RE: ssh and ids
From: Koç.net (melihk_at_koc.net)
Date: 06/22/04
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Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2004 09:06:27 +0300 To: "Adam Powers" <apowers@lancope.com>, <focus-ids@securityfocus.com>
NAI Intrushield 2.1 version is capable of detecting and analysing encrypted data packets.
İ have not tested that yet but saw that in their white paper.
İt will be released officially soon i guess
-----Original Message-----
From: Adam Powers [mailto:apowers@lancope.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 19, 2004 7:29 AM
To: focus-ids@securityfocus.com
Cc: Runion Mark A FGA DOIM WEBMASTER(ctr)
Subject: Re: ssh and ids
There is really no one full-proof answer to this question (that I'm aware of). Encryption remains the bane of network-based intrusion detection technologies.
At the risk of speaking on behalf of such flow-based vendors as Arbor, Mazu, Q1, and (yes, my personal favorite) Lancope, I think some of the new behavioral traffic analysis technologies go a long way toward solving some of the problems presented by encryption technologies.
<light details>
By observing the duration of a "flow" (read: a TCP socket or series of related sockets) and the manner in which packets are exchanged over a "long duration" flow, a behavior-based system can pinpoint those connections that seem to be "out of the norm". During the baselining period, a behavior driven system observes connections attributes such as "duration" and "relative connectedness" to gain an understanding of the nature of the flows being created by a given network node. The flow-based, behavior-driven system should have the ability to discern between a AES gotomypc.com connection over TCP 443 and an automatic refresh connection to www.weather.com. The determination that "covert communications" are underway is done not through string matching or protocol anomaly but rather through the analysis of the flow attributes themselves (duration, packets sent/rcvd, pkt size, etc). Bottoms line: the magic is in the algorithms used to examine header traffic. Header traffic is not encrypted. </light details>
The #1 defining attribute of flow-analysis techniques is that they typically DO NOT require use of payload data to determine the presence of an attack.
As previously mentioned, there is no fool-proof plan... Flow-based technologies can be tricked... It just requires a much different science than that used by snot, sidestep, or encrypted shell shoveling.
- AP
On 6/18/04 2:18 PM, "Runion Mark A FGA DOIM WEBMASTER(ctr)" <mark.runion@us.army.mil> wrote:
> Lets suppose the attacker is mildly sophisticated, and after making
> the initial assault roots the box and installs a secure backdoor or
> two. Is there any IDS capable of isolating data it cannot read,
> except to monitor authorized port usage of a system or group of
> systems? Not to complicate the question, but when the attacker is
> using portal gates and all communications traffic is encrypted in
> normal channels how can an IDS participate? Monitoring normal traffic
> patterns seems a bit slow for detection.
>
> -
> Mark Runion
>
>
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- Previous message: Aaron Jordan: "Re: Anomaly Based Network IDS"
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