RE: IPS, alternative solutions
From: Cure, Samuel J (scure_at_kpmg.com)
Date: 09/17/04
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To: "'Palmer, Paul (ISSAtlanta)'" <PPalmer@iss.net>, Jason <security@brvenik.com>, Scott Wimer <scottw@cylant.com> Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2004 15:14:00 -0500
I agree with Paul that IPS is not a solution to replace existing patch
management solutions. In fact, I would not even rely on it to "buy time"
until a consolidated update is ready (such as quarterly). There are too many
opportunities for exposure while waiting for the consolidated update even
WITH IPS installed. There are many encoders available these days that allow
for the most commonly detected exploits to be concealed over the wire and
bypass IDS/IPS systems.
I do agree however with the resource requirements necessary for testing and
rolling out each patch or hotfix.
Scott, to answer your question on cost effective, perhaps IPS will more than
likely be less expensive than the resources required to test and update
patches.
There are many factors to consider during this evaluation as well such as
-standard builds and services that are not needed.
-several patch management systems are available today that are starting to
take away from the argument of patch test resources being unavailable
-IPS technology is being developed that provide more holistic analysis to
detect anomalies for zero day and newer exploits. These may have ability to
verify encoded exploit packets as well.
Just my thoughts,
Scure
-----Original Message-----
From: Palmer, Paul (ISSAtlanta) [mailto:PPalmer@iss.net]
Sent: Friday, September 17, 2004 10:36 AM
To: Jason; Scott Wimer
Cc: Daniel; focus-ids@securityfocus.com
Subject: RE: IPS, alternative solutions
Jason,
The ROI in a medium+ organization does not come from using IPS as a
patch replacement system. The IPS lets the organization schedule the
patches at its convenience instead of the de facto schedule implied by
the release of the patch. That is, without something like an IPS in
place, the organization needs to apply patches as quickly as possible to
maintain their security posture. This is problematic for many reasons.
However, there are two common, major ones. First, it can take months
(even longer) to deploy a patch to all levels of an organization. During
this time the organization remains vulnerable. Second, it is difficult
to manage multiple overlapping patch and/or frequent patch processes.
The IPS allows them to delay patch installation until it is convenient
and this is where the ROI materializes. The IPS protects the
organization until it can deploy the patch everywhere. The ROI here is
obvious when a worm hits before you can complete the patch installation.
It turns out that the cost to install a dozen patches at once (even from
multiple vendors) is not much more than the cost to install one critical
patch. So an organization that can defer all patch installation to the
beginning of each quarter for example can reap huge dividends over the
cost of rolling out each patch individually. They only need to test one
set of changes prior to applying them (instead of several per quarter).
In addition, the number of different configurations present in the
organization at any moment is reduced, thereby lowering support costs.
Paul
-----Original Message-----
From: Jason [mailto:security@brvenik.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 3:47 PM
To: Scott Wimer
Cc: Daniel; focus-ids@securityfocus.com
Subject: Re: IPS, alternative solutions
I've heard of no medium+ sized business that is considering deploying
inline technology on the internals of the network in a sufficiently
pervasive manner that there would be any measurable benefit from the
technology over patching and asset management.
I would be seriously interested in an ROI that can demonstrate savings.
The simple question is how is inline packet scrubbing easier and more
cost effective than patching?
Scott Wimer wrote:
> Daniel,
>
> I agree with your assessment. What I have encountered in the
> financial sector though is a desire to have the packets "scrubbed"
> before they reach the servers. People _want_ to deploy network based
> IPS tools because it is easier and more cost effective. That it
> doesn't seem to be possible yet is another story altogether.
>
> Regards, Scott Wimer
>
> On Tue, 2004-09-14 at 06:01, Daniel wrote:
>
>> So far there has been a load of talk discussing which is the better
>> technology. Personally i dont think IPS is ready for the big time.
>> Yeah its great for small mum and dad networks, but for large
>> financial networks with billions of pounds flowing across them, would
>> you trust a technology to think and block what it seems as bad
>> traffic?
>>
>> So what are the alternatives? I'd say more host based protection such
>> as:
>>
>> - Stack protection - Application level firewalls
>> (ModSecurity/SecureIIS) - Host based firewalls
>>
>> I'm interested to see what everyone else feels are alternatives to
>> IPS
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> -----
>> Test Your IDS
>>
>> Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by
>> testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to
>> http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708
>> to learn more.
>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ***************************************************************************** The information in this email is confidential and may be legally privileged. It is intended solely for the addressee. Access to this email by anyone else is unauthorized. If you are not the intended recipient, any disclosure, copying, distribution or any action taken or omitted to be taken in reliance on it, is prohibited and may be unlawful. When addressed to our clients any opinions or advice contained in this email are subject to the terms and conditions expressed in the governing KPMG client engagement letter. ***************************************************************************** -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CoreSecurity_focus-ids_040708 to learn more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Previous message: Volker Kindermann: "Re: Linux SuSe host base IDS."
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