Re: Firewall vs. IPS - Differences now (ISS, Intrushield 2.1?)

From: nick black (dank_at_qemfd.net)
Date: 08/31/04

  • Next message: Martin Roesch: "Re: session logging IDS"
    To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com
    Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:07:50 +0000 (UTC)
    
    

    On 2004-08-30, Mike Frantzen <frantzen@nfr.com> wrote:
    > This is going to be an extremely controversial answer that the security
    > purists probably will not like. But they're fun to piss off so here goes.

    Hehhehe, while my job at Reflex is leading our IPS development, my
    research at the GTISC is a bit more pure -- I hope my somewhat
    theoretically-minded answer earlier didn't paint me an ivory
    towerist :D. Regarding your well thought-out comments:

    > The real benefit of a full fledged TCP state machine is knowing when to
    > expire an idle connection. If we expire a connection too early, then
    > the next packet that comes in on it will appear to be a new connection
    > and several things may happen:

    You list several problems with timing out sessions too early, but none
    with timing them out too late. For the sake of argument, what problems
    do you see with simply idling out via necessities of LRU applied to a
    fixed-size flow cache (obviously, sessions could still be closed based
    on 4-way TCP teardown, RST abortion or SYN/OOW xmit, modulo the guesswork
    typically involved in such)? A much less intensive state machine can be
    developed in this case, if one's merely concerned with the problems
    you've raised (I noted several other benefits from a detection
    standpoint in my earlier answer).

    > 3) you lose the TCP window scale value
    > 4) the connection will break if you only allow state creation on a SYN
    > 5) any sequence number modulation will break the connection
    > 6) any TCP timestamp modulation will probably break the connection

    Are these not issues arising from the use of a half-hearted attempt at
    TCP tracking, as opposed to a lack thereof in toto?

    -- 
    nick black                  "np:  the class of dashed hopes and idle dreams."
    

  • Next message: Martin Roesch: "Re: session logging IDS"

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