of rpc. I chose 03-026 because due to Blaster it should at be the one
    > > exploit it could block. You then manually generate the bind request
    > > carefully making sure the RPC frag size is so small that the target
    > > guid is in two different packets. Something funny happens. You would
    > > get system access and the Tipping Point box does nothing. Nada. Zip.
    > > Zilch. While you are issuing commands like 'net user /add hacker' the
    > > Tipping Point box stays silent. I scratched my head over this till I
    > > realized that it happens because TippingPoint doesn't do protocol
    > > parsing, it's the only explanation. Hardly the behavior for an award
    > > winning IPS that writes its sigs for the vulnrebility and not the
    > > exploit….supposedly.
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > >
    > > On Thu, 16 Sep 2004 23:30:30 -0400, Tony Carter <tcarter@entrusion.com> wrote:
    > > > David,
    > > > Can you back your claim that IPS can easily be evaded by fragging
    > > > packets? Have you actually tested this or is it your guess?
    > > >
    > > > -Tony
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > On Sep 12, 2004, at 12:29 AM, David Maynor wrote:
    > > >
    > > > > Yeah....I am gonna go ahead and disagree with you on some of these.
    > > > >
    > > > >> I have seen a lot of discussion about the differences between IDS,
    > > > >> IPS, and firewalls and the potential for convergence, but I do not
    > > > >> recall a discussion on the primary features that an IPS should have
    > > > >> out of the box.
    > > > >>
    > > > >> I am thinking of:
    > > > >> - Flow Control - limitations on flooding, unused connections, etc...
    > > > >
    > > > > Most of this should be handled by the signature base.
    > > > >
    > > > >> - Robust, ACURATE signature base
    > > > >
    > > > > Only way to do this and not create tons of false postives is true
    > > > > protocol parsing. This knocks out most IPS vendors like Tipping Point.
    > > > >
    > > > >> - Packet capture - no debate on how much before, as that has been
    > > > >> covered
    > > > >> - Pre-deployment network analysis tools to accelerate deployment
    > > > >> - Anomaly detection
    > > > >
    > > > > Why? I have yet to see a system that is more than a parlor trick.
    > > > > Anomaly based system are even easier to evade than sig based systems
    > > > > that don't do protocol parsing.
    > > > >
    > > > > What I would add is better tools for testing. Almost nobody grabs a
    > > > > copy of Canvas from Immunity or Impact from Core and actually checks
    > > > > what attacks are caught. Further more an even fewer number use modded
    > > > > copies of public exploits to see if the claims made by vendors are
    > > > > actually true. How many vendor's IPS implementation would actual catch
    > > > > a MS03-026 exploit if you frag at the RPC layer at a size like 8
    > > > > bytes?
    > > > >
    > > > > -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    > > > > ---
    > > > > Test Your IDS
    > > > >
    > > > > Is your IDS deployed correctly?
    > > > > Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from
    > > > > CORE IMPACT.
    > > > > Go to
    > > > > http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to
    > > > > learn more.
    > > > > -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    > > > > ---
    > > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > >
    >

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